Military Wiki
United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia
Established 31 March 1995
Type Peacekeeping mission
Legal status Completed on 15 January 1996

The United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, commonly abbreviated to UNCRO, is a completed United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission in Croatia. It was established under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and approved by the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 981 on 31 March 1995. UNCRO inherited United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) personnel and infrastructure. Its command was located in Zagreb while the peacekeeping troops were deployed in four sectors named North, South, East and West. Twenty different countries contributed troops to the mission.

UNCRO started with more than 15,000 troops taken over from UNPROFOR, but it was gradually reduced to approximately 7,000 by the end of the mission in early 1996. South Korean diplomat Byung Suk Min was the civilian head of the mission, while the military commanders of UNCRO were Generals Raymond Crabbe and Eid Kamal Al-Rodan. UNCRO was interlinked with UNPROFOR, which remained active under that title in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) deployed in the Republic of Macedonia. The mission was terminated on 15 January 1996 on the basis of UNSC Resolution 1025 of 30 November 1995. 16 UNCRO troops were killed, including four during Operation Storm in August 1995.

UNCRO was tasked with supporting implementation of the March 1994 ceasefire in the Croatian War of Independence, an agreement on economic cooperation between Croatia and the self-declared Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK), monitoring of areas between their armies, maintenance of 25 checkpoints along Croatian international borders in between RSK-held territory on one side and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or Bosnia and Herzegovina on the other, monitoring of the demilitarized Prevlaka Peninsula, liaison functions, and delivery of humanitarian aid. UNCRO was criticized because it did not apply the lessons learned during the UNPROFOR mission in Croatia. These included the need for sufficient troops and adequate resources to carry out the mission. As a result, fulfillment of the mission mandate proved nearly impossible.


United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia is located in Croatia
Croatia Occupied Areas 30 April 1995 Sectors.svg
Nova Gradiška
Banja Luka
Croatian controlled
Serb controlled
Bosniak controlled
UNCRO Sectors in Croatia:   North   South   West   East

In 1990, following the electoral defeat of the Communist regime in Croatia, ethnic tensions worsened. After the elections, the Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslovenska narodna armija - JNA) confiscated the weapons of Croatia's Territorial Defence (Teritorijalna obrana - TO) to minimize any resistance.[1] On 17 August 1990, the tensions escalated to an open revolt of the Croatian Serbs,[2] centered on the predominantly Serb-populated areas of the Dalmatian hinterland around Knin,[3] parts of the Lika, Kordun, Banovina and eastern Croatia regions.[4] The Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK), later established in those areas, declared its intention of integration with Serbia, and was viewed by the Government of Croatia as a breakaway region.[5] The JNA stepped in and prevented Croatian police from intervening.[2] By March 1991, the conflict had escalated into the Croatian War of Independence.[6] In June, Croatia declared independence as Yugoslavia disintegrated,[7] but implementation of the decision was postponed by a three-month moratorium,[8] eventually taking effect on 8 October.[9] A campaign of ethnic cleansing then began in the RSK, and most non-Serbs had been expelled by early 1993.[10][11]

As the JNA increasingly supported the RSK, the Croatian police could not cope with the situation. In May 1991 the Croatian National Guard (Zbor narodne garde - ZNG) was formed as the military of Croatia,[12] and was renamed the Croatian Army (Hrvatska vojska - HV) in November.[12] Late 1991 saw the fiercest fighting of the war, culminating in the Battle of the Barracks,[13] the Siege of Dubrovnik,[14] and the Battle of Vukovar.[15] In January 1992, a ceasefire agreement to implement the Vance plan was signed by representatives of Croatia, the JNA and the UN, and fighting paused.[16] The Vance plan was designed to stop hostilities in Croatia, allow negotiations by neutralizing any influence caused by fighting, and offered no political solutions in advance. The plan entailed deployment of the 10,000-strong United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to the major conflict areas known as "UN Protected Areas" (UNPAs).[17] UNPROFOR was tasked with creating a buffer between the belligerents, disarming Croatian Serb elements of the TO, and overseeing JNA and HV withdrawal from the UNPAs and return of refugees to the area.[17] United Nations Security Council Resolution 743 of 21 February described the legal basis of the UN mission that had been requested and agreed upon in November 1991, and made no explicit reference to Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.[18]

Because of organizational problems and breaches of the ceasefire agreement, UNPROFOR did not start to deploy until 8 March,[18] and took two months to fully deploy in the UNPAs. Even though UNPROFOR had placed most heavy weapons of the Army of the Republic of Serb Krajina (ARSK) in storage controlled jointly by the UN and the RSK by January 1993,[19] the force was unable to fulfil the provisions of the Vance plan, including the disarmament of the ARSK, return of refugees, restoration of civilian authority, and establishment of an ethnically mixed police.[20] It also failed to remove ARSK forces from areas outside the designated UNPAs which were under ARSK control at the time of signing of the ceasefire. Those areas, later known as the pink zones,[19] were supposed to be restored to Croatian control from the outset.[21] Failure to implement this aspect of the Vance plan made the pink zones a major source of contention between Croatia and the RSK.[22] In 1993, worried that the situation on the ground might become permanent, Croatia launched several small-scale military offensives against the RSK to seize significant local objectives and attract international attention. In response, the ARSK retrieved their weapons from the UN/RSK controlled storage sites, reversing the only major success of UNPROFOR in Croatia.[19]

Transition from UNPROFOR

The UNPROFOR mandate was extended several times, in increments of up to six months, with consent of the government of Croatia.[21] That changed in early 1995, when Croatian President Franjo Tuđman wrote to the Secretary-General of the United Nations informing him that Croatia would not accept further extensions of the mission once it expired on 31 March, asking that UNPROFOR leave Croatia by the end of June.[23] At the time, it was established UN practice to seek consent of the country where its peacekeepers were deployed, and the letter effectively required UNPROFOR to withdraw completely from Croatia.[24] Such action would also require abolishment of the UNPAs, which had been identified as integral parts of Croatia by United Nations Security Council Resolution 815 of 30 March 1993.[25] Two days later, the Secretary-General reported to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that UNPROFOR was unable to implement important elements of the Vance plan, enforce a ceasefire or protect its own vehicles against hijackings in the UNPAs.[26]

On 31 January, US ambassador Peter Galbraith unsuccessfully tried to persuade Tuđman's aide Hrvoje Šarinić to accept another extension of the UNPROFOR mandate, explaining that the conflict would inevitably escalate once the UN force withdrew.[26] This rebuff was followed by harsh French and UK diplomatic responses calling on the UN to ignore the Croatian decision, which resulted in Tuđman dismissing any extension of the mandate.[24] The US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Richard Holbrooke met Tuđman and suggested to him that if UNPROFOR was permitted to stay, Croatia could count on integration into the European Union and NATO. As a way out of the diplomatic row, Holbrooke proposed that UNPROFOR be replaced by a new mission using the same personnel and organizational structure.[27] Following Croatian agreement, the UNSC adopted Resolution 981 establishing the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), replacing UNPROFOR in the country.[28] The new mission's name was devised by Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Shashi Tharoor.[29]


Mandate and functions

The UNCRO mission was established under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It was initially scheduled to end on 30 November 1995, and its mandate was to support implementation of a ceasefire arranged between Croatia and the RSK that had been concluded on 29 March 1994, as well as an agreement on economic cooperation made on 2 December 1994.[30] The former entailed monitoring areas between HV and ARSK forward positions, verification that specific types of heavy weapons were at least 10 or 20 kilometres (6.2 or 12.4 miles) away from the forward military positions or placed in storage, maintenance of checkpoints, chairing Joint Commissions, and performance of liaison functions. The economic agreement-related functions were facilitating and supporting activities aimed at opening of transport routes, power and water supply networks, and supporting negotiation and implementation of further economic arrangements.[31]

UNCRO was also tasked with delivery of humanitarian aid and control, monitoring and reporting of any transport of military personnel, supplies, equipment or weapons across border checkpoints manned by the force—between RSK-held parts of Croatia on one side and Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the other.[30] There were 25 border checkpoints manned by the force.[32] The mandate also directed UNCRO to monitor demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula at the entrance to the Bay of Kotor, according to the UNSC Resolution 779.[30] Deployment of UNCRO was formally approved by the UNSC on 28 April.[33] The mission was scheduled to be scaled down to 8,750 troops from the larger UNPROFOR force in the country in June.[32][34]

UNCRO was criticized for several reasons. The Secretary-General's Report to the Council described the failures of UNPROFOR, but the new mission did not address them. There were insufficient troops, having been reduced from UNPROFOR levels by the new mission mandate, and adequate human and material resources to carry out the mission tasks were not forthcoming. As a result, fulfilment of the mission mandate was nearly impossible.[35] While Croatian sources said that the mission name was the only real difference from UNPROFOR, the RSK authorities were not satisfied with the UNCRO mission. Specifically, RSK objected to the deployment of UNCRO troops along the international borders and to the mission name.[36] Conversely, Croats were content that the mission acronym appeared to be an abbreviation of Croatia.[29] In response, Czech UNCRO troops used vehicle licence plates bearing the new mission's acronym when operating in HV-controlled territory and UNPROFOR plates in areas held by the ARSK due to safety concerns.[37]

UNSC resolutions relevant to UNCRO
UNSC Resolution Date Notes
981 31 March 1995 Establishment of UNCRO[30]
990 28 April 1995 Deployment of UNCRO[33]
994 17 May 1995 Implementation of UNCRO mission following Operation Flash[38]
1025 30 November 1995 Termination of UNCRO[39]

Order of battle

UNCRO was commanded from UN Peace Force Headquarters (UNPF-HQ) established in Zagreb. UNPF-HQ controlled UNCRO, the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the Republic of Macedonia, and UNPROFOR—which was confined to Bosnia and Herzegovina from late March.[35] The UNPF-HQ commander was French Lieutenant General Bernard Janvier.[40] In July, South Korean diplomat Byung Suk Min was appointed as head of UNCRO,[41] with Major General Eid Kamal Al-Rodan of the Royal Jordanian Army as the mission's military commander.[42] Before Al-Rodan, the post was held by Canadian Lieutenant General Raymond Crabbe.[43] UNCRO was initially deployed to the same parts of Croatia as UNPROFOR, however contemporary UNSC documents no longer referred to them as UNPAs—applying the designations of Sector East, West, North and South, or "areas under the control of the local Serb authorities" instead.[30][38][39][44][45] One group of sources refers to the areas of UNCRO deployment as UNPAs,[46] another reflects the UNSC practice and omits the acronym,[47] while others refer to the areas as former UNPAs.[35]

Troops from Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, Ukraine and the United States contributed to the mission. When UNCRO replaced UNPROFOR in Croatia in March 1995, there were 15,229 UN troops—including UNPF-HQ personnel—in Croatia. By mid-November the mission had been scaled down to 7,041 personnel, including 164 UN Military Observers and 296 UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) personnel.[48][49]

Response to Croatian offensives

On 1 May in Operation Flash, the HV overran the ARSK-held part of Sector West. Šarinić warned Crabbe of the attack hours in advance to allow UNCRO troops to seek shelter.[43] The RSK authorities said that some ARSK units were not able to remove antitank weapons from UNCRO depots in Stara Gradiška and near Pakrac until after the offensive began. These weapons had been stored there pursuant to the March 1994 ceasefire agreement.[58] Nonetheless, UNCRO did not stop ARSK troops from retrieving the weapons.[59] During the fighting, ARSK troops took 15 UNCIVPOL members, two interpreters and 89 Nepalese and Argentinian troops hostage to use as human shields against the HV. HV troops hijacked an UNCRO armoured personnel carrier and Land Rover to precede HV tanks that were moving west along the A3 motorway.[60] On 3 May, the Argentinian battalion of UNCRO facilitated the surrender of 600 ARSK troops near Pakrac, following an agreement reached between Croatia and the RSK which was mediated by the personal representative of the UN Secretary-General Yasushi Akashi.[61] Three Jordanian UNCRO troops were wounded by HV fire.[54] The offensive made clear that the deployment of UNCRO would not deter further Croatian offensives.[62]

On 4 August, the HV initiated Operation Storm, which was aimed at recapturing Sectors North and South—encompassing the bulk of the RSK.[63] UNCRO was notified three hours in advance of the attack after Šarinić telephoned Janvier. In addition, each HV corps notified the UNCRO sector in the path of its planned advance, and requested written confirmation that the information had been received. UNCRO relayed the information to the RSK authorities.[64] Two days later, UNCRO was requested to protect 35,000 Serb civilians accompanying the ARSK as it retreated towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were trapped near Topusko when HV troops captured Glina, closing the last road available to them.[65] The UNCRO Ukrainian battalion base was used as a venue for negotiations for the surrender of the trapped ARSK Kordun Corps, which were conducted in the presence of UNCRO officers.[66] The commander of UNCRO Sector North signed the surrender agreement as a witness.[67] This offensive also involved actions against UN peacekeepers; the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which supported the offensive from the Bihać pocket, attacked UNCRO observation posts manned by Polish troops, while HV troops used several Danish peacekeepers as human shields.[68] During the offensive, ARSK detained five Sector East headquarters staff, several UNCRO vehicles were hijacked and UN personnel were harassed. Four UN peacekeepers were killed in the offensive—three as a result of HV actions and one as a result of ARSK fire—and 16 were injured. HV troops also destroyed 98 UN observation posts.[69]

Following the two offensives and negotiations led by Akashi, UNCRO continued to supervise the ceasefire in Sector East.[69] The role of UNCRO in Sectors North and South was limited to post-conflict peace-building following an agreement between Croatian authorities and Akashi.[70] By November 1995, UNCRO had withdrawn to Sector East.[71] Even though the UN had planned to reduce UNCRO to 4,190 troops by the end of September and approximately 2,500 by October,[72] the mission strength remained at more than 7,000 troops until November.[48]

Termination and aftermath

The UNCRO mission was ended by UNSC Resolution 1025 of 30 November 1995. The resolution was passed in the wake of the Erdut Agreement between Croatia and representatives of Serbs in Sector East. It defined mechanisms for peaceful restoration of the region to Croatian control and established an interim period ending on 15 January 1996, when authority was to be transferred from UNCRO to a new transitional force to be deployed to the area.[39] When the interim period expired, the UNSC adopted resolutions 1037 and 1038, which established the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium in the former Sector East and the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka. Commencement of the two new missions coincided with arrival of NATO to Bosnia and Herzegovina to enforce the Dayton Accords.[73]

16 UNCRO personnel dies during the mission; three Kenyan soldiers were killed, the Czech, Danish, French and Russian battalions lost two each, and the Argentina, Belgium, Jordan, Poland and Ukraine contingents each lost one.[74] Four of the UNCRO peacekeepers were killed during major combat in the mission area.[69]

The United Nations Medal was awarded to troops that served with UNCRO for 90 consecutive days.[75] The medal was issued suspended from a 35 millimetres (1.4 inches) wide ribbon with a 9-millimetre (0.35 in) red stripe with a white border on a blue background, flanked by 6-millimetre (0.24 in) stripes—olive green on the left and brown on the right—set 3 millimetres (0.12 inches) apart from the white border.[76]


  1. Hoare 2010, p. 117
  2. 2.0 2.1 Hoare 2010, p. 118
  3. The New York Times 19 August 1990
  4. ICTY 12 June 2007
  5. The New York Times 2 April 1991
  6. The New York Times 3 March 1991
  7. The New York Times 26 June 1991
  8. The New York Times 29 June 1991
  9. Narodne novine 8 October 1991
  10. Department of State 31 January 1994
  11. ECOSOC 17 November 1993, Section J, points 147 & 150
  12. 12.0 12.1 EECIS 1999, pp. 272–278
  13. The New York Times 24 September 1991
  14. Bjelajac & Žunec 2009, pp. 249–250
  15. The New York Times 18 November 1991
  16. The New York Times 3 January 1992
  17. 17.0 17.1 CIA 2002, p. 106
  18. 18.0 18.1 Trbovich 2008, p. 300
  19. 19.0 19.1 19.2 CIA 2002, p. 107
  20. Denitch 1996, p. 5
  21. 21.0 21.1 UN September 1996
  22. Nambiar 2001, p. 172
  23. Ahrens 2007, p. 166
  24. 24.0 24.1 Seldowitz 2004, p. 56
  25. UNSC 30 March 1993
  26. 26.0 26.1 Ahrens 2007, p. 167
  27. Seldowitz 2004, pp. 56–57
  28. Ahrens 2007, pp. 167–168
  29. 29.0 29.1 Gharekhan 2006, p. 166
  30. 30.0 30.1 30.2 30.3 30.4 UNSC 31 March 1995
  31. UNSC 18 April 1995, pp. 3–4
  32. 32.0 32.1 GAO 1995, Chapter II:2
  33. 33.0 33.1 UNSC 28 April 1995
  34. UNSC 18 April 1995, p. 9
  35. 35.0 35.1 35.2 Ahrens 2007, p. 168
  36. Miškulin 2012, p. 73
  37. Miškulin 2012, p. 74
  38. 38.0 38.1 UNSC 17 May 1995
  39. 39.0 39.1 39.2 UNSC 30 November 1995
  40. UNSC 18 April 1995, p. 1
  41. AP 3 July 1995
  42. UNSC 23 November 1995, p. 1
  43. 43.0 43.1 Ramet 2006, pp. 455–456
  44. UNSC 1 May 1995
  45. UNSC 4 May 1995
  46. Daniel & Hayes 1999, p. 51
  47. Ramet 2006, p. 456
  48. 48.0 48.1 48.2 UNSC 23 November 1995, pp. 13–14
  49. 49.0 49.1 GAO 1995, Appendix II
  50. Klemenčić & Schofield 2001, p. 38
  51. CF 28 November 2008
  52. CZ MoD
  53. Kenya UN Mission
  54. 54.0 54.1 54.2 HRW 1 July 1995
  55. GPO 2003, p. 21
  56. US DoD 7 February 1996
  57. AP 31 July 1995
  58. Brigović 2009, pp. 46–47
  59. Brigović 2009, p. 65
  60. O'Shea 2005, p. 183
  61. Brigović 2009, p. 60
  62. Gharekhan 2006, p. 167
  63. CIA 2002, p. 370
  64. Marijan 2007, p. 129
  65. Marijan 2007, p. 111
  66. Marijan 2007, pp. 112
  67. Marijan 2007, pp. 113
  68. O'Shea 2005, p. 198
  69. 69.0 69.1 69.2 UNSC 23 August 1995, p. 2
  70. Klemenčić & Schofield 2001, p. 37
  71. UNCRO
  72. UNSC 29 September 1995
  73. Paris 2004, p. 108
  74. UN 31 December 2012
  75. NZDF 27 November 2012
  76. McCreery 2005, p. 279


News reports
Other sources

This page uses Creative Commons Licensed content from Wikipedia (view authors).