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Missile General Bureau
미싸일총국
The logo of Misisle General Bureau.
Logo of the Missile General Bureau
Active 1999–present
Country Flag of North Korea North Korea
Branch Independent
Type Strategic Missile Force, Missile Development
Role Strategic Deterrence
Size Unknown
Garrison/HQ Sŏngch'ŏn-kun
South Pyongan, North Korea
Equipment 1,000 or more ballistic missiles[1]
Commanders
Current
commander
Lt. Gen. Kim Rak-gyom, KPA

The Missile General Bureau (Chosŏn'gŭl: 미싸일총국) previously known as Strategic Rocket Forces (Chosŏn'gŭl: 조선인민군 전략로케트군, Hanja: 朝鮮人民軍 戰略로케트軍),[2] and also known as Missile Guidance Bureau (Chosŏn'gŭl: 미사일지도국; Hanja: 미사일指導局) is the strategic missile forces of North Korea. The MGB is a major division of the Korean People's Army and a special bureau that oversees in development and controlling North Korea's nuclear and conventional strategic missiles. It is mainly equipped with surface-to-surface missiles of Soviet and Chinese design, as well as locally developed long-range missiles.

History[]

Shortly after Kim Il-Sung's October 5, 1966, instructions to develop the military and economy jointly, the Second Machine Industry Ministry, under the Korean Workers Party secretary in charge of military industries, was established to manage the procurement and production of weapons.[3] Some sources assert that North Korea had begun the production of multiple rocket launchers in the early 1960s,[4] but by 1965 Kim Il-sŏng had probably made the political decision to establish an indigenous missile production capability after the Soviets rebuffed his request for ballistic missiles. Nevertheless, during the 1960s the Soviet Union began to provide free rockets over ground (FROGs), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and coastal defense antiship missiles, which exposed North Korean engineers to basic technologies for rocket propulsion, guidance, and related missile systems. And in 1965, North Korea founded the Hamhŭng Military Academy, which began to train North Korean personnel in rocket and missile development.[5] By 1970, North Korea had received surface-to-ship missiles and surface-to-air missiles from China, but Pyongyang was also seeking assistance to establish its own missile development program.[6]

In September 1971, North Korea signed an agreement with China to acquire, develop, and produce ballistic missiles, but significant bilateral cooperation did not begin until about 1977 when North Korean engineers participated in a joint development program for the DF-61, which was supposed to be a liquid-fueled ballistic missile with a range of about 600 km and a 1,000 kg warhead. The program was cancelled in 1978 because of Chinese domestic political reasons.[7]

Around this same time, Pyongyang was also seeking Soviet missiles and technology. The DPRK did receive Soviet-made Scud-B ballistic missiles, but the timing of the acquisition is unclear. One North Korean defector has asserted that the Soviet Union provided about 20 Scud-Bs in 1972, but this claim has not been substantiated and is probably not credible. By 1984, the DPRK had produced and flight-tested its Hwasong-5, which reportedly has a range of 320 km compared to the Scud-B’s 300 km; the extra 20 km is attributed to improvements in the missile’s propulsion system and not a reduction in the mass of the warhead. Just as North Korea was beginning to manufacture the Hwasŏng-5, Tehran approached Pyongyang in 1985 to purchase the missile for use in the “war of the cities” with Iraq.[8] North Korea began to construct missile bases for the Hwasŏng-5 around 1985-86, just before the missile went into serial production around 1987. North Korea’s ballistic missile development then accelerated at a fast pace; as soon as mass production of the Hwasŏng-5 began, North Korea began developing the Hwasŏng-6 (火星-6 or Scud-C), the Rodong (commonly known as Nodong-1), the Paektusan-1 (白頭山-1; commonly known as the Taepodong-1), the Paektusan-2 (白頭山-2; commonly known as the Taepodong-2), and the Musudan.[9] Despite the difficulties of missile development and the fact that other countries had tried and failed to develop medium- and intermediate-range missiles, North Korea began to produce Rodong prototypes around the same time it was beginning mass production of the Hwasŏng-6 (Scud-C). The first Rodong deployments were in February 1995, even though the system only had two flight tests—one catastrophic failure and one successful flight at a reduced range.[10] In 1999 different missile units, which were subordinate to the KPA Ground Force Artillery Command, were re-organized into a single missile force - the Missile Guidance Bureau.

The bureau is firstly observed on the venue of the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea held on 7 February 2023 by showing its own flag and it was likely established in November 2022, which is assumed that SRF is elevated into special bureau that known as Missile General Bureau.

Organization[]

The Strategic Rocket Forces is a branch of the KPA, and is directly subordinate to the supreme commander.

Facilities[]

North Korea launch site in Sea of Japan map

Location of the Musudan-ri launch facility

  • Musudan-ri is a rocket launching site in North Korea at 40°51′N, 129°40′E. It lies in southern North Hamgyong province, near the northern tip of the East Korea Bay. The area was formerly known as Taep'o-dong (대포동), from which the Taepodong rockets take their name.
  • Kittaeryŏng site is located in Kangwon province, which borders South Korea. It is used for launches of short to medium-range missiles and has a pad for mobile launchers.
  • Kalgol-dong site is located in Chagang province and houses Hwasong-5/6 missiles, targeting South Korea.
  • Kusŏng site is located in North P'yongan province and houses Rodong missiles. It targets U.S. forces in Japan.
  • Okp’yŏng-dong site is located in Kangwon province and houses Hwasong and Rodong missiles.
  • Pongdong-ri is a new larger missile launch site under construction, located on North Korea's west coast, about 50 km south of the North Korean-Chinese border. As of September 2008 it is 80% complete, being much more advanced and modern than the older Musudan-ru site.[11] Even though not completed, it can currently be used to launch missiles.[12]

There are other numerous smaller sites, scattered around the country, serving for mobile launcher pads. Some larger sites are under construction.

Launching capabilities[]

  • Silo-based launch:
DPRK is not known to have built missile silos. Such facilities are only useful if the country operates missiles with a long range, which can be deployed fueled for significant periods of time, although simple silos can be built for short-range missiles such as the Hwasong-6.
On March 18-19 2023, DPRK fired a KN-23 missile that analyst believed from silo near Sohae Satellite Launching Station.
  • Launch pads:
Launching pads are required for the more sophisticated Taepodong-1/2, as their liquid propellant is difficult to store and the missile must be fueled immediately before launch. This launching method poses a great risk, as the site itself is extremely vulnerable to airstrikes. Launching pads can be used to test different types of SRBM, IRBM and ICBMs, and to launch space satellites, but they are of little value if any of these missiles is to be deployed as a strategic weapon.
  • Mobile launcher vehicles:
DPRK extensively uses mobile launchers for its missiles, including the Hwasong-14 and the Hwasong-17. These are hard to detect and significantly improve survivability. DPRK also experimenting with railcar launcher, firing KN-23 missile.
  • Submarine/ship-based launch:
The Korean People's Navy is not known to have ballistic missile submarines in service. However, it has started research and development into a capability to launch ballistic missiles from submarines and has successfully fired a missile from one of its test submarines, the Sinpo class 8.24 Yongung.

Active Missiles[]

Detailed listings of the equipment holdings of the Korean People's Army [KPA] are rather scarce in unclassified literature. North Korea operates the FROG-7, Hwasong-5 (NK built Scud-B), Hwasong-6 (NK built Scud-C), Rodong-1, SCUD-ER.[13][14] Rather speculative estimates are given in the following table:

Missile Type Origin Range Comments
Hwasong-1 artillery rocket Soviet Union

North Korea

< 50 km 24 launcher units
Hwasong-3 < 100 km
Hwasong-5 Scud-B SRBM North Korea 340 km ≈180
Hwasong-6

Scud-C

500 km ≈100 or 300–600 A variant with new warhead that has canard fins and optical guidance devices, increasing accuracy from 900 meters to below 190 meters.
Hwasong-7

Nodong

MRBM 900–1,500 km 200-300
Hwasong-8 IRBM with Hypersonic Glide Vehicle North Korea First tested 27 September 2021
Hwasong-9

KN-04

SRBM Soviet Union  North Korea 1,000 km small numbers Recently upgraded with new guidance and electronics.
Hwasong-10

Musudan

IRBM North Korea 2,500–4,000 km 30-50 Successfully tested on 22 June 2016. Likely cancelled in favor of the Hwasong-12.
Hwasong-11

KN-02

SRBM Soviet Union  North Korea ≈70 km (500 kg payload) or 120–230+ km Original variant is referred to as KN-02 and extended range variant as KN-10.
Hwasong-11Na

KN-24

SRBM North Korea 410 km Some similarities to MGM-140 ATACMS, but larger, with aft-fins to maintain aerodynamic control over entire flight. Tested in August 2019 and March 2020.
Hwasong-12

KN-17

IRBM 5000–6000 km Successfully tested on 14 May 2017
Hwasong-13

KN-08/14

ICBM 2000–12000 km[citation needed] Likely cancelled in favor of the Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15.
Hwasong-14

KN-20

ICBM 6,700-10,000 km Successfully tested on 4 July 2017
Hwasong-15

KN-22

ICBM 13,000 km Successfully tested on 28 November 2017
Hwasong-17

KN-28

ICBM >13,000 km Successfully tested on 24 March 2022
Hwasong-18 ICBM Successfully tested on 13 April 2023

First solid-fuel ICBM in North Korean missile arsenal

KN-18 SRBM 450+ km Scud-C variant that carries a Maneuverable reentry vehicle. Tested May 2017.
KN-21 SRBM 250+ km Scud-B/Hwasong-5 variant with maneuvering capabilities. Tested April 2017.
KN-23 SRBM 240~800 km Similar to 9K720 Iskander or Hyunmoo-2, tested in August 2017. In 2019, tests of the missile were conducted on 4 and 9 May, July 25 and 6 August. First launched from a railcar 16 September 2021.
KN-25 SRBM/MLRS 380 km "Super-large multiple rocket launcher," viewed as an SRBM by U.S. assessment. 30 tracked chassis and another 9 truck chassis are known to have been made for total of 216 guided rockets.
Pukguksong-1 KN-11 SLBM 1000 km Successfully tested on 24 Aug 2016 with lofted trajectory with about 500 km and similar distance apogee.
Pukguksong-2 KN-15 MRBM 1200 km Operational and deployed to northern border in missile bases where Hwasong-7 is deployed.
Pukguksong-3 KN-26 SLBM 1900 km~2500 km
Pukkuksong-4 SLBM >1900 km Further development of Pukguksong-3, possibly could also be used on land and with multiple warheads.
Pukguksong-5 SLBM Version of Pukkuksong-4 with elongated and pointier nose.
Kumsong-1 GeumSeong-1 anti-ship cruise missile Soviet Union  North Korea 110–160 km–180–300 km
Kumsong-1 China

North Korea

110–160 km–180–300 km
Kumsong-2 Soviet Union  Russia  North Korea
Kumsong-3

KN-01/KN-19

Cruise missile North Korea 130–300 km Successfully tested on 12 February 2017.
Hwasal-2 1800 km~2000 km First tested 11 September 2021.


Additionally, there are two space booster variants:

  • North Korea Paektusan - a Taepodong-1 missile with a third stage and satellite added. Launched in 1998 with a small satellite on board (see Kwangmyŏngsŏng-1). The satellite failed to reach orbit due to a malfunction in the additional third stage.
  • North Korea Unha - a satellite launch vehicle partially based on Taepodong-2 with a solid-fueled third stage. The satellite once again failed to reach orbit after a launch in 2009 (see Kwangmyŏngsŏng-2), and two more attempts were made in 2012. The first, in April, ended when the rocket exploded in the first minute of flight. The second, in December, finally managed to deliver its satellite to orbit; see Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3 and Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3 Unit 2.

North Korea test-fired a short-range missile off its eastern coast toward Japan on 1 May 2005. The missile, fired into the Sea of Japan (East Sea of Korea), appeared to have a range of between 100 to 120 kilometers. It is called by the North the KN-02 Toksa ("Viper"), an upgraded version of the Russian SS-21, with a longer range. The KN-02 nomenclature was disclosed by Kim Sung-il Kim Seong-il, chief information officer at Seoul’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a closed-door parliamentary session. The DPRK test-fired the same type of missile in April 2004, but the test failed. Another multiple test has taken place in 2006, and it was a success. According to most reports, the missile was deployed in 2007, and was seen on military parades.

Warheads[]

North Korean missiles can serve to deliver various types of warheads, including WMD. It is possible that up to three Rodong-1 missiles are fitted with nuclear warheads.[15] In a similar manner to the initial Chinese nuclear doctrine, nuclear weapons are being stored separately, and would only be mounted on missiles after an order of the supreme commander (Kim Jong-un). Despite the claims by numerous media that North Korea has not yet created nuclear warheads small enough to be fit in a missile, reports surfaced in April 2009, according to which North Korea has miniaturized warheads, capable of being mounted on its missiles.[16] The most suitable nuclear weapons delivery system is the Rodong-1, which has been successfully tested many times.

Additionally, the DPRK possesses a large chemical weapons stockpile, including powerful agents such as tabun, sarin, soman, VX gas and others. Little is known about the biological weapons stockpiles. They are probably limited, as North Koreans consider them much more dangerous to handle, therefore posing a threat to their own soldiers apart from the enemy.

North Korea has yet to demonstrate the ability to produce a re-entry vehicle, without which North Korea cannot deliver a weapon from an ICBM.[17]

Exports[]

Several countries, including Egypt, Vietnam, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen, have bought North Korean ballistic missiles or components, or received assistance from North Korea to establish local missile production

See also[]

National strategic missile forces:

References[]

  1. "North Korea has 1,000 missiles, South says". Reuters. March 17, 2010. http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/17/us-korea-north-missiles-idUSTRE62G1ZC20100317. 
  2. The Chosun Ildo
  3. Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr, The Armed Forces of North Korea, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001, pp. 45-46
  4. Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,”
  5. Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,”
  6. Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “The North Korean ‘Scud B’ Program,” Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp. 203-207; Foss, p. 749; Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, “China’s Missile Sales--Few Changes for the Future,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, December 1992, p. 560.
  7. Bermudez, “A History of Ballistic Missile Development” p. 3; Hua Di, “One Superpower Worse than Two,” Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter, September 1991, pp. 14-15; John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, “Beijing’s Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms Export Enigma,” International Security, Fall 1992, pp. 5-40.
  8. David C. Isby, “Iranian Commander Acknowledges Use of North Korean ‘Scuds’,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, January 1, 2007
  9. Musudan is the name assigned to the North Korean road-mobile version of the Soviet R-27/SS-N-6 "Serb" submarine-launched ballistic missile. See Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Japan Reveals Name of North Korea’s R-27 IRBM,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 23, 2007.
  10. Paul Beaver, “Flash Points,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 23, No. 25, June 24, 1995, p. 22.
  11. N Korea 'builds new missile site', BBC
  12. Analysts: N. Korea completing missile test site, CNN
  13. [1][dead link]
  14. Markus Schiller (2012). Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat (Report). RAND Corporation. ISBN 978-0-8330-7621-2. TR-1268-TSF. http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1268.html. Retrieved 19 January 2013. 
  15. "The North Korean Plutonium Stock Mid-2006" (PDF). http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/DPRKplutoniumFEB.pdf. Retrieved 2012-10-09. 
  16. "North Korea is fully fledged nuclear power, experts agree". The Times. London. April 24, 2009. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6155956.ece. Retrieved 2009-04-25. 
  17. Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Report). U.S. Department of Defense. 2012. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ReporttoCongressonMilitaryandSecurityDevelopmentsInvolvingtheDPRK.pdf. Retrieved 23 May 2013. 
  • Reuters - A look at North Korea's missile arsenal
  • Bermudez, Joseph S. (2001). Shield of the Great Leader. The Armed Forces of North Korea, The Armed Forces of Asia. Sydney: Allen & Unwin. ISBN 1864485825.
  • Homer T. Hodge, North Korea’s Military Strategy, Parameters (journal), Spring 2003, pp. 68–81
  • The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (2007). The Military Balance 2007. Abingdon: Routledge Journals. ISBN 9781857434378.
  • Bermudez, Joseph S. (1999). "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK: First Ballistic Missiles, 1979-1989".
  • James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
  • Zaloga, Steven; Illustrated by Jim Laurier and Lee Ray (2006). Scud Ballistic Missile Launch Systems 1955-2005. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 1-84176-947-9.
  • [2]

Further reading[]

External links[]

All or a portion of this article consists of text from Wikipedia, and is therefore Creative Commons Licensed under GFDL.
The original article can be found at Strategic Rocket Forces (North Korea) and the edit history here.
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