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Long March
Overview map of the route of the Long March
Overview map of the route of the Long March
Red-hatched areas show Communist enclaves. Areas marked by a blue "X" were overrun by Kuomintang forces during the Fourth Encirclement Campaign, forcing the Fourth Red Army (north) and the Second Red Army (south) to retreat to more western enclaves (open dotted lines). The solid dotted line is the route of the First Red Army from Jiangxi. The withdrawal of all three Red Armies ends in the northeast enclave of Shaanxi.
DateOctober 1934 – October 1935
LocationChina. from Jiangxi to Shaanxi
Result Armies of the Communist Party of China evade the Chinese Nationalist Party armies
Flag of the Kuomintang
Chinese Nationalist Party and allied warlords
Flag of the Communist Party of China
Communist Party of China
Commanders and leaders
Flag of the Kuomintang Chiang Kai-shek
Flag of the Kuomintang Xue Yue
Flag of German Reich (1933–1935).svg Hans von Seeckt
Flag of the Kuomintang Bai Chongxi
Flag of the Communist Party of China Mao Zedong
Flag of the Communist Party of China Zhu De
Flag of the Communist Party of China Zhou Enlai
Flag of the Communist Party of China Peng Dehuai
Flag of the Communist Party of China Lin Biao
over 300,000 First Front Red Army: 86,000 (October 1934)
7,000 (October 1935)

The Long March (October 1934-October 1935) was a military retreat undertaken by the Red Army of the Communist Party of China, the forerunner of the People's Liberation Army, to evade the pursuit of the Kuomintang (KMT or Chinese Nationalist Party) army. There was not one Long March, but a series of marches, as various Communist armies in the south escaped to the north and west. The most well known is the march from Jiangxi province which began in October 1934. The First Front Army of the Chinese Soviet Republic, led by an inexperienced military commission, was on the brink of annihilation by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's troops in their stronghold in Jiangxi province. The Communists, under the eventual command of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, escaped in a circling retreat to the west and north, which reportedly traversed some 12,500 kilometers (8,000 miles) over 370 days.[1] The route passed through some of the most difficult terrain of western China by traveling west, then north, to Shaanxi.

The Long March began Mao Zedong's ascent to power, whose leadership during the retreat gained him the support of the members of the party. The bitter struggles of the Long March, which was completed by only about one-tenth of the force that left Jiangxi, would come to represent a significant episode in the history of the Communist Party of China, and would seal the personal prestige of Mao and his supporters as the new leaders of the party in the following decades. However the true role of Mao in the Long March remains hotly disputed, with some claiming the official Communist Party line to be truthful while many historians, mainly Western, claim Mao's role was heavily exaggerated and some events in the Long March entirely fabricated.


Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek encircled the Communists in Jiangxi in 1934.

  • 1930: Unofficial founding of the Jiangxi–Fujian Soviet by Mao Zedong and Zhu De.
  • 1931: December, Zhou Enlai arrives in Ruijin and replaces Mao as leader of the CCP.
  • 1932: October, at the Ningdu Conference, major CCP military leaders criticize Mao's tactics; Mao is demoted to figurehead status.
  • 1933: Bo Gu and Otto Braun arrive from the USSR, reorganize the Red Army, and take control of Party affairs. They defeat four encirclement campaigns.
  • 1933: September 25, start of the Fifth Encirclement Campaign. Bo and Braun are defeated.
  • 1934: October 16, breakout of 130,000 soldiers and civilians led by Bo Gu and Otto Braun, beginning the Long March.
  • 1934: November 25 – December 3, Battle of Xiang River.
  • 1935: January 15–17, Zunyi Conference. The leadership of Bo and Braun is denounced. Zhou becomes the most powerful person in the Party; Mao becomes Zhou's assistant.
  • 1935: June–July, troops under Zhou and Mao meet with Zhang Guotao's troops. The two forces disagree on strategy, and separate.
  • 1935: April 29 – May 8, crossing of the Jinsha River, a major tributary of the Yangtze.
  • 1935: May 22, Yihai Alliance with the Yi people.
  • 1935: May 29, CCP forces capture Luding Bridge.
  • 1935: July, CCP forces cross the Jade Dragon Snow Mountains.
  • 1935: August, CCP forces cross the Zoigê Marsh.
  • 1935: September 16, CCP forces cross the Lazikou Pass.
  • 1935: October 22, Union of the three armies in Shaanxi, end of the Long March.
  • 1935: November, Mao becomes leader of the CCP. Zhou becomes Mao's assistant.


The Red Army in 1934

Although the literal translation of the Chinese Cháng Zhēng is “Long March”, official publications of the People's Republic of China refer to "The Long March of the Red Army" (Chinese traditional: 紅軍長征, Chinese simplified: 红军长征, pinyin: Hóngjūn Chángzhēng). The Long March most commonly refers to the transfer of the main group of the First (or Central) Red Army, which included the leaders of the Communist Party of China, from Yudu in the province of Jiangxi, to Yan'an in Shaanxi. In this sense, the Long March lasted from October 16, 1934 to October 19, 1935. In a broader view, the Long March included two other forces retreating under pressure from the Kuomintang: the Second Red Army and the Fourth Red Army. The retreat of all the Red Armies was not complete until October 22, 1936, when the three forces linked up in Shaanxi.

The divisions of the "Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" (紅軍) were named according to historical circumstances, sometimes in a nonconsecutive way. Early Communist units often formed by defection from existing Kuomintang forces, keeping their original designations. By the time of the Long March, numerous small units had been organized into three unified groups, the First Red Army (紅一方面軍/红一方面军/Hóng Yī Fāngmiàn Jūn), the Second Red Army (紅二方面軍/红二方面军/Hóng Èr Fāngmiàn Jūn) and the Fourth Red Army (紅四方面軍/红四方面军/Hóng Sì Fāngmiàn Jūn).[2] Some translations refer to these same units as the “First Front Red Army", “Second Front Red Army” and “Fourth Front Red Army" to distinguish them from the earlier organizational divisions. The First Red Army formed from the First, Third and Fifth Army Groups in southern Jiangxi under command of Bo Gu and Otto Braun. When the Fourth Red Army under Zhang Guotao was formed in the Sichuan-Shaanxi border area from several smaller units, no standard nomenclature of the armies of the Communist Party existed; moreover, during the Chinese Civil War central control of separate Communist-controlled enclaves within China was limited. After the organization of these first two main forces, the Second Red Army formed in eastern Guizhou by unifying the Second and Sixth Army Groups under He Long and Xiao Ke. A “Third Red Army" was led by He Long who established his base area in the Hunan-Hubei border; by 1932 his forces were soundly defeated and in October 1934 merged with the 6th Army Corps led by Xiao Ke to form the Second Red Army. The three armies would maintain their historical designation as the First, Second and Fourth Red Armies until Communist military forces were nominally integrated into the National Revolutionary Army, forming the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, during the Second Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945.

Civil war

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief of the National Revolutionary Army, emerged from the Northern Expedition as the leader of China.

The Communist Party of China (CCP), founded in 1921, by Chen Duxiu with Soviet support, initially collaborated with the Chinese Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT), founded by the revolutionary republican Sun Yat-sen. After the unexpected death of Sun in March 1925, a power struggle within the KMT favored Chiang Kai-shek, whose Northern Expedition forces succeeded in wresting control of large areas of China from local warlords, establishing a unified government in Nanjing in April 1927. Unlike other nationalist leaders, like Wang Jingwei, Chiang was hostile to continued collaboration with the Communists. This initial period of cooperation to unify China and end the unequal treaties broke up in April 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek struck out against the Communists. Unsuccessful urban insurrections (in Nanchang, Wuhan and Guangzhou) and the suppression of the Communist Party in Shanghai and other cities drove many party supporters to rural strongholds such as the Jiangxi Soviet organized by Mao Zedong. By 1928, deserters and defecting Kuomintang army units, supplemented by peasants from the Communist rural soviets, formed the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. The ideological confrontation between the CCP and the KMT soon evolved into the first phase of the Chinese Civil War.

The Jiangxi Soviet

By 1930, the Communist Red Army had established the Chinese Soviet Republic in the provinces of Jiangxi and Fujian around the city of Ruijin, including industrial facilities.[3]

After the establishment of the Jiangxi Soviet, Mao's status within the Party declined. In 1930, Mao claimed a need to eliminate alleged KMT spies and Anti-Bolsheviks operating inside the Jiangxi Soviet and began an ideological campaign featuring torture and guilt by association, in order to eliminate his enemies. The campaign continued until the end of 1931, killing approximately 100,000 people and reducing the size of the Red Army from 40,000 to less than 10,000. Although the de facto leader of the party at the time, Zhou Enlai, originally supported Mao's purges as necessary to eliminate KMT spies, after he arrived in Jiangxi in December 1931 Zhou criticized Mao's campaigns for being directed more against anti-Maoists than legitimate threats to the Party, for the campaign's general senselessness, and for the widespread use of torture to extract confessions. Following Zhou's efforts to end Mao's ideological persecutions the campaigns gradually subsided in 1932.[4]

In December, of 1931 Zhou replaced Mao Zedong as Secretary of the First Front Army and political commissar of the Red Army. Liu Bocheng, Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai all criticized Mao's tactics at the August 1932 Ningdu Conference.[5] The most senior leaders to support Mao in 1932 were Zhou Enlai, who had become disillusioned with the strategic leadership of other senior leaders in the Party, and Mao's old comrade, Zhu De. Zhou's support was not enough, and Mao was demoted to being a figurehead in the Soviet government until he regained his position later, during the Long March.[6]

Chiang's Encirclement Campaigns

In early 1933, Bo Gu arrived in Jiangxi with the German Comintern adviser Otto Braun (Li De) and took control of Party affairs. Zhou at this time, apparently with strong support from Party and military colleagues, reorganized and standardized the Red Army. Under Zhou, Bo, and Braun, the Red Army defeated four attacks by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist troops.[7]

General Leu Wei-yuan (柳維垣將軍) provided a new strategy for the fifth campaign. At that time, many people thought the Red army should be encircled and then have been destroyed. However, General Leu was strongly opposed to this strategy. He believed that the Government (i.e. the KMT army) could win the war only by forcing the Red army out of their bases and then organizing a powerful army to engage in a long pursuit to eradicate the enemy. The Commander-in-Chief, Chiang Kai-shek, accepted General Leu’s strategy and launched a 25,000-li ( about 9000 miles ) long pursuit and gave the Chinese Communists severe blows. Mao later wrote this part in his book ( On the strategical problems of the Revolution, by Mao Zedong 毛澤東 中國革命戰爭的戰略問題 ) : " The new strategy for the fifth campaign was first invented and proposed by General Leu Wei-yuan.....and the new strategy was accepted by Chiang Kai-shek, ... We have learned a bitter historical lesson from this. ". In October 1934 KMT troops won a decisive battle and drove deep into the heart of the Central Soviet Area. When Ruijin became exposed to KMT attack, Party leaders faced the choice of either remaining and perishing or of abandoning the base area and attempting to break through the enemy encirclement.[8]

In August 1934, with the Red Army depleted by the prolonged conflict, a spy, Mo Xiong, placed by Zhou Enlai in the KMT army headquarters in Nanchang brought news that Chiang Kai-shek was preparing a major offensive against the Communist capital, Ruijin. The Communist leadership decided on a strategic retreat to regroup with other Communist units, and to avoid annihilation. The original plan was to link up with the Second Red Army commanded by He Long, thought to be in Hubei to the west and north. Communications between divided groups of the Red Army had been disrupted by the Kuomintang campaign. During the planning to evacuate Jiangxi, the First Red Army was unaware that these other Communist forces were also retreating westward.

The Long March

Escape from Jiangxi

Since the Central Base Area could not be held, the Standing Committee appointed Bo (responsible for politics), Braun (responsible for military strategy), and Zhou (responsible for the implementation of military planning) to organize the evacuation. Since the enemy was close, Zhou, in charge of logistics, made his plans in complete secrecy. It was not disclosed who was to leave or when: even senior leaders were informed only at the last moments of the Army's movements. It is not known what criteria were used to determine who would stay and who would go, but 16,000 troops and some of the Communists' most notable commanders at the time (including Xiang Ying, Chen Yi, Tan Zhenlin, and Qu Qiubai) were left to form a rear guard, to divert the main force of Nationalist troops from noticing, and preventing, the general withdrawal.[9]

The first movements to screen the retreat were undertaken by forces led by Fang Zhimin, breaking through Kuomintang lines in June 1934. Although Fang Zhimin's troops were soon destroyed, these movements surprised the Kuomintang, who were numerically superior to the Communists at the time and did not expect an attack on their fortified perimeter.

The early troop movements were actually a diversion to allow the retreat of more important leaders from Jiangxi. On October 16, 1934, a force of about 130,000 soldiers and civilians under Bo Gu and Li De attacked the line of Kuomintang positions near Yudu. More than 86,000 troops, 11,000 administrative personnel and thousands of civilian porters actually completed the breakout; the remainder, largely wounded or ill soldiers, continued to fight a delaying action after the main force had left, and then dispersed into the countryside.[10] Several prominent members of the Chinese Soviet who remained behind were captured and executed by the Kuomintang after the fall of Ruijin in November 1934, including Qu Qiubai and the youngest brother of Mao Zedong, Mao Zetan.

The withdrawal began in early October 1934. Zhou's intelligence agents were successful in identifying a large section of Chiang's blockhouse lines that were manned by troops under General Chen Jitang, a Guangdong warlord who Zhou identified as being likely to prefer preserving the strength of his troops over fighting. Zhou sent Pan Hannian to negotiate for safe passage with General Chen, who subsequently allowed the Red Army to pass through the territory that he controlled without fighting.[11] The Red army successfully crossed the Xinfeng River and marched through the province of Guangdong and into Hunan before encountering the last of Chiang's fortifications at the Xiang River.

After passing through three of the four blockhouse fortifications needed to escape Chiang's encirclement, the Red Army was finally intercepted by regular Nationalist troops, and suffered heavy casualties. Of the 86,000 Communists who attempted to break out of Jiangxi with the First Red Army, only 36,000 successfully escaped. Due to the low morale within the Red Army at the time, it is not possible to know what proportion of these losses were due to military casualties, and which proportion were due to desertion. The conditions of the Red Army's forced withdrawal demoralized some Communist leaders (particularly Bo Gu and Otto Braun), but Zhou remained calm and retained his command.[11] Most Communist losses occurred over only two days of heavy fighting, from November 30 to December 1, 1934.

Determining the direction of the Red Army

After escaping Chiang's encirclement, it was obvious to Party leaders that Chiang was intent on intercepting what remained of the Red Army in Hunan, and the direction of the Red Army's movements had to be reconsidered. The plan to rendezvous and join He Long's army in Hunan had become too risky. Mao suggested to Zhou that the Red Army change direction, towards Guizhou, where Mao expected enemy defenses to be weak.[11]

A meeting at Tongdao, close to the border of Hunan and Guizhou, was convened to discuss the direction of the Red Army on December 12, 1934. Zhou endorsed Mao's proposal, encouraging other leaders to overrule the objections of Bo and Braun. Another dispute of the direction of the Red Army occurred soon after, once the Red Army reached Liping, in the mountains of southeast Guizhou. Braun believed that they should travel to eastern Guizhou, but Mao wanted to go to western Guizhou, where he expected KMT forces to be lighter and which borders Sichuan, and to establish a base area there. In a meeting to decide the army's direction, Zhou sided with Mao, making Braun "fly into a rage because he was overruled in the debate." At the meeting it was decided that the Red Army would travel towards Zunyi, in western Guizhou.[12]

On January 1, 1935, the Red Army reached the Wu River. Bo and Braun again insisted the Red Army move back to western Hunan to join other Communist troops in the area, but their prestige had considerably declined by that point, and their suggestion was rejected. Even Zhou had become impatient, and proposed a new rule which was put into effect immediately: that all military plans had to be submitted to the Politburo for approval. The movement passed, clearly depriving Braun of the right to direct military affairs. On January 15 the Red Army captured Zunyi, the second largest city in Guizhou. As Mao had predicted, the city was weakly defended, and was too far from Nationalist forces to be under immediate threat of attack.[12] By the time the Red Army occupied Zunyi, it was highly depleted, and counted little more than 10,000 men.[13] Zhou used the peace afforded in Zunyi to call an enlarged Politburo meeting, in order to examine the causes of the Communists' repeated defeats.[12]

The Zunyi Conference

The Communists' Zunyi Conference lasted from January 15–17, 1935, and resulted in a reshuffling of the Party politburo. Zhou intended the conference to draw lessons from the Red Army's past failures, and to develop strategies for the future. Much of the discussion revolved around whether the defeats of the Red Army were due to unavoidable circumstances, or inadequacies of leadership. Bo Gu, the first speaker, attributed the Red Army's losses to "objective" causes, particularly the enemy's overwhelming numerical superiority, and poor coordination of Communist forces. Braun's interpreter, Wu Xiuquan, later recalled that Bo's arguments did not impress his audience, and that Bo came across as someone attempting to avoid responsibility.[12]

Zhou Enlai was the next to speak. Zhou blamed the Red Army's failures on poor decisions at the leadership level, and blamed himself as one of the three people most responsible. Zhou's willingness to accept responsibility was well received. Zhang Wentian, basing many of his conclusions on recent discussions with Mao, attacked Bo and Braun directly, criticizing them for numerous strategic and tactical errors.[14]

After Zhang, Mao gave a speech in which he analyzed the poor tactics and strategies of the two leaders. With Zhou's explicit backing, Mao won over the meeting. Seventeen of the meeting's twenty participants (with the exception of Bo, Braun, and He Kequan) argued in his favor.[14]

Of the three leaders who had controlled the Party before the Zunyi Conference, only Zhou Enlai's political career survived. Zhou was held partially responsible for the Red Army's defeat, but was retained at the top level of Party leadership because of his differences with Bo and Braun at Ningdu, his successful tactics in defeating Chiang's fourth Encirclement Campaign, and his resolute support of Mao.[14] Although the failed leadership of Bo Gu and Li De was denounced, Mao was not able to win the support of a sufficient number of Party leaders to gain outright power at the conference.[15]

A major shift in the Party's leadership occurred two months later, in March 1935. Mao was passed over for the position of General Secretary by Zhang Wentian, but gained enough influence to be elected one of three members of Military Affairs Commission. The other two members were Zhou Enlai, who retained his position as Director of the Commission, and Wang Jiaxiang, whose support Mao had enlisted earlier,.[15] Within this group, Zhou was empowered to make the final decisions on military matters, while Mao was Zhou's assistant. Wang was in charge of Party affairs.[14]

Escaping Chiang's pursuit


Mao in 1935.

When the army resumed its march northward, the direct route to Sichuan was blocked by Chiang's forces. Mao's forces spent the next several months maneuvering to avoid direct confrontation with hostile forces, but still attempting to move north to join Zhang Guotao's Fourth Red Army.[16] During this period, in February 1935, Mao's wife, He Zizhen, gave birth to a daughter. Given the harsh conditions of the retreat, the infant was left with a local family[17] (Two Europeans retracing the Long March route in 2003 met a woman in rural Yunnan province, said by local officials to be Mao and He Zizhen's long-lost daughter[18]).

The Luding Bridge

The Communist forces were harassed by both the Kuomintang and its local warlord allies. To avoid a fatal confrontation with the enemy, Zhou and Mao maneuvered the Red army south and west, through Guizhou, Sichuan, and Yunnan, feigning attacks on Guiyang and Kunming to disguise their movements. The First Red Army crossed the Yangtze on May 9, 1935, finally escaping determined enemy pursuit, but still had to deal with dangerous mountain passes at heights of up to 4,000 meters, rough climatic conditions, shortages of food, clothing, and equipment, and tribes of local ethnic minorities hostile to Chinese encroachment.[19] The Red Army had to cross mountains and rivers, often capturing river crossings heavily defended by hostile warlords and Nationalist troops, the most famous of which was Luding Bridge (although many historians believe that the battle at Luding Bridge was exaggerated or even entirely fabricated for propaganda purposes).

The Fourth Red Army

In June–July 1935, the troops under Mao united with the Fourth Red Army, led by Zhang Guotao, which had retreated west from Henan. Zhang had taken a different route of evacuation, and arrived at Lianghekou with 84,000 troops in relatively good condition. The fact that he had control of superior forces gave him the power to challenge the authority of Zhou and Mao, whose power was based largely on the Party's support. Zhang demanded that one of his own generals, Chen Changhao, take over Zhou's position as political commissar of the entire Red Army, and suggested that Zhang himself replace Zhu De on the Military Commission. Zhang argued that such a reorganization would create a more "equal" army organization. On July 18, Zhou relinquished his position as political commissar, and several leading positions were taken over by generals of the Fourth Red Army.[19]

These changes had no long-term significance because Zhang and Mao disagreed with the direction of the army. Zhang insisted on going southwest, while Mao insisted on going northwards, towards Shaanxi. No agreement was reached, and the two armies eventually split, each going their separate ways.[19]

Zhang Guotao's Fourth Red Army took a different route than Mao travelling south, then west, and finally north through China. On the way Zhang's forces were largely destroyed by the forces of Chiang Kai-shek and his Chinese Muslim allies, the Ma clique. The remnants of Zhang's forces later rejoined elements of the Second Red Army before eventually linking up with Mao's forces in Shaanxi.[20]

The Second Red Army

Tiger Leaping Gorge in the Jade Dragon Snow Mountain massif of western Yunnan province.

The Second Red Army began its own withdrawal west from Hubei in November 1935, led by He Long, who commanded the KMT Twentieth Army in 1923 before joining the Communist Party of China (CPC). For retribution Chiang Kai-Shek had He Long's relatives executed, including three sisters and a brother.[citation needed] In 1932 he established a soviet in the Hunan-Jiangxi border area, and in August 1934 received command of the Second Red Army, establishing a base in Hubei. An advance party of the First Red Army called the Sixth Group, commanded by Xiao Ke, was sent towards the Second Red Army two months before the beginning of the Long March. Xiao Ke's force would link up with He Long and his army, but lost communication with the First Army that came behind.

On November 19, 1935, the Second Red Army set out on its own Long March. He Long's force was driven further west than the First Red Army, all the way to Lijiang in Yunnan province, then across the Jade Dragon Snow Mountain massif and through the Tibetan highlands of western Sichuan. He Long and Xiao Ke were married to sisters who also accompanied the army. He Long's wife, Jian Xianren, carried the baby daughter she had given birth to three weeks before the retreat began. Jian Xianfo gave birth to a son in the desolate swamps of northern Sichuan.[21] Forces of the Second Army detained two European missionaries, Rudolf Bosshardt and Arnolis Hayman, for 16 months.[22] Bosshardt later related his account of the details of daily life on the Long March in a book.[23]

Union of the three armies

Mao's First Red Army traversed several swamps and was attacked by Muslim Hui Ma Clique forces under Generals Ma Bufang and Ma Buqing.[20] Finally, in October 1935, Mao's army reached Shaanxi province and joined with local Communist forces there, led by Liu Zhidan, Gao Gang, and Xu Haidong, who had already established a Soviet base in northern Shaanxi.[24] The remnants of Zhang's Fourth Red Army eventually rejoined Mao in Shaanxi, but with his army destroyed, Zhang, even as a founding member of the CPC, was never able to challenge Mao's authority.[20] After an expedition of almost a year, the Second Red Army reached Bao'an (Shaanxi) on October 22, 1936, known in China as the “union of the three armies”, and the end of the Long March.

All along the way, the Communist Army confiscated property and weapons from local warlords and landlords, while recruiting peasants and the poor. Nevertheless, only some 8,000 troops under Mao's command, the First Front Army, ultimately made it to the final destination of Yan'an in 1935. Of these, less than 7,000 were among the original 100,000 soldiers who had started the march. A variety of factors contributed to the losses including fatigue, hunger and cold, sickness, desertion, and military casualties. During the retreat, membership in the party fell from 300,000 to around 40,000.[25]

In November 1935, shortly after settling in northern Shaanxi, Mao officially took over Zhou Enlai's leading position in the Red Army. Following a major reshuffling of official roles, Mao became the chairman of the Military Commission, with Zhou and Deng Xiaoping as vice-chairmen. (After Zhang Gutao reached Shaanxi, Deng was replaced by Zhang). This marked Mao's position as the pre-eminent leader of the Party, with Zhou in a position second to Mao. Both Mao and Zhou would retain their positions until their deaths, in 1976.[24]

Cooperativeness of warlords

Warlords often refused to help out the Kuomintang against the Communist Red Army, preferring to save their own forces.

300 "Khampa bandits" were enlisted into the Kuomintang's Consolatory Commission military in Sichuan, where they were part of the effort of the central government of China to penetrated and destabilize the local Han warlords such as Liu Wenhui. The Chinese government sought to exercise full control over frontier areas against the warlords. Liu had refused to do battle against the Red Army, to save his own military from destruction. The Consoltary Commission forces were used to battle the Communist Red Army, but were defeated when their religious leader was captured by Communist forces.[26]


The greatest strategic retreat in military history turned Mao into a living legend.

Roderick MacFarquhar, Mao Tse Tung: China's Peasant Emperor, A&E Biography, 2005[27]

A Communist leader addressing Long March survivors.

While costly, the Long March gave the Communist Party of China (CCP) the isolation it needed, allowing its army to recuperate and rebuild in the north of China. It also was vital in helping the CCP to gain a positive reputation among the peasants due to the determination and dedication of the surviving participants of the Long March. Mao wrote in 1935:

"The Long March is a manifesto. It has proclaimed to the world that the Red Army is an army of heroes, while the imperialists and their running dogs, Chiang Kai-shek and his like, are impotent. It has proclaimed their utter failure to encircle, pursue, obstruct and intercept us. The Long March is also a propaganda force. It has announced to some 200 million people in eleven provinces that the road of the Red Army is their only road to liberation."[28]

In addition, policies ordered by Mao for all soldiers to follow, the Eight Points of Attention, instructed the army to avoid harm to or disrespect for the peasants, in spite of the desperate need for food and supplies. This policy won support for the Communists among the rural peasants.[29]

Hostilities ceased while the Nationalists and Chinese Communists formed a nominal alliance during the Second Sino-Japanese War from 1937 until 1945. During these years, the Chinese Communist Party persevered and strengthened its influence. The Red Army fought a disciplined and organized guerilla campaign[30] against superior Japanese forces, allowing it to gain experience. Following the end of World War II, the resurgent Communist Eighth Route Army, later called the People's Liberation Army, returned to drive the Kuomintang out of Mainland China to the island of Taiwan. Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Long March has been glorified as an example of the Communist Party's strength and resilience. The Long March solidified Mao's status as the undisputed leader of the CPC. Other participants in the March also went on to become prominent party leaders, including Zhu De, Lin Biao, Liu Shaoqi, Dong Biwu, Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, Yang Shangkun, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping.

The Chinese government produced a movie in 2006, My Long March,[31][32] relating personal experiences of a fictional participant in the Long March.


The Long March is surrounded by controversial and conflicting accounts of what actually occurred. The myths of the march are difficult to uncover because the Chinese government has prevented independent historians from exploring the topic. The few that were able to do research into the myths of the march have only done so recently[when?] and struggle with the fact that many years have gone by since the march took place, hence many of the survivors are no longer alive or able to accurately recall events.[33]


In 2003, controversy arose about the distance covered by Mao's First Front Army in the Long March.[34] The figure of 25,000 li (12,500 kilometres or about 8,000 miles[1]) was Mao's estimate, quoted by his biographer Edgar Snow in Red Star Over China, published not long after the end of the Long March in 1938. In 2003, two British researchers, Ed Jocelyn and Andrew McEwen,[29] retraced the route in 384 days,[21][29] and in their 2006 book "The Long March" estimated the March actually covered about 6,000 km (3,700 miles). Jocelyn and McEwen conclude in their book that "Mao and his followers twisted the tale of the Long March for their own ends. Mao's role was mythologized to the point where ... it seemed he had single-handedly saved the Red Army and defeated Chiang Kai-shek". Mao exaggerated, perhaps even doubled, the length of the march, they believe.[35] Their report has been disputed by the Chinese media, citing "The 25,000 li of the Red Army's Long March are a historic fact and not open to doubt."[36] However, even at the time that Edgar Snow's account was written, there were estimates that the distance traveled was closer to 18,000 li (9,375 km).[37]

Luding Bridge

Well, that’s the way it’s presented in our propaganda. We needed that to express the fighting spirit of our forces. In fact, it was a very easy military operation. There wasn’t really much to it. The other side were just some troops of the warlord who were armed with old muskets and it really wasn’t that much of a feat, but we felt we had to dramatize it.

Deng Xiaoping, Quote according to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 2005[38]

The battle for Luding Bridge has been portrayed as a glorious and heroic moment in Chinese Communist history, analogous to the U.S. battle of the Alamo. The official account of the battle depicts exhausted and depleted Communist forces in a desperate situation, where they must fight across a bridge that is guarded by the numerically superior forces of Chiang Kai-shek and his warlord allies. The Communists send a small volunteer force that braves a hail of gunfire to climb across the bridge on underlying chains and assault the enemy positions on the other side, hence securing the bridgehead for the rest of the army to cross.

However, there is evidence that differs from the official account of the battle. This suggests that much of the fighting was dramatized, by Communist leaders, for propaganda purposes. Authors Andrew McEwen and Ed Jocelyn who retraced the route of the Long March, interviewing survivors along the way, said that a woman in her early 80s recalled that local people led the way across the bridge and were all shot and killed.[39] Author Sun Shuyun quotes a witness who said that there was a small enemy force on the other side armed with guns that could “only fire a few metres”. They panicked and fled.[40]

Use as propaganda

If you find it hard, think of the Long March; if you feel tired, think of our revolutionary forbears. The message has been drilled into us so that we can accomplish any goal set before us by the party because nothing compares in difficulty with what they did. Decades after the historical one, we have been spurred on to ever more Long Marches – to industrialize China, to feed the largest population in the world, to catch up with the West, to reform the socialist economy, to send men into space, to engage with the 21st century.

- Sun Shuyun[41]

The Long March has been depicted as a pillar of the Chinese Communist Revolution and has been a constant theme of communist propaganda since its completion, in 1935. It has been used as an example to depict the nationalistic fighting spirit of the Chinese people and the rallying call to communism. As a propaganda theme, many facts about the Long March have been altered from historical truth. For example, the battle at Xiang River “which the official history of the Long March identifies as the longest and most heroic battle of the entire campaign, was in fact a major defeat for the Communists, with casualties and desertions reducing the First Army from 86,000 to 30,000 people.”[42]

October 2006 marked the 70th anniversary of the end of the Long March. Dozens of newly released, government approved books were proudly displayed in bookstores, with the intention of showing the heroic actions and drama of the Long March. Meanwhile Chinese television presented, “a feast of Long March-themed entertainment, including a 20-part drama series, documentaries, and even a song-and-dance extravaganza.”[43]

Western scholars, when examining the Long March, sometimes choose to focus on aspects of the Long March rarely portrayed by Chinese propaganda. Negative aspects of the Long March include instances of the Red Army desperately recruiting local people through kidnapping, blackmail, and sex.[44] Sun Shuyun, while researching a book on the Long March, interviewed one-man who said he was barely into his teens when he was forced to join the Red Army. This veteran only joined the Red Army because his father was arrested by the communists and would not be released until the man agreed to join the army. The man later thought of deserting, but stayed on because he feared being caught and executed.[33] In order to escape starvation, the Red Army sometimes stole food from villagers in the remote locations it traveled through.[44] Driven by desperation and hunger, communist armies during the Long March sometimes took hostages for ransom.

See also


  1. 1.0 1.1 Zhang, Chunhou. Vaughan, C. Edwin. [2002] (2002). Mao Zedong as Poet and Revolutionary Leader: Social and Historical Perspectives. Lexington books. ISBN 0-7391-0406-3. pg 65.
  2. Peoples Liberation Army Daily (August 14, 2006) Notes Retrieved 2007-02-17
  3. Ruth Rogaski, PhD, in Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2006: Mao Zedong, III. Rise to Power (Retrieved November 25, 2006). Archived 2009-11-01.
  4. Barnouin, Barbara and Yu Changgen. Zhou Enlai: A Political Life. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. ISBN 962-996-280-2. Retrieved March 12, 2011. p.49-52
  5. Whitson, William W. and Huang, Chen-hsia. The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927–71. New York: Praeger, 1973. p. 57-58
  6. Barnouin, Barbara and Yu Changgen. Zhou Enlai: A Political Life. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. ISBN 962-996-280-2. Retrieved March 12, 2011. p.52-55
  7. Wilson 51
  8. Barnouin, Barbara and Yu Changgen. Zhou Enlai: A Political Life. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. ISBN 962-996-280-2. Retrieved March 12, 2011. pp.56–57
  9. Barnouin, Barbara and Yu Changgen. Zhou Enlai: A Political Life. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. ISBN 962-996-280-2. Retrieved at <> on March 12, 2011. pp.56–57
  10. Mao Zedong, On Tactics...: Note 26 retrieved 2007-02-17
  11. 11.0 11.1 11.2 Barnouin, Barbara and Yu Changgen. Zhou Enlai: A Political Life. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. ISBN 962-996-280-2. Retrieved March 12, 2011. p.58
  12. 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 Barnouin, Barbara and Yu Changgen. Zhou Enlai: A Political Life. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. ISBN 962-996-280-2. Retrieved at <> on March 12, 2011. p.59
  13. Barnouin, Barbara and Yu Changgen. Zhou Enlai: A Political Life. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. ISBN 962-996-280-2. Retrieved March 12, 2011. pp.60–61
  14. 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.3 Barnouin, Barbara and Yu Changgen. Zhou Enlai: A Political Life. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. ISBN 962-996-280-2. Retrieved March 12, 2011. p.60
  15. 15.0 15.1 Kampen, Thomas (2000). Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the Evolution of the Chinese Communist Leadership. Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. pp. 67–68. ISBN 87-87062-76-3. 
  16. Chang and Halliday have recently[when?] offered a reinterpretation of this period of the March, suggesting that in fact Mao deliberately delayed the move into Sichuan in order to consolidate his personal power before joining up with the other parts of the Red Army, and that rather than facing direct attack from Chiang's forces, the army was in fact being deliberately herded into Sichuan by Chiang. (Chang, Halliday, in Mao, The Unknown Story, pp 135–162). The work, however, has been criticized for being unscholarly and anecdotal.
  17. Shuyun, Sun (March 16, 2006). "Mao's lost children". The Guardian. London.,,1731887,00.html. Retrieved 2007-03-15. 
  18. George Mason University, History News Network: Woman wonders whether she is Mao's abandoned Long March daughter (Retrieved 2007-03-15)
  19. 19.0 19.1 19.2 Barnouin, Barbara and Yu Changgen. Zhou Enlai: A Political Life. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. ISBN 962-996-280-2. Retrieved March 12, 2011. p.61
  20. 20.0 20.1 20.2 New Long March 2: Fourth Front Army (Retrieved November 23, 2006)
  21. 21.0 21.1 China Daily (November 23, 2003): Stepping into history (Retrieved November 23, 2006)
  22. The New Long March, Photo Archive (January 5, 2005): Kidnapped! Retrieved 2007-03-15
  23. Bosshardt, Rudolf A. (1936). The Restraining Hand: Captivity for Christ in China. Hodder and Stoughton, London. 
  24. 24.0 24.1 Barnouin, Barbara and Yu Changgen. Zhou Enlai: A Political Life. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. ISBN 962-996-280-2. Retrieved March 12, 2011. p.62
  25. Yang, Benjamin (1990). From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March. Westview Press. pp. 233. ISBN 0-8133-7672-6. 
  26. Hsiao-ting Lin (2010). Modern China's ethnic frontiers: a journey to the west. Volume 67 of Routledge studies in the modern history of Asia (illustrated ed.). Taylor & Francis. p. 52. ISBN 0-415-58264-4. Retrieved 2011-12-27. "A force of about 300 soldiers was organized and augmented by recruiting local Khampa bandits into the army. The relationship between the Consolatory Commission and Liu Wenhui seriously deteriorated in early 1936, when the Norla Hutuktu" 
  27. TV series – Mao Tse Tung: China's Peasant Emperor, A&E Network, 2005, ASIN B000AABKXG
  28. Mao Zedong, in On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism (December 27, 1935): "The Characteristics of the Present Political Situation" (Retrieved November 25, 2006)
  29. 29.0 29.1 29.2 Indo-Asian News Service (October 22, 2006): Retracing Mao's Long March (Retrieved November 23, 2006)
  30. *Griffith, Samuel B. (translator) (2005). On Guerrilla Warfare by Mao Tse-tung (1937). Dover Books on History. pp. 94. ISBN 0-486-44376-0. 
  31., Chinese government official web portal: My Long March, retrieved 2008-10-18
  32. People's Daily Online (October 17, 2006) Chinese military leader attends movie premiere commemorating Long March, retrieved 2008-10-18
  33. 33.0 33.1 Sun, Shuyun. "The Real Long March." March 2, 2006. (Retrieved April 2011).
  34. CNN (November 5, 2003): Mao's long March 'comes up short' (Retrieved November 25, 2006)
  35. Jocelyn, Ed & McEwen, Andrew (2006). The Long March. Constable & Robinson. pp. 288. ISBN 1-84529-255-3. 
  36. Richard Spencer, (April 3, 2006): British pair under attack for doubts over Mao's march Daily Telegraph (Retrieved November 23, 2006)
  37. Columbia University, Asia for Educators (2009): Edgar Snow's Account of "The Long March" (Retrieved April 10, 2010)
  38. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "America and the New Asia." Michel Oksenberg Lecture. Asia-Pacific Research Center. Stanford University, 09 Mar 2009. Lecture.
  39. The Economist Apr 27, 2006."China's Long March: The Long and Winding Road.".
  40. Shuyun, Sun. The Long March: The True History of Communist China's Founding Myth. 1st. New York City: Anchor Books, 2008. pp 145
  41. Adams, Martin. "Long March to mythology." Asia Times October 24, 2006.
  42. Pye, Lucian. "The Long March: The True History of Communist China's Founding Myth"; Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary." Foreign Affairs (2008): n. pag. Web. Apr 28, 2011. <>.
  43. Adams, Martin. (Oct 24, 2006). "Long March to mythology" Asia Times
  44. 44.0 44.1 Adams, Martin. (Oct 24, 2006). > "Long March to Mythology." Asia Times

Further reading

  • Chang, Jung & Halliday, Jon (2005). Mao: The Unknown Story. Alfred A. Knopf. pp. 814 pages. ISBN 0-679-42271-4. 
  • Griffith, Samuel B. (translator) (2005). Yu Chi Chan (On Guerrilla Warfare) by Mao Tse-tung (1937). Dover Books on History. pp. 128 pages. ISBN 0-486-44376-0. 
  • Jocelyn, Ed & McEwen, Andrew (March 2006). The Long March. Constable and Robinson. pp. 320 pages. ISBN 1-84529-255-3. 
  • Kampen, Thomas (2000). Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the Evolution of the Chinese Communist Leadership. Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. pp. 66–83. ISBN 87-87062-76-3. 
  • King, Dean (2010). Unbound: A True Story of War, Love, and Survival. Little, Brown and Company. pp. 432 pages. ISBN 978-0-316-16708-6. 
  • Salisbury, Harrison Evans (1985). The Long March : The Untold Story. Harper & Row, New York. pp. 419 pages. ISBN 0-06-039044-1. 
  • Shuyun, Sun (2008). The Long March: The True History of Communist China's Founding Myth. Anchor. pp. 304. ISBN 0-307-27831-X. 
  • Snow, Edgar (1968 Revised Edition). Red Star Over China. Grove Press. pp. 534 pages. ISBN 0-8021-5093-4. 
  • Whitson, William W. (1973). The Chinese High Command : A History of Communist Military Politics 1927–71. Praeger. ISBN 0-333-15053-8. 
  • Wilson, Dick (1971). The Long March 1935: The Epic of Chinese Communism's Survival. Penguin Press. pp. 283 pages. ISBN 0-14-006113-4. 
  • Yang, Benjamin (1990). From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March. Westview Press. pp. 240 pages. ISBN 0-8133-7672-6. 
  • Young, Helen Prager (2000). Choosing Revolution: Chinese Women Soldiers on the Long March. University of Illinois Press, pp. 282 pages. [ISBN 978-0-252-07456-1]

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