Military Wiki

London Pact (Italian language: Patto di Londra ), or more correctly, the Treaty of London, 1915, was a secret pact between the Triple Entente and Italy, signed in London on 26 April 1915 by the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and the Kingdom of Italy.[1] Its intent was to gain the alliance of Italy against its former allies, including Germany.

According to the pact, Italy was to leave the Triple Alliance and join Triple Entente, as already stated in a secret agreement signed in London, on 4–5 September 1914. Italy was to declare war against Germany and Austria-Hungary within a month (this happened against Austria-Hungary within a month, but not until 1916 against Germany). Assuming victory against Germany and its allies, the Triple Entente promised Italy the following territorial gains (see Italia irredenta) at the end of the war:

Tyrol, partitioned in 1918, parts remaining Austrian referred to as Nordtirol and Osttirol, but part of one Federal State of Tirol

File:Londonski ugovor hr.svg

Lands offered to Italy, Serbia and Montenegro by the Allies in 1915

  1. Tyrol, up to the Alpine water divide at the Brenner Pass, which includes the modern-day Italian provinces of Trentino and South Tyrol.
  2. The entire Austrian Littoral, including the port of Trieste and the Cres-Lošinj (Cherso-Lussino) archipelago, but without the Hungarian port of Rijeka (Fiume).
  3. Northern Dalmatia, including Zadar (Zara), Šibenik (Sebenico), and most of the Dalmatian islands, except Krk and Rab.
  4. The Dodecanese Islands (held by Italy since 1912)
  5. The port of Vlorë in Albania
  6. A protectorate over Albania ("Italy should be entrusted with the task of representing the State of Albania in its relations with Foreign Powers").
  7. Parts of the German colonies in Asia and Africa[2]
  8. In the event of the partition of Turkey, Italy "ought to obtain a just share of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the province of Antalya"[2]

The Kingdom of Serbia, which was not present nor a signatory, was assigned:

  1. The Dalmatian coast between the Krka and Ston, including the Pelješac peninsula (Sabbioncello), the port of Split, and the island of Brač (Brazza).

The Kingdom of Montenegro, which was not present nor a signatory, was assigned:

  1. The Dalmatian coast between Budva (Budua) and Ston, including Dubrovnik (Ragusa) and Kotor Bay (it. Cattaro), but without the Pelješac peninsula;
  2. The coast south to the Albanian port of Shengjin (San Giovanni di Medua).

Also, but less precisely, Serbia was assigned:

  1. Bosnia and Herzegovina
  2. Srem
  3. Bačka
  4. Slavonia (against Italian objections)
  5. Some unspecified areas of Albania (to be divided among Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece).

Italy insisted, and the Allies agreed, that the question of the Adriatic coast between Zara and Istria should be settled after the war. Italy also insisted that Serbia should not be informed about the agreements. However, the Allies overruled this by sending an official note to Serbia on 4 August 1915, confirming the post-war territorial claims of Serbia and Montenegro.

The pact was to be kept secret, but after the October Revolution in Russia, it was published in November 1917 by the Russian journal Izvestia.

Paris Peace Conference

After the war, Italy would only negotiate with Serbia and Montenegro. The Italian delegation staged a walk-out for a number of months when faced with the denial of their territorial demands.

The pact was nullified by the Treaty of Versailles. Before 1918, the contents of the Pact of London had been published to the world by the Bolshevik Russian State. The Fourteen Points, as proposed by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, contained a number of clauses that argued for ethnic or national self-determination and against respecting the provisions of the Treaty of London:

  • Point 1: There should be pen covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.
  • Point 9: There should be a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy to be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.
  • Point 11: Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored...
  • Point 12: The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty...

In Wilson's view, the Pact of London had been arrived by secret contract, hence was not valid. Overall Wilson sought to achieve borders being determined by the populations present in the area rather than by outside parties; the pact of London adjudicated to Italy areas that did not have a majority-Italian population. Wilson believed that Slavic claims to some of the disputed regions were more sound than those of Italy.[3]

Italy ultimately was denied other gains promised in the Treaty: a share of German colonies and control of Albania.[2] They tried to establish a physical claim in Anatolia (Turkey), but were quickly forced to evacuate. The partition of the Tyrol on the water divide line was confirmed by the Treaty of St. Germain.

Repercussions of the disavowal of the Treaty

Some of Italy's demands for territory, as proposed in the Treaty, were both excessive and unworkable. The British and French leaders believed that the effective Italian contribution to the outcome of the war was limited, and they easily broke with the promises in the treaty once these became public and caused outrage. The irredentist nationalist element of Italy considered this an inexcusable betrayal by these two European allies. The colonial gains by England and France from the war further angered the Italians, who felt excluded.

The breakdown of the London Pact helped give rise to a belief in a so-called "mutilated victory" within Italy, which played a role in determining Italian inter-war imperialism. In 1920 Italian nationalists created the Free State of Fiume, although it had not been assigned to Italy in the Treaty of London. This underscored the unstable results of the Treaty of Versailles relative to Italian claims.

See also


  1. Baker, Ray Stannard. Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, Volume I Doubleday, Page, and Company, 1923. pages 52–55 [1]
  2. 2.0 2.1 2.2
  3. American Society of International Law. Volume 15, Oxford University Press, 1921, p. 253

This page uses Creative Commons Licensed content from Wikipedia (view authors).