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In political science, rollback is the strategy of forcing change in the major policies of a state, usually by replacing its ruling regime. It contrasts with containment, which means preventing the expansion of that state; and with détente, which means a working relationship with that state. Most of the discussions of rollback in the scholarly literature deal with United States foreign policy toward Communist countries during the Cold War. The rollback strategy was tried, and failed, in Korea in 1950, and in Cuba in 1961. The political leadership of the United States discussed the use of rollback during the uprising of 1953 in East Germany and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, but decided against it to avoid the risk of Soviet intervention and a major war.[1]

The rollback strategy succeeded in Grenada in 1983. Ronald Reagan promoted a rollback strategy against what he called the "evil empire" (the Soviet Union) in the 1980s. NATO has deployed a rollback strategy in Afghanistan since 2001 to end the power of the Taliban.[2] Rollback of governments hostile to the U.S. took place in the American Civil War (1861–65), World War I (against Germany 1918), World War II (against Italy 1943, Germany 1945 and Japan 1945), 1953 Iranian coup d'état (against Mohammad Mosaddegh), 1954 Guatemalan coup (against Jacobo Árbenz), Panama (against Noriega, 1989), and Iraq (against Saddam Hussein 2003). Today rollback is sometimes called "regime change".[3]

Rollback during the Cold War

Early years

In American strategic language, rollback is the policy of totally annihilating an enemy army and occupying the country, as was done in the American Civil War to the Confederacy, and in World War II to Germany and Japan.[4][5]

The notion of military rollback against the Soviet Union was proposed by conservative strategist James Burnham[6] and other strategists in the late 1940s, and by the Truman Administration against North Korea in the Korean War. Much debated was the question whether the U.S. should pursue a rollback strategy against Communism in Eastern Europe in 1953-56; the decision was not to.[7]

Instead of military rollback the U.S. began a program of long-term psychological warfare to delegitimize Communist and pro-Communist regimes[citation needed] and help insurgents. These attempts began as early as 1945 in Eastern Europe, including efforts to provide weapons to independence fighters in the Baltic States and Ukraine. Another early effort was against Albania in 1949, following the defeat of Communist forces in the Greek Civil War that year. In this case, a force of agents was landed by the British and Americans to try to provoke a guerrilla war, but it failed. The operation had already been betrayed to the Soviets by the British double-agent Kim Philby, and led to the immediate capture or killing of the agents.[8] The process proved most successful in undermining the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s.[9]


In the Korean War, the United States and the United Nations officially endorsed a policy of rollback - the destruction of the North Korean government[citation needed] - and sent UN forces across the 38th parallel to take over North Korea.[10] The rollback strategy, however, caused the Chinese to intervene, and they pushed the UN forces back to the 38th parallel. The failure of the rollback policy, despite its advocacy by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, moved the United States to a commitment to the containment policy, without rollback.[11]


A more ambitious effort was Operation Paper in November 1950; this included the arming and supplying of remnant Nationalist Chinese troops in eastern Burma, the 93rd Division under General Li Mi, to invade the southern Chinese province of Yunnan. All of Li Mi's brief forays into China were swiftly repulsed, and after another failure in August 1952, the United States began to scale back its support.[12][13]

Eisenhower and Dulles

Republican spokesman John Foster Dulles took the lead in promoting a rollback policy. He wrote in 1949:

We should make it clear to the tens of millions of restive subject people in Eastern Europe and Asia, that we do not accept the status quo of servitude aggressive Soviet Communism has imposed on them, and eventual liberation is an essential and enduring part of our foreign policy.[14]

The 1952 Republican national platform reaffirmed this position; when Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected, he appointed Dulles as secretary of state. Eisenhower adviser Charles Douglas Jackson to coordinate psychological warfare against Communism. Radio Free Europe, a private agency funded by Congress, broadcast attacks on Communism directed to Eastern Europe.[15] A strategic alternative to rollback was containment, and the Eisenhower Administration adopted containment through National Security Council document NSC 162/2 in October 1953; this effectively abandoned the rollback efforts in Europe.

Eisenhower relied on clandestine CIA actions to undermine hostile small governments and used economic and military foreign aid to strengthen governments supporting the American position in the Cold War. A successful rollback was the CIA's Operation Ajax in August 1953, in collaboration with the British, which assisted the Iranian military in their restoration of the Shah.[16]


Eisenhower's decision not to intervene during the Hungarian Uprising of 1956 made containment a safer strategy than rollback, which risked a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Critics argue that an important opportunity for rollback was forfeited in October–November 1956, when Hungarian reformist leader Imre Nagy announced Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and when he and Hungarian insurgents called on the West for help against invading Soviet troops. Eisenhower thought it too risky to intervene in a landlocked country such as Hungary and feared it might trigger a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. His Secretary of State John Foster Dulles mistakenly believed that Imre Nagy sided with the Soviet Union.

On October 25, 1956, he sent a telegram to the US embassy in Belgrade expressing his fears that the Imre Nagy-János Kádár government might take “reprisals” against the Hungarian “freedom fighters.” By the next day, October 26, State Department officials in Washington assumed the worst about Nagy, asserting in a top secret memorandum: “Nagy's appeal for Soviet troops indicates, at least superficially, that there are not any open differences between the Soviet and Hungarian governments.” [17][18]

Both Eisenhower and Dulles focused more attention on the Suez Crisis which, due to the Protocol of Sèvres, unfolded simultaneously. The Suez Crisis played an extremely important role in hampering the US response to the crisis in Hungary. The problem was not, contrary to widespread belief, that Suez distracted US attention from Hungary, but that it made the condemnation of Soviet actions very difficult. As Vice President Richard Nixon later explained: "We couldn't on one hand, complain about the Soviets intervening in Hungary and, on the other hand, approve of the British and the French picking that particular time to intervene against Gamal Abdel Nasser."[7]

Reagan Administration

The "rollback" movement gained significant ground, however, in the 1980s, as the Reagan administration, urged on by the Heritage Foundation and other influential conservatives, began to channel weapons to anti-communist armed movements in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Nicaragua and other nations, and launched a successful invasion of Grenada in 1983 to protect American residents and reinstate constitutional government following a coup by what Reagan called "a brutal gang of leftist thugs,"— this invasion was presented as a dramatic example of rolling back a Communist government in power.[19][20] Moscow worried that it might be next.[21]

Reagan's interventions in the Third World came to be known as the Reagan Doctrine. It was applied especially to pro-Communist regimes in Central America, as in Grenada and Nicaragua, and was also extended to Angola, Afghanistan, and Cambodia.[22]

Critics argued that the Reagan Doctrine led to so-called blowback and an unnecessary intensification of Third World conflict. On the other hand, in the various rollback battlefields, the Soviet Union made major concessions, and eventually had to abandon the Soviet-Afghan war. Jessica Martin writes, "Insofar as rollback is concerned, American support for rebels, especially in Afghanistan, at the time helped to drain Soviet coffers and tax its human resources, contributing to that nation's overall crisis and eventual disintegration."[23][24]

Nationalistic unrest in the Soviet Empire exploded in 1989, as most of the Eastern European satellites broke free and rolled back Communism peacefully, with the exception of the violent revolution in Romania to rollback Communism. East Germany merged with West Germany. In 1991 the fifteen Soviet Socialist Republics declared their laws superior to those of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union ceased to exist on December 25, 1991, as Communism was rolled back across all of Europe.[25]

See also

Further reading

  • Bodenheimer, Thomas, and Robert Gould. Rollback!: Right-wing Power in U.S. Foreign Policy (1999), hostile to the strategy
  • Bowie, Robert R., and Richard H. Immerman. Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (1998).
  • Borhi, László. "Rollback, Liberation, Containment, or Inaction?: U.S. Policy and Eastern Europe in the 1950s," Journal of Cold War Studies, Fall 1999, Vol. 1 Issue 3, pp 67–110
  • Grose, Peter. Operation Roll Back: America's Secret War behind the Iron Curtain (2000) online review
  • Lesh, Bruce. "Limited War or a Rollback of Communism?: Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean Conflict," OAH Magazine of History, Oct 2008, Vol. 22 Issue 4, pp 47–53
  • Meese III, Edwin. "Rollback: Intelligence and the Reagan strategy in the developing world," in Peter Schweizer, ed., The fall of the Berlin wall (2000), pp 77–86
  • Mitrovich, Gregory (2000). "Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc 1947-1956". .
  • Stöver, Bernd (2004). "United States and Germany in the era of the Cold War, 1945 to 1990, A handbook". In Junker, Detlef. pp. 97–102. .

Primary sources

  • Burnham, James (1947). "Struggle for the World". .


  1. Stöver & 2004 pp97-102.
  2. Moore, John Allphin; Pubantz, Jerry, eds (2008). "Encyclopedia of the United Nations". p. 7. .
  3. Litwak, Robert (2007). Regime Change: U.S. Strategy Through the Prism of 9/11. Johns Hopkins U.P.. p. 109. 
  4. Weigley, Russell F (1977). "The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy". pp. 145, 239, 325, 382, 391. .
  5. Pash, Sidney (2010). "The United States and the Second World War: New Perspectives on Diplomacy, War, and the Home Front". In Piehler, G Kurt; Pash, Sidney. pp. 38–67. .
  6. Kelly, Daniel (2002). "James Burnham and the struggle for the world: a life". p. 155. .
  7. 7.0 7.1 Borhi, László (1999). "Rollback, Liberation, Containment, or Inaction? U.S. Policy and Eastern Europe in the 1950s". pp. 67–110. 
  8. Weiner, Tim (2007). "Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA". Doubleday. pp. 45–46. .
  9. Scott, James M (1996). "Deciding to intervene: the Reagan doctrine and American foreign policy". p. 40. .
  10. Matray, James I (Sept 1979). "Truman's Plan for Victory: National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel Decision in Korea". JStor. pp. 314–33. .
  11. Cumings, Bruce (2010). "The Korean War: A History". pp. 25, 210. .
  12. McCoy, Alfred W (2001). "The Politics of Heroin". Lawrence Hill/Chicago Review Press. pp. 168–74. .
  13. Kaufman, Victor S (June 2001). "Trouble in the Golden Triangle: The United States, Taiwan and the 93rd Nationalist Division". pp. 440–56. .
  14. Stöver 2004, p. 98.
  15. Puddington, Arch (2003). "Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty". .
  16. Prados, John (2009). "Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA". .
  17. Granville, Johanna (2005). ""Caught With Jam on Our Fingers": Radio Free Europe and the Hungarian Revolution in 1956". pp. 811–39. .
  18. Granville, Johanna (2004). The First Domino: International Decision Making During the Hungarian Crisis of 1956. Texas: Texas A & M University Press, College Station. ISBN 1-58544-298-4. 
  19. Thomas Carothers (1993). In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years. U. of California Press. pp. 113–15. 
  20. H. W. Brands, Jr., "Decisions on American Armed Intervention: Lebanon, Dominican Republic, and Grenada," Political Science Quarterly (1987) 102#4 pp. 607-624 quote at p 616 in JSTOR
  21. Vladislav Martinovich Zubok. A failed empire: the Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (2007) p. 275
  22. DeConde, Alexander, ed (2002). Encyclopedia of American foreign policy. Scribner. p. 273. 
  23. Van Dijk, Ruud, ed (2008). Encyclopedia of the Cold War. US: Taylor & Francis. p. 751. 
  24. Mann, James (2009). "The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War". .
  25. Rosenberg, Victor (2005). Soviet-American relations, 1953-1960: diplomacy and cultural exchange during the Eisenhower presidency. McFarland & Co.. p. 260. 

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