The Oslo Accords are a set of agreements between the government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO): the Oslo I Accord, signed in Washington, D.C., in 1993 and the Oslo II Accord, signed in Taba in 1995. The Oslo Accords marked the start of the Oslo process, a peace process that is aimed at achieving a peace-treaty based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and 338, and to fulfill the "right of the Palestinian people to self-determination". The Oslo process started after secret negotiations in Oslo, resulting in the recognition by the PLO of the State of Israel and the recognition by Israel of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and as a partner in negotiations.
The Oslo Accords created the Palestinian Authority, whose functions are the limited self-governance over parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip; and, it acknowledged that the PLO is now Israel's partner in permanent status negotiations about the remaining issues. The most important issues are the borders of Israel and Palestine, the Israeli settlements, the status of Jerusalem, the question of Israel's military presence in and control over the remaining territories after the recognition of the Palestinian autonomy by Israel, and the Palestinian right of return. The Oslo Accords, however, did not create a Palestinian state.
The Oslo process
The Oslo process is the "peace process" that started in 1993 with secret talks between Israel and the PLO. It became a cycle of negotiations, suspension, mediation, restart of negotiations and suspension again. A number of agreements were reached, until the Oslo process ended after the failure of the Camp David Summit in 2000 and the outbreak of the Second Intifada.
During the Second Intifada, the Roadmap for Peace was introduced, which explicitly aimed a two-state solution and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The Roadmap, however, soon came into a cycle similar to the Oslo process, but without producing any agreement.
The Oslo Accords are based on the 1978 Camp David Accords and show therefore high similarity.[upper-alpha 1] The Camp David's "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" envisioned autonomy for the local, and only for the local, (Palestinian) inhabitants of West Bank and Gaza. At the time, there lived some 7,400 settlers in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem), and 500 in Gaza, with the number in the West Bank, however, rapidly growing. As Israel regarded the PLO a terrorist organisation, it refused to talk with the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Instead, Israel preferred to negotiate with Egypt and Jordan, and "elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza".[upper-alpha 1] Like the 1978 Camp David Accords, the Oslo Accords were an interim agreement, allowing first steps, followed by negotiations to complete within five years. The main difference was that the final goal in Camp David was a "peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached in the final status of the West Bank and Gaza", while the Oslo Accords aimed at a peace treaty with the Palestinians.[upper-alpha 1] Indeed, an Israel–Jordan peace treaty was concluded, but only on 26 October 1994, after the Oslo I Accord, and without the Palestinians.
Both plans had in common that, possibly intentionally, they did not have a "Plan B" in case a final agreement would not be reached within the set period.
Only after Israel's acceptance of the PLO as negotiation partner, serious negotiations could start. In their Letters of Mutual Recognition of 9 September 1993, days before the signing of the Oslo I Accord, both parties declared to accept each other as negotiation partner. The PLO recognized the State of Israel. Israel recognized the PLO as "the representative of the Palestinian people"; no more, no less.
Outline of the peace plan
Stated goals of the Oslo Accords were among other things, Palestinian interim Self-Government (not the Palestinian Authority, but the Palestinian Legislative Council) and a permanent settlement (of unresolved issues) within five years, based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Although the agreements recognize the Palestinian "legitimate and political rights", they remain silent about their fate after the interim period. The Oslo Accords do neither define the nature of the post-Oslo Palestinian self-government and its powers and responsibilities, nor do they define the borders of the territory it eventually would govern.
The first step was a partial Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho and transfer of some powers and responsibilities on civil matters to the interim Palestinian Authority. All to agree upon within two months from October 1993 (Oslo I, Annex II).
Then, Israeli troops to withdraw from populated Palestinian areas to pave the way for Palestinian elections to establish the Council. The Council would replace the PA, and the Israeli Civil Administration in the West Bank would be dissolved (Oslo II, Article I). Further redeployments of Israeli troops would follow upon the inauguration of the Council (Oslo II, Annex I, Article I).
Permanent status negotiations about remaining issues would start not later than May 1996 (two years after the signing of the Gaza–Jericho Agreement; Oslo I, Article V) and be concluded before May 1999 (end of 5 year interim period). A peace treaty would end the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.
End of the interim period
In May 1999, the five years interim period ended without reaching a comprehensive peace agreement, but elements of the Oslo Accords remained. The interim Palestinian Authority became permanent, and a dominant factor of the PLO. The West Bank remained divided into Areas A, B and C, the latter some 60% of the West Bank and under exclusive military and civilian control. Less than 1% of area C is designated for use by Palestinians, who are also unable to build in their own existing villages in area C due to Israeli restrictions. The Israeli Civil Administration, part of a larger entity known as Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), which is a unit in the Defense Ministry of Israel, is still functioning in full. The Israeli–Palestinian Joint Water Committee also still exists.
Key agreements in the Oslo process were:
- Israel–PLO letters of recognition (1993). Mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO.
- The Oslo I Accord (1993). The "Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements" ("DOPOISGA"), which declared the aim of the negotiations and set forth the framework for the interim period. Dissolution of the Israeli Civil Administration upon the inauguration of the Palestinian Legislative Council (Article VII).
- The Gaza–Jericho Agreement or Cairo Agreement (1994). Partial Israeli withdrawal within three weeks from Gaza Strip and Jericho area, being the start of the five-year transitional period (Article V of Oslo I). Simultaneously transfer of limited power to the Palestinian Authority (PA), which was established in the same agreement. Part of the Agreement was the Protocol on Economic Relations (Paris Protocol), which regulates the economic relationship between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, but in effect integrated the Palestinian economy into the Israeli one. This agreement was superseded by the Oslo II Accord, except for Article XX (Confidence-Building Measures). Article XX dictated the release or turn over of Palestinian detainees and prisoners by Israel. The Paris Protocol was incorporated in Article XXIV of Oslo II.
- The Oslo II Accord (1995). Division of the West Bank into Areas, in effect fragmenting it into numerous enclaves and banning the Palestinians from some 60% of the West Bank. Redeployment of Israeli troops from Area A and from other areas through "Further Redeployments". Election of the Palestinian Legislative Council (Palestinian parlement, PLC), replacing the PA upon its inauguration. Deployment of Palestinian Police replacing Israeli military forces in Area A. Safe passage between West Bank and Gaza. Most importantly, start of negotiations on a final settlement of remaining issues, to be concluded before 4 May 1999.
All later agreements had the purpose to implement the former three key agreements.
Additional Israeli-Palestinian agreements related to the Oslo Accords are:
- Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities Between Israel and the PLO (August 1994)
- This agreement was signed on 29 August 1994 at the Erez Crossing. It is also known as Early Empowerment Agreement (the term is used on the Israel MFA website). Superseded by Oslo II.
- Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities (August 1995)
- This agreement was signed on 27 August 1995 at Cairo. It is also known as Further Transfer Protocol. Superseded by Oslo II.
- Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron (January 1997)
- Wye River Memorandum (October 1998)
- Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum (September 1999)
- Agreement on Movement and Access (November 2005)
Continued settlement expansion
While Peres had limited settlement construction at the request of US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, Netanyahu continued construction within existing Israeli settlements, and put forward plans for the construction of a new neighborhood, Har Homa, in East Jerusalem. However, he fell far short of the Shamir government's 1991–92 level and refrained from building new settlements, although the Oslo agreements stipulated no such ban. Construction of Housing Units Before Oslo: 1991–92: 13,960, After Oslo: 1994–95: 3,840, 1996–1997: 3,570.
Norwegian academics, including Norway's leading authority on the negotiations, Hilde Henriksen Waage, have focused on the flawed role of Norway during the Oslo process. In 2001, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had been at the heart of the Oslo process, commissioned Waage to produce an official, comprehensive history of the Norwegian-mediated back channel negotiations. In order to do the research, she was given privileged access to all relevant, classified files in the ministry's archives. Waage was surprised to discover "not a single scrap of paper for the entire period from January to September 1993—precisely the period of the back channel talks". Involved persons kept documents privately and refused to hand them over. Waage concluded that there seems no doubt that the missing documents would have shown the extent to which the Oslo process was conducted on Israel’s premises, with Norway acting as Israel’s helpful errand boy. Norway played a mediating role as a small state between vastly unequal parties and had to play by the rules of the stronger party, acting on its premises. "Israel’s red lines were the ones that counted, and if the Palestinians wanted a deal, they would have to accept them, too."
Alternatives to the Oslo Accords
There have been suggested alternatives to boundary setting and creating principles that divide Israelis and Palestinians. One alternative is to move a peace process towards the creation of a bi-national state, a "one-state solution", that promotes co-existence rather than to continuing to divide. An argument for this as a possible way of reconciliation is that neither side can wholly justify a claim for homogeneity. Also, some Israeli and Palestinian thinkers have previously argued for a bi-national state as a more attractive alternative to separatism.
- From the
Framework for Peace in the Middle East, part of the 1978 Camp David Accords and blueprint for the Oslo Accords:
- Egypt and Israel agree that, ... there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government.
- Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.
- When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.
(See JimmyCarterLibrary, The Framework for Peace in the Middle East (1978). Accessed December 2013)
- Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP), 13 September 1993. From the Knesset website
- Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 28 September 1995. From the Knesset website
- Just Vision, Oslo Process. Retrieved December 2013
- MEDEA, Oslo peace process. Retrieved December 2013
- By Hook and by Crook—Israeli Settlement Policy in the West Bank, p. 90. B’Tselem, July 2010
- Israeli Settlements in Occupied Arab Lands: Conquest to Colony, p. 29. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Winter, 1982), pp. 16-54. Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies
- Israel-PLO Recognition: Exchange of Letters between PM Rabin and Chairman Arafat, 9 September 1993
- Annex I:Protocol Concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangements. From the Knesset website
- "West Bank and Gaza - Area C and the future of the Palestinian economy". World Bank. 2 October 2013. p. 4. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/10/18836847/west-bank-gaza-area-c-future-palestinian-economy. "Less than 1 percent of Area C, which is already built up, is designated by the Israeli authorities for Palestinian use; the remainder is heavily restricted or off-limits to Palestinians, 13 with 68 percent reserved for Israeli settlements, 14 c. 21 percent for closed military zones, 15 and c. 9 percent for nature reserves (approximately 10 percent of the West Bank, 86 percent of which lies in Area C). These areas are not mutually exclusive, and overlap in some cases. In practice it is virtually impossible for Palestinians to obtain construction permits for residential or economic purposes, even within existing Palestinian villages in Area C: the application process has been described by an earlier World Bank report (2008) as fraught with "ambiguity, complexity and high cost"."
- The Discourse of Palestinian-Israeli Relations: Persistent Analytics and Practices, Sean F. McMahon, Routledge, 2009, page 5
- Will we always have Paris?. Gaza Gateway, 13 September 2012
- Text on Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website
- Text on UNISPAL
- Palestinians in the West Bank chafe under `early empowerment′.
- Arnon, Arie. "The Palestinian economy: between imposed integration and voluntary separation". p. 216.
- Aruri, Naseer Hasan. "Dishonest broker: the U.S. role in Israel and Palestine". p. 98.
- Text on Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website
- Serge Schmemann (December 5, 1997). "In West Bank, 'Time' for Settlements Is Clearly Not 'Out'". The New York Times. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C02E3D9133DF936A35751C1A961958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=print. Retrieved December 18, 2007.
- "Extraordinary Increase in Settlement Construction as Diplomacy Falters". Foundation for Middle East Peace. March–April 1998. http://www.fmep.org/reports/archive/vol.-8/no.-2/extraordinary-increase-in-settlement-construction-as-diplomacy-falters. [dead link]
- "Housing Starts in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip Settlements*, 1990-2003". Foundation for Middle East Peace. Archived from the original on November 18, 2008. https://web.archive.org/web/20081118071542/http://fmep.org/settlement_info/settlement-info-and-tables/stats-data/housing-starts-in-israel-the-west-bank-and-gaza-strip-settlements-1990-2003. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
- Postscript to Oslo: The Mystery of Norway's Missing Files. Hilde Henriksen Waage, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1 (Autumn 2008), pp. 54–65; ISSN 1533-8614
- Truth and reconciliation Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue 412
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