|USS Panay incident|
|Part of the Second Sino-Japanese War|
USS Panay sinking after Japanese air attack. Nanking, China. 12 December 1937.
|Commanders and leaders|
|1 gunboat||12 aircraft|
|Casualties and losses|
1 gunboat sunk|
|Civilian casualties: 5 wounded|
The USS Panay incident was a Japanese attack on the American gunboat Panay while she was anchored in the Yangtze River outside Nanking (now known as Nanjing), China on 12 December 1937. Japan and the United States were not at war at the time. The Japanese claimed that they did not see the American flags painted on the deck of the gunboat, apologized, and paid an indemnity. Nevertheless, the attack and the subsequent Allison incident in Nanking caused U.S. opinion to turn against the Japanese. Fon Huffman, the last survivor of the incident, died in 2008.
A flat-bottomed craft built in Shanghai specifically for river duty, Panay served as part of the U.S. Navy's Yangtze Patrol in the Asiatic Fleet, which was responsible for patrolling the Yangtze River to protect American lives and property in China.
After invading China in the summer of 1937, Japanese forces moved in on the city of Nanking (now known as Nanjing) in December. Panay evacuated the remaining Americans from the city on 11 December, bringing the number of people aboard to five officers, 54 enlisted men, four U.S. embassy staff, and 10 civilians.
On the morning of the 12th, the Japanese air forces received information that fleeing Chinese forces were in the area in 10 large steamers and a large number of junks and that they were at a point about 12 and 25 mi (19 and 40 km) upstream from Nanking. While anchored upstream from Nanking, Panay and three Standard Oil tankers, Mei Ping, Mei An and Mei Hsia, came under attack from Japanese naval aircraft. Panay was hit by two of the eighteen 132 lb (60 kg) bombs dropped by three Yokosuka B4Y Type-96 bombers and strafed by nine Nakajima A4N Type-95 fighters. Panay sank; three men were killed, and 43 sailors and five civilians were wounded. The three Standard Oil tankers were also bombed and destroyed, and the captain of Mei An and many Chinese civilian passengers were killed. The vessels had been helping to evacuate the families of Standard Oil's employees and agents from Nanking during the Japanese attack on that city.
Two newsreel cameramen were aboard during the attack (Norman Alley of Universal News and Eric Mayell of Movietone News); they were able to film part of the attack and, after reaching shore, the sinking of the ship in the middle of the river. Survivors were later taken aboard the American vessel Oahu and the British gunboats HMS Ladybird and Bee. Earlier the same day, a Japanese shore battery had fired on Ladybird.
The aftermath of the Panay sinking was a nervous time for the American ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew. Grew, whose experience in the foreign service spanned over 30 years, "remembered the Maine," the U.S. Navy ship that blew up in Havana Harbor in 1898. The sinking of Maine had propelled the U.S. into the Spanish-American War, and Grew hoped the sinking of Panay would not be a similar catalyst for the severance of diplomatic ties and war with Japan.
The Japanese government took full responsibility for sinking Panay, but continued to maintain that the attack had been unintentional. Chief of Staff of Japanese naval forces in northern China, Vice Admiral Rokuzo Sugiyama, was assigned to make an apology. The formal apology reached Washington, D.C. on Christmas Eve.
Although Japanese officials maintained that their pilots never saw any American flags on Panay, a U.S. Navy court of inquiry determined that several U.S. flags were clearly visible on the vessel during the attacks. At the meeting held at the American embassy in Tokyo on 23 December, Japanese officials maintained that one navy airplane had attacked a boat by machine gun for a short period of time and that Japanese army motor boats or launches attack the Chinese steamers escaping upstream on the opposite bank. But the Japanese navy insisted that the attack had been unintentional. The Japanese government paid an indemnity of $2,214,007.36 to the U.S. on 22 April 1938, officially settling the Panay incident.
But U.S. Navy cryptographers had intercepted and decrypted traffic relating to the attacking planes which clearly indicated that they were under orders during the attack, and that it had not been a mistake of any kind — thus suggesting that it was the type of unauthorized action known by the classical Japanese term Gekokujō. This was not released for the obvious secrecy reasons.
Immediately after the Panay bombing, a lesser known aspect of the story started to unfold. In the days following the Panay incident, Japanese citizens began sending letters and cards of sympathy to the American embassy in Tokyo. Ambassador Grew wrote that "never before has the fact that there are 'two Japans' been more clearly emphasized. Ever since the first news of the Panay disaster came, we have been deluged by delegations, visitors, letters, and contributions of money – people from all walks of life, from high officials, doctors, professors, businessmen down to school children, trying to express their shame, apologies, and regrets for the action of their own Navy." In addition, "highly placed women, the wives of officials, have called on Alice [Grew's wife] without the knowledge of their husbands." The ambassador noted, "that side of the incident, at least, is profoundly touching and shows that at heart the Japanese are still a chivalrous people." These signs of sympathy were expressed as the ambassador was receiving word of possible atrocities being committed by Japanese forces in China.
While most letters of sympathy were sent to the embassy in Tokyo, a few were sent to the Navy Department in Washington, D.C. One noteworthy group of letters received by the navy was from thirty-seven Japanese girls attending St. Margaret's School in Tokyo. The letters, each written in English and dated 24 December 1937, extended their apologies for the sinking of the Panay. By coincidence, the girls' letters are dated the same day the Japanese government's formal apology reached Washington. The letters are very similar in content. The typical letter reads, "Dear Friend! This is a short letter, but we want to tell you how sorry we are for the mistake our airplane[s] made. We want you to forgive us I am little and do not understand very well, but I know they did not mean it. I feel so sorry for those who were hurt and killed. I am studying here at St. Margarets school which was built by many American friends. I am studying English. But I am only thirteen and cannot write very well. All my school-mates are sorry like myself and wish you to forgive our country. To-morrow is X-Mas, May it be merry, I hope the time will come when everybody can be friends. I wish you a Happy New Year. Good-bye."
Some of the girls enclosed postcards of beautiful Japanese places and scenes, while others sent Christmas cards and holiday wishes. One girl included a drawing of a Christmas candle burning bright with holly at the bottom. Several of the girls included their ages, which ranged from around eight to thirteen. Many of the letters are written on intricately decorated stationery. Each envelope bears the identical address: "To the Family of the 'Paney' [sic] C/O U.S.A. Navy Department, Washington, DC U.S.A." While each letter seems to be penned individually, the envelopes appear to have been addressed by the same person, possibly their teacher.
Three months later, a naval officer sent a reply to the principal of St. Margaret's School, thanking the girls for the cards and letters. The officer noted, "The kind thoughts of the little girls are appreciated, and it is requested that you inform them of this acknowledgement." Although the girls' letters were addressed to the families of the Panay victims, it does not appear that they made it any further than the Navy Department.
Other letters from Japanese individuals and organizations contained gifts of money along with expressions of regret. These donations caused a problem for the Navy Department. One letter from ten Japanese men expressed their sympathy over the Panay incident and included a check for $87.19. The men claimed to be retired U.S. Navy sailors living in Yokohama, and the letter, written by Kankichi Hashimoto, stated that "this little monetary gift is the instrument through which we hope to be able to further convey our sympathy with the bereaved families of the members of the Panay." The navy returned the check but informed the gentlemen that the U.S. ambassador in Tokyo had received a number of similar letters and gifts and that a committee was being formed in Japan to accept such donations. The donors were almost back to square one. They had originally approached the American consulate in Yokohama to donate three hundred yen. The consular staff said that they could not accept the contribution and suggested donating the money to the Japanese government. The former sailors turned down this suggestion and chose instead to send their donation to the Navy Department in Washington.
After being turned down by the navy, Hashimoto approached the U.S. naval attaché at the American embassy in Tokyo with a check for 300 yen. The attaché—Capt. Harold Bemis—informed Ambassador Grew that a Mr. K. Hashimoto had brought in a contribution from the Ex-U.S. Navy Enlisted Men's Association of Yokohama. Bemis further told the ambassador that Hashimoto requested that the names of the former sailors be withheld from the Japanese authorities and public. The donor feared that his group's motives might be misconstrued because of their connection with the U.S. Navy but had no objection to their names being published in the U.S.
Letters and cards of sympathy and apology continued to pour into the American embassy in Tokyo. Meanwhile, the increasing number of donations from several sources had the State Department scrambling to come up with a policy on how to handle the monetary gifts. Four days after Panay's sinking, Grew sent a telegram to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, presenting the problem and requesting advice. With cash donations coming into the embassy by mail and in person, the contributions were creating what the ambassador described as "a delicate problem". As Grew explained to Hull, "Cash donations to Americans in the disaster are being brought in or sent to the embassy and we hear that the newspapers and various Government departments are receiving donations for transmission to us." While the ambassador attempted to turn away many of the donors, he explained to the secretary of state, "On the other hand the donations are all of trivial amounts so that sentiment is chiefly involved in the problem and to return the donations might give rise to a misunderstanding of our attitude."
Grew was concerned that accepting any money from the Japanese people might interfere with the official indemnity the Japanese government had already agreed to pay. Expressing his concern to Hull, he wrote, "We realize that the acceptance of the donations for the purpose for which they are offered might prejudice the principle of indemnification for which the Japanese Government has assumed liability." The ambassador was in a difficult position: accepting the money posed one set of problems, while refusing the contributions posed another. Grew did not wish to offend the contributors, explaining that "logical grounds for refusal are difficult to explain to people who know of no other way to express their regrets over the disaster." One suggestion offered in Grew's telegram was to accept the donations and give the money to the American Red Cross for relieving Americans in China. The ambassador ended the telegram by requesting the State Department's guidance on the matter as soon as possible.
The Navy Department also dispatched a telegram to the State Department to inform them that the Japanese junior aide navy minister had presented the naval attaché in Tokyo with ¥650.11 that had been donated by several organizations and individuals. The Navy Department also included part of a dispatch from the naval attaché in which he informed them that "as this is but one of many popular expressions of public sympathy and concern manifested during [the] past three days and furthermore [it] is a Japanese custom which if not accepted by our government might lead to misunderstanding, it is recommended that same be accepted in the spirit in which offered." Similarly, Adm. Harry Yarnell—commander of the U.S. Navy's Asiatic Fleet—was also offered a large sum of money by personnel of the IJN Third Fleet but declined the offer.
In a telegram of 18 December, Secretary of State Hull replied to Grew, "In view of the apparent sincerity of feeling in which the donations are being proffered and of the likelihood that a flat rejection of such offers would produce some misunderstanding of our general attitude and offend those Japanese who make such a gesture, the Department is of the opinion that some method should be found whereby Japanese who wish to give that type of expression to their feelings may do so."
One of the problems posed by the contributions involved the difficulty of the U.S. government accepting money. Hull explained that "the Department feels, however, that neither the American Government nor any agency of it nor any of its nationals should receive sums of money thus offered or take direct benefit therefrom." Hull suggested that Grew approach Prince Tokugawa Iesato or another Japanese gentleman, "inquiring whether he would be willing to constitute himself an authorized recipient for any gifts which any Japanese may wish voluntarily to offer in evidence of their feeling, public announcement to be made of such arrangement and an accompanying announcement that funds thus contributed will be devoted to something in Japan that will testify to good will between the two countries but not be conveyed to the American Government or American nationals."
Prince Tokugawa was president of the America-Japan Society, which had been formed in 1917 to promote a better relationship and understanding between the people of Japan and the U.S. The society was formed in Tokyo and included prominent leaders from various fields; Viscount Kaneko Kentarō was elected as the first president, and U.S. Ambassador Roland Sletor Morris served as the first honorary president.
State Department's position
From the beginning, the State Department's position was that none of the families of those killed or the sailors or civilians wounded would receive any of the contributions. Nor would any office or department of the federal government accept the money. The State Department also expressed the desire that any necessary arrangements be made promptly. Hull did not wish to keep the Japanese people waiting for a decision on what was to become of the money they donated. A prolonged delay could lead to misunderstanding, especially if a decision was reached months later to return the money to the donors.
The State Department telegram of 18 December also set forth, at least for the time being, that only the American ambassador in Japan and the American ambassador in China could accept donations related to the Panay incident. Several American consulates were receiving money, including consulates at Nagoya, Kobe, Nagasaki and Osaka, in Japan; Taipei, Taiwan; Keijo (Seoul), Korea; Dairen, Manchuria; and São Paulo, Brazil. These contributions were eventually forwarded to the ambassador in Tokyo. Grew kept all money received related to the Panay incident in the embassy safe until the State Department could find a solution.
The American consulates in Nagasaki forwarded several contributions and translations of letters to the embassy in Tokyo, including 50 yen from a Mr. Ichiro Murakami, identified as a former U.S. Navy pensioner, and another individual who wished to remain anonymous.
In a letter two days later, the consulate in Nagasaki also reported to Grew that on 21 December a small boy from the Shin Kozen Primary School brought in a letter and donation of two yen to the consulate and was accompanied by his older brother. The consul enclosed the contribution and both the original and translation of the boy's letter. The letter reads, "The cold has come. Having heard from my elder brother that the American warship has sunk the other day I feel very sorry. Having been committed without intention beyond doubt, I apologize on behalf of the soldiers. Please forgive. Here is the money I saved. Please hand it to the American sailors injured." The letter, addressed "To the American sailors," was signed only, "One of the pupils of the Shin Kozen." The boy did not provide his name in the letter, nor did he reveal it when visiting the consulate.
A local newspaper—the Nagasaki Minyu Shimbun—published the story of Murakami's donation and that of the schoolboy and included an excerpt of the boy's letter. Arthur F. Tower—the American consul in Nagasaki—informed Ambassador Grew of the article, which had been published on 7 January. Tower also informed Grew that a reporter of another newspaper—the Tokyo and Osaka Asahi Shimbun—had called on him on 23 December to discuss the Panay contributions. Towers reassured Grew that "this consulate has not sought to give publicity to the donations received or offered and has furnished information concerning them on two occasions only, when requested."
Although the consul in Nagasaki was not trying to publicize the donations, the newspaper stories may have increased contributions at his consulate. On 8 January, a Japanese pensioner of the U.S. Navy called in person to make a contribution of five yen for the relief of those involved in the Panay incident. When his contribution was accepted, the former sailor informed the consul that a group of other U.S. pensioners also wished to donate money. On 10 January, he visited the consulate again, this time with two representatives of Japanese pensioners of the U.S. Navy who lived in the area. By this time, however, the Nagasaki consulate had received the consulate general's supervisory circular informing them that all Panay-related contributions were to be made either to the ambassador in China or the ambassador in Japan. The gentlemen attempted to donate money but were informed that the consul could no longer receive contributions, and the men were asked to communicate directly with the American embassy in Tokyo. Soon after the departure of the former U.S. sailors, two Japanese men arrived at the consulate. These gentlemen—representing the Buddhist Association of Nagasaki—also had come to donate money for victims of Panay and were likewise turned away.
Responsibility for the attack
Modern historians have gone back and analyzed the attack. Many now believe that the attack may have been intentional. According to John Prados, Navy cryptographers had intercepted and decrypted traffic relating to the attacking planes which clearly indicated that they were under orders during the attack, and that it had not been a mistake of any kind. Writer Nick Sparks believes that the chaos in Nanking created an opportunity for renegade factions within the Japanese army who wanted to force the U.S. into an active conflict so that the Japanese could once and for all drive the U.S. out of China.
The episode has been cited by Philip K. Dick in his novel The Man in the High Castle, depicted in a collectible picture-card of the 1940s, in the series Horrors of War with the title "The sinking of the Panay".
The incident features in the novel A Winter in China by the British writer Douglas Galbraith. It is also described in the historical fiction novel Pearl Harbor by Newt Gingrich and William R. Forstchen.
The 2009 film John Rabe portrays a fictionalized version of the incident.
- "Obituaries in the news: Fon B. Huffman". Associated Press. International Herald Tribune. 7 September 2008. http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/09/07/america/Deaths.php. Retrieved 2008-09-13.
- Swanson, Harland J. (December 1967). "The Panay Incident: Prelude to Pearl Harbor". United States Naval Institute Proceedings.
- Mender, P., Thirty Years a Mariner in the Far East 1907–1937, The Memoirs of Peter Mender,a Standard Oil ship captain on China's Yangtze River, ISBN 978-1-60910-498-6.
- Prados, John., Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II, ISBN 0-679-43701-0, page 50.
- http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS193141v01&entity=FRUS.FRUS193141v01.p0638&q1=japan 1931–1941.
- Based on public domain material from Prologue Magazine
- NPR: A Japanese Attack Before Pearl Harbor
- Photos of Japanese attack
- "The Panay incident and Japan-US relations (パネー号事件と日米関係)", in US-Japan War Talks, the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records  (Japanese)
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