Military Wiki
Dnieper–Carpathian offensive
Part of the Eastern Front of World War II
File:Sov Odessa 44.jpg
Soviet T-34 tanks and tank riders advance in the vicinity of Odessa, April 1944
Date24 December 1943 – 6 May 1944[1]

Winter phase (1st stage): 24 December 1943 – 29 February 1944

Spring phase (2nd stage): 4 March – 17 April (1st Ukrainian Front)[2]-6 May 1944 (2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts)[1]
LocationRight-bank Ukraine, Southern Ukraine, Western Ukraine, Polesia. Eastern Poland, northern Romania, Moldavia, Carpathian Mountains.
Result
Territorial
changes
  • Soviets reclaim most of the Ukrainian SSR, expulsion of Axis forces
  • Red Army enters Romania
  • Red Army enters Eastern Poland
  • Red Army enters part of Czechoslovakia
  • Creation of "Belorussian Balcony"- a salient in which the lines of Army Group Center protruded to the east and led to Operation Bagration.
  • Belligerents
    Flag of the Soviet Union Soviet Union
    Czechoslovakia Czechoslovak Army Corps
    Flag of German Reich (1935–1945) Germany
    Flag of Romania Romania
    Flag of Hungary (1915-1918, 1919-1946) Hungary
    Commanders and leaders
    Soviet Union Joseph Stalin (Supreme Commander)
    Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov (Stavka representative, coordinator of operations of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Front)
    Soviet Union Nikolai Vatutin (1st Ukrainian Front)
    Soviet Union Ivan Konev (2nd Ukrainian Front)
    Soviet Union Aleksandr Vasilevsky (Stavka representative, coordinator of operations of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Front)
    Soviet Union Rodion Malinovsky (3rd Ukrainian Front)
    Soviet Union Feodor Tolbukhin (4th Ukrainian Front)
    Soviet Union Pavel Kurochkin (2nd Belorussian Front)
    Nazi Germany Adolf Hitler (Supreme Commander)
    Nazi Germany Erich von Manstein (Army Group South)
    Nazi Germany Walther Model (Army Group North Ukraine, from April 1944)
    Nazi Germany Ewald von Kleist (Army Group A)
    Nazi Germany Ferdinand Schörner (Army Group South Ukraine, from April 1944)
    Nazi Germany Hans-Valentin Hube (1st Panzer Army)
    Nazi Germany Erhard Raus (4th Panzer Army)
    Nazi Germany Otto Wöhler (8th Army)
    Nazi Germany Karl-Adolf Hollidt (6th Army)
    Nazi Germany Maximilian de Angelis (6th Army, from April 1944)
    Nazi Germany Walter Weiß (2nd Army)
    Nazi Germany Wilhelm Stemmermann (Overall commander of the forces in the Korsun Pocket)
    Kingdom of Romania Petre Dumitrescu (3rd Army)
    Kingdom of Romania Ioan Mihail Racoviță (4th Army)
    Kingdom of Hungary (1920–1946) Géza Lakatos (1st Army)
    Units involved
    Soviet Union 1st Ukrainian Front
    Soviet Union 2nd Ukrainian Front
    Soviet Union 3rd Ukrainian Front
    Soviet Union 4th Ukrainian Front (January–February 1944)
    Soviet Union 2nd Belorussian Front (March–April 1944)

    Nazi Germany Army Group South

    Nazi Germany Army Group A

    Nazi Germany Army Group Center

    Strength

    Soviet Union On 24 December 1943:

    2,406,100 personnel[3]

    2,015 tanks and self-propelled guns[4]

    28,654 guns and mortars[4]

    2,600 aircraft[4]

    Soviet Union On 1 March 1944:[5]

    2,111,987 personnel[6]

    2,652 operational tanks and self-propelled guns[6]

    611 tanks and self-propelled guns in repair[6]

    27,718 guns and mortars[6]

    1,621 aircraft[6]

    Nazi Germany On 1 March 1944:

    915,721 personnel[7]

    Kingdom of Romania 300,000+ personnel (by spring 1944)[8]

    3,235 guns and mortars[9]

    1,344 anti-tank guns[9]

    Kingdom of Hungary (1920–1946) 150,000-180,000 personnel (by spring 1944)[8]

    30 operational tanks[10]

    30 operational assault guns[11]

    60 operational armored vehicles in total

    75 tanks in repairs[10]
    Casualties and losses
    270,198 killed or missing[12]
    839,330 wounded & sick[12]
    4,666 tanks/assault guns destroyed[13]
    7,532 artillery pieces lost[12]
    676 aircraft destroyed[12]
    Total:
    1,109,528[12]

    Flag of German Reich (1935–1945) Germany
    Frieser:

    From 1 January to 30 April 1944:

    41,907 killed[14]
    157,888 wounded[14]
    51,161 missing[14]

    Total: 250,956 casualties[14] (Excluding 21 to 31 December 1943 and 1 to 10 May 1944)

    Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) Reports:

    From 1 January to 30 April 1944:

    Total: 379,688 casualties[15] (Excluding 21 to 31 December 1943 and 1 to 10 May 1944)

    2nd Army of Army Group Center during Polesskoe Offensive (Battle of Kovel):

    10,000+ killed, wounded and missing in action[16]

    Flag of Romania Romania unknown

    Flag of Hungary (1915-1918, 1919-1946) Hungary 1st Army:

    15,571 killed, wounded and missing (for 17-30 April 1944 only)[17]

    VII Army Corps:

    Unknown, destroyed at the end of March 1944[18]





    The Dnieper–Carpathian offensive (Russian: Днепровско-Карпатская Операция, Dneprovsko-Karpatskaya Operatsiya), also known in Soviet historical sources as the liberation of right-bank Ukraine (Russian: Освобождение Правобережной Украины, Osvobozhdeniye Pravoberezhnoy Ukrainy), was a strategic offensive executed by the Soviet 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts, along with the 2nd Belorussian Front, against the German Army Group South, Army Group A and elements of Army Group Center, and fought from late December 1943 to early May 1944.[2][19] The battles on the right-bank Ukraine and in the Crimea were the most important event of the 1944 winter-spring campaign on the Eastern Front.[20]

    Consisting of a whole series of closely linked operations, the goal of this offensive was to split Wehrmacht's Army Group South and to clear the German-Romanian-Hungarian forces from most of the Ukrainian and Moldavian territories, which were under the Axis forces. It was one of the biggest offensives of World War II, stretching over a 1,200 km (745 mi) front, to a 450 km depth (280 mi) and involving almost 3,500,000 troops from both sides.[21]

    In the course of the operation, 20 Wehrmacht divisions were either destroyed, disbanded or required major rebuilding, while another 60 divisions were reduced to 50% of their establishment strength.[22][23] Even worse were equipment losses, with thousands of precious tanks, assault guns, artillery and trucks being lost, principally through their abandonment in the spring mud.[24] According to German General Kurt von Tippelskirch, this was the biggest Wehrmacht defeat since Stalingrad.[20]

    As a result of this strategic offensive, Wehrmacht's Army Group South was split into two parts- north and south of the Carpathian Mountains. The northern portion was pushed back into Galicia (Poland), while the southern portion was pushed back into Romania. The northern portion was renamed to Army Group North Ukraine, while the southern portion to Army Group South Ukraine, which was effective from 5 April 1944, although very little of Ukraine remained in German hands. It was during this offensive that the Red Army for the first time reached the pre-war June 1941 state border of USSR, after which they transferred the combat into Polish and Romanian territory.[25]

    For the Wehrmacht defeat, the commander of Army Group South Erich von Manstein and the commander of Army Group A Ewald von Kleist were dismissed by Hitler and replaced by Walther Model and Ferdinand Schörner respectively. This offensive marked the end of Manstein's and Kleist's career in the Wehrmacht.

    In order to save its southern sector from complete collapse, the German high command was forced to transfer 8 divisions in January- February[26] and another 26 German divisions as reinforcements[27] between March- May from across France, Germany, Denmark, Poland, Balkans, Army Group Centre and Army Group North to the crumbling front of Army Group South. This amounted to a total of 34 divisions,[20] 550,000 men[28] and at least 1,850 tanks, assault guns, and self-propelled anti-tank guns.[29][30][31][32][33]

    As a result, the Soviet Dnieper–Carpathian offensive played a key role in influencing the future successes of Allied D-Day landings and Soviet Operation Bagration, as German forces stationed in France and belonging to Army Group Centre were critically weakened by those transfers.[34] All told, during the major crisis in the Western Ukraine, the German forces stationed in France were deprived of 45,827 troops[35] and 363 tanks, assault guns, and self-propelled anti-tank guns on 6 June 1944.[36] Meanwhile, Army Group Center was deprived of a total of 125,380 troops[37] and 552 tanks, assault guns, and self-propelled anti-tank guns on 22 June 1944.[38]

    The Soviet success during this operation has led the German High Command to conclude that the southern sector of the Eastern Front would be the area where the main Soviet summer offensive of 1944 would take place.[39] For this reason, the German forces in the south, especially the crucial panzer divisions, received priority in reinforcements. The weakening of Army Group Centre during the spring of 1944 and German anticipation that the southern sector of the Eastern Front would be the place of the main Soviet summer offensive of 1944, had catastrophic consequences to the Germans during Operation Bagration.[9] This Soviet offensive had a major military-political effect on Germany's Axis allies, Hungary and Romania.[40] The Soviet approach to Hungarian and Romanian borders during this offensive had prompted the leaders of both countries to seek peace with the Allies and leave the Axis.[41] The Germans were aware of this and with the Soviets approaching the borders of these two countries, the German side suspected that both countries would follow Italy's example.[42] To prevent this, Hitler ordered Operation Margarethe, a codename for German occupation of Hungary in March 1944. While both countries were already in negotiations with the Allies, they also began mobilizing an entire army each to face the approaching Soviets.[43] As the Soviets approached the borders of Hungary and Romania, both countries have mobilized their full resources and had committed a combined total of 25 fresh divisions.[28] While these Axis reinforcements are often overlooked, they nevertheless represented a significant reinforcement.

    This was the offensive in which for the first and only time in the history of the entire Soviet-German War all 6 Soviet tank armies, the elite of the Red Army's mechanized formations, had participated at the same time.[44] Similarly, most of the Wehrmacht's panzer divisions stationed in the East were deployed in Ukraine, belonging to Army Group South. Out of 30 panzer and panzer-grenadier divisions available in late 1943, 22 were stationed in Ukraine.[45]

    Background[]

    During the massive Battle of the Dnieper in autumn 1943, which secured the Left-bank or eastern Ukraine and cut off the German 17th Army in the Crimea, several Soviet bridgeheads were established across the right bank of the Dnieper River, which was declared to be "East Wall" by the Germans. These bridgeheads were expanded throughout November and December and became the platforms from which the Dnieper–Carpathian offensive was launched.[46]

    One of these bridgeheads centered around Kiev was up to 240 km wide and 120 km deep, and was occupied by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front.[47] The other, in the region of Cherkasy, Znamenka, and Dnepropetrovsk, was up to 350 km wide and 30 to 100 km deep, and was occupied by troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts.

    Meanwhile, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front reached the lower reaches of the Dnieper in the Kakhovka-Tsyurupinsk sector, and had cut off the German 17th Army stationed in the Crimean peninsula, while also seizing a bridgehead on the southern coast of Sivash.

    The troops of the North Caucasus Front (18th and 56th Armies, 4th Air Army) in early November 1943, with the assistance of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla, crossed the Kerch Strait and captured a bridgehead on the Kerch Peninsula.

    Forces involved and their plans[]

    Axis[]

    After a heavy defeat in the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, the German forces adopted a posture of strategic defense. The main line of the strategic behavior of the German forces on the Soviet-German front was stubborn defense in order to keep the occupied lines.[48] Plans for stubborn defense on the Soviet-German front were determined by political and, most importantly, economic factors.

    By holding the lines in Ukraine, the German High Command, Hitler foremost, hoped to prevent the German allies, namely Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria, from leaving the Axis military-political bloc. German General Kurt von Tippelskirch wrote the following:[48]

    "The front was rapidly approaching the Balkans. We had to fear that if events continued to develop with the same speed, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, despite their fear of Bolshevism, would become unreliable allies. The example of Italy was in this sense highly indicative".

    The most important reason for holding the right-bank Ukraine was economic. The control of Ukraine allowed the German leadership to export food and important strategic raw materials to Germany. In their calculations for stubborn defense, the Germans attached particular importance to the retention of the right-bank Ukraine and Crimea with their rich food resources, manganese production centers around Nikopol, iron ore production centers around Krivoy Rog and Kerch, as well as the Black Sea basin with first-class seaports.

    The German command took into account the important strategic position of the right bank of Ukraine and Crimea, as areas covering the approaches to southern Poland and the Balkans and ensuring control over the central and western parts of the Black Sea.

    Erich von Manstein's Army Group South and Ewald von Kleist's Army Group A consisted of 2 panzer and 2 field armies (from north to south):

    The German forces were also supported by the following Axis armies:

    All told, on the right-bank Ukraine the combined German-Romanian-Hungarian forces had a total of 93 divisions (including 18 panzer and 4 panzer-grenadier), 2 motorized brigades, 3 heavy panzer battalions of Tiger tanks, 18 StuG Assault Gun Brigades, a battalion of "Ferdinand" or Elefant tank destroyer, several anti-tank battalions, as well as a large number of artillery, construction, engineering and other units.[49] In general, this amounted to 40% of all German troops and 72% of all panzer divisions stationed on the Eastern Front. Army Group South was supported by the Luftwaffe's Luftflotte 4 (1st, 4th and 8th Air Corps), as well as the bulk of the Romanian Air Force. The headquarters of the Luftflotte 4 was in Proskurov, the 8th Air Corps in Vinnitsa, the 4th Air Corps in Balta, the 1st Air Corps in Pervomaisk, and the headquarters of the Romanian Air Corps in Odessa.

    All along the vast front, the Germans hastily built defenses. The main defense zone with a depth of 4–6 km had a developed system of trenches, communications and various kinds of engineering barriers.[47] On the most important directions, 6–15 km from the front line, a second line of defense was built. In the operational depth along the banks of the Goryn, Southern Bug, Ingulets, Dniester and Prut rivers, new fortifications were erected while the available fortifications were modernized.

    The German forces operating on the right-bank Ukraine intended not only to keep the occupied lines, but also to try and liquidate the Soviet bridgeheads on the right bank of the Dnieper, as well as to strike from the Nikopol bridgehead to the south and from the Crimea to the north, in order to re-establish a land connection with the German forces stationed in Crimea.

    By the end of 1943, the German forces operating in Ukraine were driven back to the line of Ovruch, Radomyshl, Kanev, Bashtina, Marganets, Kachachrovka. On the left bank of the Dnieper, south of Nikopol, the Germans kept a bridgehead with a depth of 30 km and a width of 120 km, which was called the "Nikopol Bridgehead".[48]

    Both Erich von Manstein and Ewald von Kleist demanded that their forces be allowed to pull back to more defensible positions, however, they were overruled by Hitler who ordered his armies to stand where they were.[50] Despite Hitler's orders, German troops retreated anyway, often in direct disregard of orders or after submitting fictitious reports to justify their actions.

    Soviet[]

    The Stavka committed four Fronts to the operation, with the Belorussian Front providing a strategic flank security to the north in the Gomel-Mogilev area, but taking little part in the actual operation. It included the 13th and 65th Armies. From north to the south, opposing 4th Panzer, 1st Panzer, 8th and 6th Armies respectively:

    Nikolai Vatutin's 1st Ukrainian Front had the 60th, 1st Guards, 6th Guards Tank[51] and 40th Armies, while also possessing significant armored reserves in the 3rd Guards Army and the 1st and 4th Tank Armies, backed up by the 18th and 38th Armies and the 2nd Air Army.

    Ivan Konev's 2nd Ukrainian Front to the south led with the 27th, 7th Guards and 53rd Armies, with reserves including the 5th Guards Tank and 2nd Guards Tank armies, and the 4th Guards Army, all supported by the 5th Air Army.

    Rodion Malinovsky's 3rd Ukrainian Front had the 57th, 46th, 8th Guards and 37th armies leading his front, with the 6th Army in reserve, and the 17th Air Army providing air support.

    Fyodor Tolbukhin's 4th Ukrainian Front would have the most difficult job in conducting combined operations of his Separate Coastal Army and the Black Sea Fleet while the 5th and 2nd Guards armies would cut off escape routes over land for the German 17th Army with air support from the 8th Air Army and the Black Sea Fleet naval aviation.

    In accordance with the general military-political task of completely clearing the Soviet land from the German forces and restoring the USSR's state borders from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea, the Soviet Supreme Command, Stavka, for the winter of 1943/44 planned a series of major offensive operations- near Leningrad and Novgorod, in Belarus, on the right-bank Ukraine and in the Crimea.[52]

    In the upcoming winter offensive, the main efforts of the Red Army forces were concentrated in the south with the task of liberating right-Bank Ukraine and Crimea. This would ensure the defeat of the largest strategic grouping of the Germans (Army Group South), the return to the Soviet control of economically important areas of Krivoy Rog, Kerch, Nikopol, the fertile lands of Ukraine and Crimea, first-class ports of the Black Sea, as well as the creation of necessary conditions for a further attack on the Balkans, Poland and towards the flank of Army Group Center, operating in Belarus.

    To fulfill the goals, the Soviet command utilized the troops of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts, Separate Coastal Army, the Black Sea Fleet, the Azov Flotilla, as well as the partisans operating in the rear of the Germans. According to the plan, which was formed by December 1943, the 1st Ukrainian Front was to crush the north wing of Army Group South by a blow from Kiev to Mogilev-Podolsky.[53] At the same time, the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts with blows from the north, east and south were supposed to surround and destroy the Krivoi Rog-Nikopol group of the Germans. At the end of December 1943, the situation prevailing in Ukraine made it necessary to change this plan somewhat. Instead of a deep blow to the south, in the direction of Kazanka, Bereznegovatoye, the 2nd Ukrainian Front had to attack with the main forces towards Kirovograd, Pervomaisk.

    In early January 1944, the plan for the actions of the Red Army troops was reduced in general terms to the following. The 1st Ukrainian Front would launch the main attack on Vinnitsa, Mogilev-Podolsky, with part of the forces being directed towards Lutsk and Khristinovka. The 2nd Ukrainian Front would launch the main attack on Kirovograd, Pervomaisk, with part of the forces being also directed towards Khristinovka, These combined Soviet offensives were to shatter the main forces of Army Group South, after which the Red Army would advance towards the Carpathian Mountains, thereby leading to a split of Army Group South. The actions of these fronts were coordinated by the Stavka representative Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov.

    The troops of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts would strike two converging blows in the directions of Nikopol, Novo-Vorontsovka and were to defeat the Nikopol-Krivoi Rog grouping of the Germans, then to develop an attack towards Nikolaev, Odessa and free the entire Black Sea coast. At the same time, the 4th Ukrainian Front was only initially engaged for joint actions with the 3rd Ukrainian Front to defeat the Germans in the Nikopol area- subsequently, the front switched to defeating the enemy in Crimea, together with the Separate Coastal Army, the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov military flotilla. The actions of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts were coordinated by the STAVKA representative Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky.

    Such a sequence was envisaged in solving the tasks: first, defeat the Germans in the areas adjacent to the Dnieper, and throw them back to the line of the Southern Bug river, Pervomaisk, Ingulets river. In the future, to develop an offensive to the west and southwest, reach the line of Lutsk, Mogilev-Podolsky and the Dniester river.

    The beginning of the operation to liberate Crimea was made dependent on the liquidation of the Nikopol-Krivoy Rog grouping of the Germans. Then, however, the deteriorating weather conditions in Crimea forced the beginning of this operation to be postponed until April.[54]

    The Soviet partisans were given the task of strengthening the attacks on German communications, road junctions, crossings, their rear garrisons, thereby assisting the Red Army.

    All told, at the start of January 1944 the 4 Soviet Ukrainian Fronts (1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts) had a total of 21 combined-arms armies, 3 tank armies and 4 air armies- a total of 169 rifle divisions, 9 cavalry divisions, 18 tank and mechanized corps, 31,530 guns and mortars, 1,908 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, 2,364 combat aircraft.

    Retained Soviet bridgeheads on the right bank of the Dnieper were the starting areas for the concentration of troops, military equipment, materiel needed for the impending offensive. In early December 1943, the Soviets began to regroup the troops. At night rifle divisions, artillery and tank units marched to the front line. A continuous stream of moving vehicles with weapons, military equipment, ammunition and food arrived to the front.

    The territory of the right-bank Ukraine[]

    The hostilities that unfolded in January–May 1944 in the southern section of the Soviet-German front covered a vast territory from the Dnieper to the Carpathians, from Polesia to the Black Sea, including the right-bank Ukraine, Western Ukraine, Southern Ukraine, Crimea, part of Moldova and Romania.[55]

    The terrain in the combat areas was very diverse, ranging from vast wooded swampy areas, endless steppes, to mountains and hills. On the right-bank Ukraine there are many rivers flowing mainly from the northwest to the southeast: for example, the Dnieper, Southern Bug, Ingulets, Dniester, Prut and Siret. Those rivers were serious natural barriers for the advancing Red Army troops that could be used by the Germans to organize defense. In general, the vast territory of the right-bank Ukraine allowed the Soviets to launch broad offensive operations and use all types of troops, including large armored and mechanized formations.

    Right-bank Ukraine makes up more than half of the territory of all Ukraine and is of extreme economic importance. There are many large administrative and industrial centers such as Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, Krivoy Rog, Nikolaev, Kirovograd, Vinnitsa.

    In the areas of the right-bank Ukraine, important industries were developed: iron ore (Krivoy Rog), manganese ore (Nikopol), oil extracting (Drohobych district), shipbuilding (Nikolaev), sugar, textile and other industries.[56] Wheat, sugar beet, maize, rye, and barley are grown on the territory of the right-bank Ukraine. Cattle breeding is well developed in the Polesie regions, while horticulture is well developed in the central and southern regions. Crimea is a horticulture and viticulture district. The iron ore development of the Kerch Peninsula is important. In the Crimea there are 4 large ports: Sevastopol, Feodosiya, Kerch, Yevpatoria.

    The capture of the right-bank Ukraine and the Crimea would open the doors for the Red Army troops to Poland, Slovakia, Romania and the Balkans. It would also ensure the domination of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet in the Central and Western parts of the Black Sea.

    Weather and its effect on combat operations[]

    One of the defining features of the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive is the weather, which had a major impact on combat operations.[57]

    Compared to previous winters on the Eastern Front, the winter of 1943–1944 in Ukraine was unusually warm. During the winter of 1941-1942 around Moscow, the temperatures reached as low -40 °C.[58] Meanwhile, during the winter 1942-1943 Soviet offensives in southern Russia, after the German 6th Army was destroyed at Stalingrad, the temperatures reached at least as low as -20 °C.[59]

    In 1944, spring in Ukraine was early. Already in January 1944, melting of the snow began, the wet snow was soon followed by rain. In February, there were frosts and snowstorms in places, but not for long, then it got warmer again by the end of the month. For 10 days in the period from 27 January to 18 February 1944, there were constant rains and wet snowfalls, for 5 days there were no precipitation, while the rest of the days there were snowfalls.[60] Daily mean temperature in Ukraine during this period ranged from -5.5 °C to +4.9 °C.[60] The rivers became flooded, the roads became very muddy, the terrain outside roads became difficult to pass.

    Alexander Werth, a British journalist and wartime correspondent, who was with the 2nd Ukrainian Front at the time, described what he saw in Ukraine in the spring of 1944:[61]

    "The Ukrainian mud in spring has to be seen to be believed. The whole country is swamped, and the roads are like rivers of mud, often two feet deep, with deep holes to add to the difficulty of driving any kind of vehicle, except a Russian T- 34 tank. Most of the German tanks could not cope with it."

    The flooded rivers became serious obstacle for both sides. For the Germans attempting to break out of Korsun Pocket in February 1944, the last obstacle was the Gniloy Tikich shallow river. Usually, in the hot summer the river was no bigger than a brook that can be easily forded, but in February 1944, after a three-week thaw, the Gniloy Tikich flooded to a width of 20–30 meters.[62] The river was transformed into a fast flowing river, deeper than a person's height. It was a serious obstacle for the encircled German units that had lost their engineering equipment, as there was no bridge or fishing boat on the river. The banks of the Gniloy Tikich became a grave for thousands of German soldiers. Soon Soviet tanks approached the river and their shots began to pierce gaps in the ranks of the Germans who had gathered on its banks.[62] The retreat turned into a disorderly flight. German soldiers threw themselves into the icy water, trying to swim across the river, and many drowned or succumbed to frostbite .

    All this sharply reduced the maneuverability of the troops of both sides, especially the Soviet troops that were on continuous advance with supply bases being over 300 km behind. It also limited the use of tanks and artillery, and hampered the supply of food, fuel and ammunition. In connection with the spring thaw, most of the ground airfields were no longer usable, which complicated the deployment and usage of aviation.

    However, much to the disappointment of the Germans, the Red Army continued their offensives, becoming the only force in the history of warfare that was able to launch large-scale and successful offensives in the conditions of the spring mud (rasputitsa) and amid flooded rivers.[63]

    Battle[]

    Liberation of Ukraine

    Dnieper–Carpathian offensive

    First phase[]

    The initial phase of the offensive, it lasted from 24 December 1943, to 29 February 1944. It included the following operations:[64]

    Zhitomir–Berdichev offensive[]

    The offensive was launched on December 24, 1943, by General Nikolai Vatutin's 1st Ukrainian Front, with attacks against the German 4th Panzer Army, to the west and south-west of Kiev.[51][65] Manstein attempted to counter the attack with a flank attack by the Fourth Panzer Army, while simultaneously requesting reinforcements and permission to shorten the line by withdrawing.[66] Vatutin's offensive continued west, and the Fortieth Army passed south of Fastov.[67] Manstein's attempted counterattack failed when Erhard Raus, the commander of the Fourth Panzer Army, said that he did not have time to organize for an offensive and preferred to attempt to directly stop the attacking troops.[67] On December 27, Manstein directly asked Hitler for permission to pull back his troops, but he was ordered to hold.[51] Soviet troops attacked Kazatin on December 28. After several hours of confused fighting, Soviet forces captured the town later that day.[67] Korosten fell on December 29, and Zhitomir followed on December 31.[51]

    Zitomir 43-44

    Soviet tank army on the move during the Zhitomir-Berdichev Offensive.

    The Fourth Panzer Army began to fall apart, as a 35-mile gap opened around Zhitomir between its southern flank and the XIII Corps.[68] Another gap developed between the XXXXII Corps and VII Corps.[68] Raus advised Manstein to forgo attempts to close the gaps, and instead focus on keeping the remaining Corps intact.[68] Around the time of the new year, however, Soviet forces began an attempt to encircle German forces, particularly the XIII, XXXXVIII, and XXIV Panzer Corps.[68] As attacks on areas surrounding Berdichev continued, the XIII Corps was reduced to the strength of one infantry regiment.[69] A gap of almost 70 miles was opened between Fourth Panzer Army and the First Panzer Army.[69] Planned German reinforcements were stopped by the Soviet Kirovograd offensive.[69]

    In the course of the operation the Soviets achieved notable success. Having advanced to a depth of 80 to 200 km, they almost completely cleared the German forces from the Kiev and Zhytomyr regions, a number of districts of the Vinnitsa and Rovno regions.[70] The Soviets now dangerously hanged from the north over Army Group South, while the 27th and 40th Armies had deeply enveloped the German troops that continued to hold the right bank of the Dnieper in the area of Kanev. This created the conditions for the subsequent Korsun-Schevchenkovsky Operation.

    Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-278-0898-04, Russland, Panzerhaubitze "Hummel"

    Hummel self-propelled artillery piece in the Ukraine, 1944.

    The blow of the 1st Ukrainian Front was struck at the most sensitive place of Army Group South – its northern flank, which threatened to cut off its main forces from the paths leading to Germany. The 1st and 4th Panzer Armies operating in the front line had suffered serious losses- the 143rd and 147th Reserve Infantry Divisions were disbanded, the 68th Infantry Division due to heavy losses was withdrawn from the front-line and sent to Poland for extensive refits, while 8th Panzer Division, 20th Panzer-Grenadier Division, 112th, 291st and 340th Infantry Divisions were halved in strength.[70] All told, 8 Wehrmacht divisions were either destroyed or halved in strength.

    To close the gaps in their defense and to stop the Soviet offensive on this sector, the Germans had to urgently transfer 12 divisions of the 1st Panzer Army from the southern Ukraine to this area. The reserves turned out to be almost completely spent, which affected the further course of operations. To parry the subsequent attacks of the Soviet troops, the German command was forced to deploy troops from Western Europe, as well as from Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia.[70]

    Kirovograd offensive[]

    General Ivan Konev's 2nd Ukrainian Front next joined the fray by launching the Kirovograd offensive on January 5, 1944.[51] One of the first accomplishments was to stop III Panzer Corps' attempted reinforcement of the Fourth Panzer Army, which was simultaneously being attacked by Vatutin's Front in the Zhitomir–Berdichev offensive.[69] At this point, Manstein flew to Hitler's headquarters in East Prussia to ask permission to withdraw, but was again refused.[51]

    Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-090-3912-05A, Russland, Panzer IV im Schnee

    German Panzer IV and infantry in the Ukraine, January 1944.

    As a result of the Kirovograd operation, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front pushed back the Germans from the Dnieper 40–50 km. During intense battles, the German 8th Army suffered significant losses- the 167th Infantry Division was disbanded due to heavy losses, while the 10th Panzer-Grenadier Division, 106th, 282nd and 376th infantry divisions suffered 50 to 75% losses in personnel and lost a large number of equipment.[71]

    The most important result of the operation was the liberation of Kirovograd – a major stronghold and an important road junction, which broke the stability of the defense of the 8th German Army.[71] The capture of Kirovograd threatened from the south the flanks of German forces which were located around Korsun-Schevchenkovsky. In turn, the Kirovograd Operation, alongside the neighboring Zhitomir-Berdichev Operation, created the conditions for the subsequent Korsun-Schevchenkovsky Operation.

    Korsun–Shevchenkovsky offensive[]

    The main effort was to the south, where the Korsun–Shevchenkovsky offensive was launched on January 24. After a massive bombardment,[51] 2nd Ukrainian Front's 4th Guards and 53rd Armies attacked to the south of the Korsun bulge, and were joined the next day by the 5th Guards Tank Army. They broke through and easily repelled a German counter-attack.[51] On January 26, 1st Ukrainian Front dispatched 6th Guards Tank Army from the north, which met up with the forces advancing from the south on January 28, encircling about 60,000 Germans in XI and XXXXII Army Corps around Korsun, in a pocket named "Little Stalingrad" due to the ferocity of the fighting in it.[51][72]

    Wreckedtruckserickson1

    German equipment destroyed during the breakout attempt from the Korsun Pocket.

    In total, twenty-seven Soviet divisions were assigned to destroy the pocket.[73] Soviet efforts, however, were hindered by the onset of an early thaw, which made the ground muddy.[73] On February 4 Manstein dispatched Hans Hube, commanding the 1st Panzer Army,[73] including XLVII and III Panzer Corps to assist in a breakout attempt. XLVII Panzer Corps attacked from the south-east, while III Panzer Corps attacked the west, but they were both bogged down by the mud.[51] Zhukov issued a surrender demand to the forces trapped in the pocket on February 8, but was turned down.[73] III Panzer Corps was eventually, after a hard battle of attrition, able to reach Lysyanka, close to the trapped forces,[51] and German forces in the pocket attempted to break out, with a majority perhaps escaping, albeit with heavy losses in abandoned wounded and heavy equipment. Running out of supplies and harried by airstrikes and advancing ground forces, Wilhelm Stemmermann, commander of the trapped forces, decided to attempt a final break-out on the night of February 16–17.[51] The Soviets took approximately 15,000 prisoners, and killed at least 10,000 Germans, including Stemmermann. The battle was waged under incredibly brutal conditions, with Russian POWs shot by the Germans during the retreat, and Konev admitted to allowing his cavalry to massacre troops attempting surrender with upraised hands.

    On the results of this battle and its impact on subsequent course of events, German military historian Alex Buchner wrote:[74]

    "It had not become a second Stalingrad, but two German army corps had ceased to exist and the better part of six divisions, which were soon to be bitterly needed, had been destroyed. [...] The two corps had also lost their entire complement of armaments, equipment, vehicles and horses. Hitler's totally absurd plan for a German offensive toward Kiev had failed at the outset, and his authorization for a breakout from the pocket had been given far too late. The enemy could no longer be stopped. The Soviet flood broke loose again, overwhelming the entire Ukraine, and soon reached the Dnestr."

    Rovno–Lutsk offensive[]

    Vatutin's forces continued attacking on the right flank, coming near to the important supply centers of Lvov and Ternopol in the Rovno–Lutsk Offensive,[65] which opened a 110-mile gap between Army Group South and Army Group Center, which was stationed to the north.[65]

    Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-711-0410-33, Russland, Schützenpanzer in Fahrt

    German armored half-tracks on the move on the muddy roads of Ukraine, 1944.

    Nikopol–Krivoi Rog offensive[]

    The Nikopol–Krivoi Rog offensive was meanwhile launched by 3rd Ukrainian Front to the south against forces in Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist's Army Group A, and proceeded slowly at first.[75] However, it eventually destroyed the salient projecting around Kryvyi Rih and Nikopol, costing the Germans the important mining operations there as well as nearly encircling the defenders.[75]

    While the offensive appeared to slow down in late February, the Soviets were preparing for the second phase of the offensive, soon to be launched on an even larger scale.[72]

    Second phase[]

    These operations were included in the second phase by Soviet planners:[70]

    Proskurov–Chernovtsy offensive[]

    This was the biggest and most important Soviet operation of the Dnieper–Carpathian offensive. After the slackening of the Soviet effort at the end of February, the OKH, the headquarters for the Eastern Front, believed any further offensive effort in that sector unlikely.[72]

    Ucraina 1944

    Soviet T-34's and tank riders in the Ukrainian village, spring 1944.

    However, the Soviets were secretly preparing an even greater offensive, bringing in all six tank armies stationed in Ukraine.[76] The Soviet deception measures were successful and most Germans were surprised when, on March 4, the 1st Ukrainian Front–commanded by Marshal Georgy Zhukov after Vatutin's death–launched the Proskurov–Chernovtsy offensive (see Kamenets-Podolsky pocket), with a fierce artillery barrage.[51] Due to the extremely muddy conditions, it was hard for the defending Germans to remain mobile, but the Soviet forces had adequate supplies of tracked tanks and trucks, giving them the advantage.[51]

    Uman–Botoshany offensive[]

    On March 5 Koniev launched the Uman–Botoshany offensive,[51] advancing rapidly and soon cutting off the supply line for First Panzer Army by capturing Chortkov on March 23.[51] On March 10, the 2nd Ukrainian Front destroyed two Panzer Corps by capturing them at the fall of Uman.[77]

    Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-090-3949-19A, Russland, Gruppe deutscher Soldaten

    German soldiers in the Ukrainian village, March 1944.

    Bereznegovatoye–Snigirevka offensive[]

    Malinovsky joined with the Bereznegovatoye–Snigirevka offensive the next day,[51] while Tolbukin was detached to begin preparations for the Crimean offensive.[78] These Fronts advanced rapidly, while Konev moved to cut off the withdrawal of the First Panzer Army. The First Panzer Army, now commanded by Hans Hube, was entirely encircled by March 28.[51] During the encirclement, Eric von Manstein flew to Hitler's headquarters and asked him to revoke his directive that required all encircled formations to form "fortresses" where they were.[79] He was successful, and received II SS Panzer Corps as reinforcements, the first transfer of forces to the Eastern Front at the expense of the Western Front since Hitler's Führer Directive 51.[76]

    On March 30, Hube's forces struck out of the pocket, and, because Soviet military intelligence was unaware of the arrival of II Panzer Corps[76] and he moved west, instead of south as Soviet commanders were expecting,[79] he was successful, and, by April 10, Hube's forces had met up with the Fourth Panzer Army.[79] Despite this small success, Hitler blamed his generals for the overall strategic success of Soviet forces, fired the commanders of Army Group South and Army Group A (von Manstein and von Kleist, respectively), replaced them with Walter Model and Ferdinand Schörner, and renamed them Army Groups North and South Ukraine, indicating his plans to recapture this territory.[80]

    A large gun trapped in mud. Several men in long, heavy coats are pushing on it trying to get it free.

    Soviet artillerymen pulling a gun stuck in the mud, Ukraine, spring 1944.

    Polesskoe offensive[]

    Meanwhile, towards the south, the 3rd Ukrainian Front was advancing on Odessa and into the Romanian-administered Transnistria.[79] After three days of heavy fighting, his spearheading Eight Guards Army had advanced only 5 miles (8.0 km), but it had broken the crust of Karl-Adolf Hollidt's Sixth Army, and quickly advanced 25 miles (40 km) towards Novyi Buh, nearly encircling the defenders.[79] Despite Hitler's orders forbidding retreat, German forces fell back to the Bug River by March 11. The same day, Hollidt managed to break out from his encirclement – primarily because Malinovsky had divided his forces at Mykolaiv (Nikolaev)[79] – and was able to improvise a defensive line on the Bug by March 21. However, he had lost Hitler's confidence, and was sacked, to be replaced with Maximilian de Angelis.[79] On March 28, pressed hard all over the line, German troops began to fall back from the Bug.[79]

    Odessa offensive[]

    File:Sov Odessa 44.jpg

    Soviet T-34 tanks near Odessa, April 1944.

    By March 25, the Prut had fallen and the 3rd Ukrainian Front was dispatched to secure Odessa.[77] On April 2, Vasili Chuikov's Eighth Guards Army and Forty-Sixty Army attacked through a blizzard[79] and, by April 6, had driven the defenders past the Dniester River and isolated Odessa.[79] Odessa capitulated on April 10, and Soviet troops began entering Romania proper.[79]

    Aftermath[]

    The battles on the right-bank Ukraine and in the Crimea were the most important events of the 1944 winter-spring campaign on the Eastern Front and were of the greatest political, economic and strategic importance.[20]

    RIAN archive 1726 Captive German Soldiers crossing a field

    German POWs near Odessa, April 1944

    Between late December 1943– early May 1944, the Red Army troops defeated the strongest German force on the territory of the right-bank, western and southern Ukraine, which was Army Group South and Army Group A, and forced the battered army groups to retreat 250–450 km to the west, into eastern Poland (Galicia) and Romania.

    The defeat of Army Group South and Army Group A, and the clearing of the German forces from the Right-Bank Ukraine and Crimea had radically changed the strategic situation in the south. With the Red Army capturing the Lvov-Odessa railway, the main supply lifeline of Army Group South, and reaching the Carpathian Mountains, the front of Army Group South was split into two parts- north and south of the Carpathians. The northern portion was pushed back into Galicia (Poland), while the southern portion was pushed back into Romania.

    The northern portion was renamed to Army Group North Ukraine, while the southern portion to Army Group South Ukraine, which was effective from 5 April 1944, although very little of Ukraine remained in German hands. As a result of this split, the connection between these two new army groups had been broken. Now, the southern group of German forces would have to use the long roundabout route through the Balkans, with all of the supplies being rerouted over the Romanian railroads, which were in poor condition.

    For the German forces deployed in Ukraine, the personnel losses were significant. During the campaign, 9 infantry and 1 Luftwaffe field division were destroyed,[20] while 7 panzer and panzergrenadier, 1 parachute, and 2 infantry divisions were so badly damaged that they were withdrawn from the front and sent to the West for extensive refits.[39] Nearly all the rest of the divisions were heavily damaged as well, suffering at least 50% losses in personnel, while some were left with just remnants of their troops.[20] For instance, 18 of the 39 divisions belonging to Army Group A were categorized as Kampfgruppen, or battle groups, meaning that the divisions were so depleted as to actually be the equivalent of little more than reinforced regiments.[81]

    According to German General Kurt von Tippelskirch, the defeat of the German forces on the Right-bank Ukraine was the biggest since Stalingrad:[20]

    "Since the time when the German armies followed a thorny path from the Volga and the Caucasus, retreating to the Dnieper, this was their biggest defeat. Even such skilled generals as Manstein and Kleist could not save the German troops."

    In Crimea, during the April–May 1944 Crimean offensive, the German 17th Army was annihilated. The 5 German and 7 Romanian divisions that were part of it were largely destroyed.

    In reaction to the German defeat, Hitler took repressive measures against the senior command. The commander of Army Group South Erich von Manstein and the commander of Army Group A Ewald von Kleist were dismissed by Hitler and replaced by Walther Model and Ferdinand Schörner respectively. Many commanders of corps, divisions and commandants of the "fortresses" were removed from their posts and put on trial. Thousands of middle and junior officers were convicted by military courts.

    British military historian John Erickson described the results of this offensive:[82]

    "The Soviet command could look with real satisfaction on the damage it had inflicted on the Ostheer's southern wing, now visibly crumpled; ten German divisions destroyed, eight disbanded owing to losses, sixty divisions halved in strength and eight left with only a remnant of their men. The two super-soldiers Manstein and Kleist, who had for so long cast immense shadows in the east, suddenly vanished in a Hitlerian storm-cloud of dismissals. Marshal Zhukov had won his protracted encounter with Field-Marshal von Manstein."

    With a crushing blows between January and May 1944, the Red Army thwarted the intentions of the German command to wage a protracted defensive war and overturned all attempts by the Germans to create a stable defense on the southern part of the Soviet-German front.

    The huge losses of the German troops significantly shook the stability of the German defenses on the entire Soviet-German front, weakening the forces of the neighboring Army Group Center, as well as weakening the German forces stationed in France prior to the opening of the second front in Europe.

    The Dnieper–Carpathian offensive had a major impact upon the future course of events during the summer of 1944 in the East and West.[34] In essence, the battle turned out to be a huge bloodsucker that absorbed huge amounts of German resources from across France, Germany, Denmark, Poland, Balkans and Army Group Center. All told, between January–May 1944, a total of 34 divisions,[20] 550,000 men[28] and at least 1,200 tanks, assault guns, and self-propelled anti-tank guns[29][30][31][33] were transferred to Ukraine from across Europe and Army Group Center.

    This Soviet offensive also ended any prospects the Germans may had about creating a sizable strategic reserve, since most of the German reserves were exhausted in this battle.[34] In turn, this set the Wehrmacht up for a new series of even greater disasters in the summer of 1944. While German defeat was inevitable at this point in the war, the Soviet success during this offensive had sped up the process of the eventual Allied victory and saved the Allies a great deal of time, blood, and treasure.

    The Soviet success during this offensive created the conditions for a series of major offensives in the summer of 1944.[20] First, conditions were created to develop attacks in the Lublin direction to the flank and rear of Army Group Center, which were accomplished during the Lublin–Brest offensive. Secondly, conditions were created to develop attack in the Lvov direction and towards eastern Poland, which was accomplished during the Lvov–Sandomierz offensive. Thirdly, conditions were created to develop attack deeper into Romania and the Balkans, which were accomplished during the second Jassy–Kishinev offensive.

    The operation, along with the Crimean offensive, resulted in very heavy casualties for the unmotorized Romanian troops stationed in Ukraine.[79] The heavy casualties and the proximity of Soviet forces to the Romanian border were the primary motivations for Romanian leaders when they began secret peace talks in Moscow soon after the completion of the offensive.[79]

    Speaking about the results of the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive and the neighboring inter-related Crimean Offensive, U.S. military historian David Glantz wrote:[83]

    "By May 1944, the Red Army had freed virtually all Soviet territory in the south and, in the process, shattered large portions of First Panzer, Sixth, Eighth, and Seventeenth Armies. The strategic attention of Hitler and the German High Command was riveted on the southern region. The presence of all six Soviet tank armies in that region led them to conclude that it would be the focus of the Soviet summer offensive. This preoccupation goes far to explain the Germans' surprise when the next great offensive was aimed at Army Group Center.

    The victories of winter-spring 1944 had significant political as well as military consequences. In late March, Marshal Ion Antonescu of Rumania flew to Berlin to appeal for the evacuation of Rumanian troops in the Crimea. He had already lost the region of present-day Bessarabia and Moldova, which Rumania had annexed, and now faced defeat in the Crimea, where Rumanian arms had shone so brilliantly in 1942. He persuaded Hitler to concentrate the remaining Rumanian forces under a new Army Group South Ukraine, which was geographically isolated from the rest of the German line. But Rumania was clearly on the edge of annihilation, and Antonescu had already extended diplomatic feelers to Moscow and London. Meanwhile, on 19 March, German troops had occupied Hungary to prevent its defection. Only the Bulgarian government clung desperately to Germany."

    Impact of the offensive on the 1944 summer events in Normandy[]

    The Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive had a major impact in influencing the subsequent course of events during the Battle of Normandy, specifically, in terms of German force dispositions and resource allocations, which then had a very detrimental effect for the Wehrmacht in the summer of 1944.[84]

    Direct weakening of German forces in Western Europe prior to D-Day landings[]

    In November 1943, Hitler created the Fuhrer Directive No. 51, which assigned top strategic priority to the improvement of German defenses in Western Europe and no longer allowed withdrawals of German forces from Western Europe to reinforce the Eastern Front.[85] In the spring of 1944, however, the dramatic developments on the Eastern Front in Ukraine, during the Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, forced Hitler to reconsider this strategy for the time being. In late March 1944, during the Soviet Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation, the entire 1st Panzer Army, numbering over 200,000 personnel, was encircled by the Red Army in the Kamenets-Podolsky Pocket. This encirclement was the largest catastrophe facing the Wehrmacht since Stalingrad, which would precipitate the collapse of the entire southern sector of the German Eastern Front.[86]

    Faced with a prospect of a new Stalingrad before the Allied invasion of France would even begin, Hitler was forced to yield to Manstein‟s demands for powerful reinforcements that would de-blockade the 1st Panzer Army.[87] As reinforcements, he provided the entire II SS Panzer Corps (with the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions) from France in April 1944, as well as divisions from the Balkan Theatre of Operations.[27] Designated as the "Hauser Attack Group", they were commanded by SS Obergruppenführer Paul Hauser.[88] Furthermore, a month earlier in March 1944, during the same Soviet offensive, the OKW had already transferred one infantry division, one Tiger tank battalion and two StuG Assault Gun brigades from France to Ukraine.[37]

    This major transfer of forces from France to Ukraine with just months before the Allied D-Day landings was detrimental to the German prospects of successfully defending France. The withdrawal of two SS panzer and one infantry divisions, one Tiger tank battalion, and two assault gun brigades in the spring of 1944, meant that OB West was deprived of a total of 363 tanks, assault guns, and self-propelled anti-tank guns on 6 June 1944.[89] This number, however, is still incomplete. In January 1944, a Panther tank battalion was transferred from France to Army Group South in Ukraine, equipped with 76 new Panthers.[90] All told, between January–April 1944, the German forces stationed in France were deprived of well over 400 armored vehicles, with the biggest transfer being made in April 1944, when the II SS Panzer Corps was transferred to Ukraine.

    U.S. military historian Earl F. Ziemke, described the impact that these transfers had on the German prospects of repelling the Allied invasion:[91]

    "The decision to give Manstein more divisions was painful for Hitler and the OKW. It jeopardized the strategy laid down in Fuehrer Directive 51- and carefully nurtured through the winter- just when the Anglo-American invasion seemed most likely to come. The four infantry divisions sent east earlier in the month and the two Hitler gave on 26 March came out of OKW reserves and the Southeastern Theater, which was bad enough. Losing II SS Panzer Corps and its two spanking new panzer divisions cut directly into the anti-invasion forces, and divisions that went to the Eastern Front, experience taught, were a long time coming back."

    Similarly, German military historian and retired Colonel of the Bundeswehr Karl-Heinz Frieser wrote about the impact of the transfer of the II SS Panzer Corps to the Eastern Front:[87]

    "After the successful Allied landing in Normandy, Hitler complained of the absence of that corps, which was to have constituted the operational reserve. The SS armoured units, whose modern fighting vehicles were superior to those of the Americans and British, would have caused the western Allies considerable difficulties if they could have been deployed in the right place at the right time. As this example shows, Germany’s military situation had deteriorated so alarmingly that even the absence of two armoured divisions now had operational, rather than merely tactical, consequences."

    One week after the Allied invasion of Normandy, the II SS Panzer Corps was ordered back to France.[36] However, the Allied air interdiction and damage to the French railway net delayed their arrival at the invasion front until the last days of June 1944. While the commitment of the II SS Panzer Corps at that point had ended the British Operation Epsom, it also meant that German hopes for launching a coordinated effort to wipe out the British portion of the Allied bridgehead failed to materialize. From that point on, the corps was fully preoccupied with simply trying to contain the Allied bridgehead.

    The presence of the II SS Panzer Corps in France on 6 June 1944 would have represented a major reinforcement.[36] With its two divisions possessing most of their required number of motor vehicles and hence a high degree of mobility, the II SS Panzer Corps would have been employed against the Allied landings at a very early stage. While the early deployment of an additional two panzer divisions may not have been enough to eliminate any of the Allied beachheads, their presence would nonetheless have made the German defense lines in Normandy even more formidable. Breaching these German defences would have entailed significantly higher costs of time, blood and equipment for the Allied forces. Given the difficulties the Allies experienced in overcoming the German containment front as it in fact existed, with the British and Canadian armies experiencing dire shortages of trained infantry replacements during the campaign, and Winston Churchill worried that fighting in Normandy was degenerating into positional warfare reminiscent of the Great War, the situation for the Allies could have been far worse.[36]

    German General Walter Warlimont, who was deputy chief of operations for the OKW from 1939 to 1944, wrote about the damaging effect that the second stage of the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, the Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation in particular, had upon the German forces in Western Europe preparing for Allied invasion, which made the Fuhrer Directive No. 51 largely unrealistic:[92]

    "During these months [winter-spring 1944] the most serious and most continuous drain on the forces preparing for defence against the invasion was constituted by withdrawals to the Eastern Front. [...] In March Hitler was so shaken by the catastrophic developments in the southern sector of the Eastern Front, developments for which he himself was responsible by clinging to lines which had long since become untenable, that he threw overboard all the principles laid down regarding the relative importance of East and West. Away went three newly formed divisions from Poland, one from Denmark and two from the South-eastern area, all of which were immediate or potential candidates for the West. On the night of 24 March he began raiding the resources of the West in earnest. [...] It is true that Hitler only reached this decision after deliberating on it for some days; it is also probably true that, without this assistance, the First Panzer Army in the East, which was now in a pocket in the northern foothills of the Carpathians, could not have escaped encirclement. This does not alter the fact however that, in view of the threat hanging over the West, the German Supreme Command ought never to have let things get to such a pass. Contrary to his normal practice, Hitler in this case took a risk which can only be characterized as a gamble. Had there been an Army Chief of Staff responsible for all theatres of war, such a situation would never have been allowed to develop. Some of the responsibility must be laid at the door of Jodl. Admittedly he had long since given up all pretensions of dealing with the situation in the East in detail, and had thereby renounced one of the essential elements of his job. Nevertheless he could have produced sound reasons to stop this destruction of the framework of the defence in the West, so laboriously built up and yet still inadequate."

    Regarding the Fuhrer Directive No. 51 and how impractical it was on German preparations against Allied invasion, Warlimont further added:[93]

    "This directive (No. 51) was the starting point and framework on which the German Wehrmacht prepared for its great task of defence against the forthcoming attack on Western Europe (in which Denmark was included); operationally it laid down the principles upon which the battle at the start of the invasion was conducted. [...] In spite of all this, contrary to his own convictions and his own orders, Hitler continued, literally up to the day before the invasion, to prejudice the defensive preparations in the West in favour of the East or even of Italy. [...] But he then went on to reveal the real situation when he said: ‘but it is very difficult for me. I look at the situation in the East every day; it’s horrible. Another five or six divisions (!) might be decisive and lead to a great victory.’ [...] Detailed study of the facts will show that the intentions expressed in Directive No. 51 were honoured more on paper than in reality. [...] Instead what the German Supreme Command proposed, and indeed all it could propose, was little better than a series of expedients. As time went on it became ever clearer that the defence against the invasion would have to be undertaken primarily by the forces already available in the West; it equally became clear that these forces had neither the numbers nor the fighting capacity to stand up to a large-scale battle of attrition."

    Poor shape of half of German armored divisions stationed in Western Europe[]

    At the time of Allied D-Day landings on 6 June 1944, the German forces in Western Europe altogether had eleven panzer and panzergrenadier divisions.[94] Of this number, however, five and a half divisions or every one out of two, were actually formations that only recently arrived to Western Europe, between March to May 1944, after being heavily damaged on the Eastern Front in Ukraine during the Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive.[94] Their late arrival to the West, coupled with the very poor shape that those divisions were in at the time of their arrival, meant that at the time of Allied D-Day landings they were not combat-ready and at best only partially operational.

    All of these divisions arrived to the West severely depleted in personnel and with very little equipment. By early June 1944 these formations had been mostly replenished with their required number of personnel. However, the biggest problem impeding the rapid restoration of these divisions to full operational readiness was a crippling lack of equipment, especially in terms of tanks, self-propelled anti-tank guns, and motor vehicles.[95] These deficiencies affected unit training, and severely limited the firepower and especially the mobility of panzer divisions whose strength rested upon their ability to hit hard and fast. This meant that all of these divisions arrived to the invasion front in Normandy piecemeal and not as a single cohesive fighting unit.

    Swedish military historian Niklas Zetterling, analyzing the German forces in Western Europe at the time of Allied landings, wrote:[96]

    "The image of the German forces in the west as combat ready units eagerly awaiting an Allied invasion, but hampered by ambiguous, divided and hesitant command does not stand up to closer scrutiny. While the description of the German higher command certainly has some merit, it is not true that the German ground forces in general could have intervened swiftly on any of the possible invasion sites. The main reason for this was the lack of mobility and incomplete training among several units. Insufficient mobility was caused by shortages of vehicles, spare parts and fuel. These factors, together with shortages of ammunition also hampered training. Another important factor was, of course, the fact that many of the panzer formations in the west were units depleted after sustained combat on the Eastern Front [Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive]. The replacements fed into these units needed training and since important units had arrived during the spring 1944, they were not yet fully trained when the Allies invaded. These factors, together with limited stockpiling of fuel and ammunition were the main reasons for the slow German commitment of units to Normandy."

    For example, the elite 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) at the time of its withdrawal from Ukraine to Belgium for rebuilding in April 1944 was a shell of its former self. In March 1944, its combat strength (kampfstärke) was a mere 1,229 men or below 25% of its authorized strength.[97] By March 1944, all of the division's combat battalions were rated as "burnt-out" (abgekämpft), meaning that each of them had less than 100 combat-ready men.[98] From 227 tanks with which the division arrived to Ukraine from Italy in November 1943, nearly everything was irrevocably lost in the spring mud during the breakout as part of the 1st Panzer Army from the Kamenets-Podolsky Pocket in April 1944, other than 2 Tigers and 9 StuG's.[99] The same case was with motor vehicles of all types, artillery etc.

    While by June 1944 LSSAH was near-fully replenished in terms of personnel, many of the men were recently arrived recruits who had to be trained.[100] The situation with equipment was very poor- on 1 June 1944, LSSAH had only 28% of their authorized trucks operational.[94] Specifically, the division was authorized to have 3,887 trucks of all types, but had only 1,691 in total (44%), of which a mere 1,070 trucks (28%) were in running order, while the rest were in maintenance facilities.[100] It did not have a single armored half-track operational. Similarly, the division possessed only 43% of its authorized tanks on 1 June 1944.[94]

    All of these major deficiencies meant that LSSAH was not combat ready at the time of Allied D-Day landings and arrived to the front piecemeal. The first elements of LSSAH deployed to the invasion front arrived in late June 1944, but even this was only a two-battalion battle group.[101] Most of the division only began its assembly south of Caen on 6 July, but even then significant elements of the division remained behind at its initial deployment area in Belgium because they had still not received their required weapons and vehicles. In fact, these units would never rejoin the division while it was in Normandy.

    Another elite division, the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich, was in similar shape. After continuous battles, from the start of the Battle of Kursk in July 1943 to the end of the Battle of the Dnieper in December 1943, the division was significantly depleted. In December 1943, before the start of the Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, elements of Das Reich were withdrawn from Ukraine to Germany for refitting and in February 1944 were sent to southern France.[102] Meanwhile, Das Reich's armoured brigade-sized combat group (kampfgruppe), which represented the main strike power of the division and numbered 5,598 personnel, remained on the Eastern Front in Ukraine.[103] In the course of the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, the combat group suffered significant personnel losses and lost most of its armored and motor vehicles during the breakout as part of the 1st Panzer Army from the Kamenets-Podolsky Pocket in April 1944.[104] It was only after this that the combat group rejoined the rest of the division in France.[102]

    Just like LSSAH, Das Reich had major deficiencies in equipment at the time of Allied landings- on 1 June 1944, it had a mere 23% of its authorized trucks, 56% of its tanks and 54% of its artillery.[94] Those units of Das Reich that were ready for combat started their movement toward the invasion front on 12 June 1944, but shortages of trucks and towing vehicles meant that large elements of the division- including two of its six panzergrenadier battalions- did not arrive in Normandy until late July 1944.[105]

    The 16th Panzergrenadier Division was near-completely destroyed during the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive and its remnants were withdrawn to France for extensive refitting in April 1944.[106] While in France, the division absorbed the entire 179th Reserve Panzer Division and was renamed to the 116th Panzer Division.[107] As the division only arrived in France in April 1944, it was impossible to create a new, fully battle-worthy division before the Allies landed in Normandy. Just like other heavily damaged formations that arrived from Ukraine, the division had major deficiencies at the time of Allied landings too. Needing even more time to train and receive equipment, the appearance of the 116th Panzer Division was delayed until late July-early August 1944, far too late to do more than prolong the outcome of the Normandy campaign.[101]

    The 9th Panzer Division was involved in near continuous heavy combat since July 1943 and was badly depleted by the spring of 1944.[108] After being further battered during the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, the remaining elements of the heavily damaged division were withdrawn from Ukraine to southern France for extensive refitting in late March 1944.[109][110] In France, the 9th Panzer Division absorbed the entire 155th Reserve Panzer Division.[111] Due to its late arrival from the Eastern Front in Ukraine to France and the fact that the division had to incorporate many new men, meant that the 9th Panzer Division was also not combat ready when the Allied forces landed in Normandy.[112] Needing a signifficant amount of time to train and receive new equipment, the appearance of the 9th Panzer Division in Normandy, similar to that of the 116th Panzer Division, was delayed until late July-early August 1944, which merely prolonged the outcome of the Normandy campaign.[113] Thus, the division received orders to move to Normandy only on 27 July 1944,[114] after Operation Cobra, which resulted in decisive breakout in Normandy campaign, was already launched. Most of the 9th Panzer Division arrived at the invasion front only by 6 August 1944, but even then some elements of the division were not employed.[115]

    Similar cases are observed in other formations that arrived to Western Europe in late spring 1944 after being heavily decimated in Ukraine.[101]

    British military historian Max Hastings wrote about the negative effect that this Soviet offensive had on the readiness of German forces in Western Europe that were preparing for Allied invasion:[116]

    "The hapless Commander-in-Chief, von Rundstedt, was never consulted about what forces he deemed necessary to defeat an invasion- he was merely informed of what was to arrive. The bulk of his army was made up of the over-age and medically unfit, convalescents from the east, and an entirely unreliable rabble of Polish, Russian and Italian defectors and forced labourers. Even the majority of the first-line divisions which began to move into France in the spring of 1944, in accordance with Hitler’s Directive 51 for the strengthening of the western defences, were formations shattered in the east [Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive], which would need massive reinforcement and re-equipment if they were ever to regain their old fighting power. However well Hitler recognized the need to defend against invasion, he was the victim of a remorseless imperative that demanded men and tanks to fight against the present menace in the east, rather than the prospective threat in the west."

    The severe battering that numerous German armored divisions endured during the Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, coupled with their late arrival to Western Europe for extensive refitting and reorganization, meant that at the time of Allied Normandy landings in early June 1944 they were only partially operational and not fully combat ready. The slow, piecemeal arrival of these formations meant that the Germans never had the ability to mount a unified effort to eradicate the Allied bridgehead.[101]

    Niklas Zetterling summarized:[117]

    "Ever since Operation Barbarossa was launched, Western Europe had been a calm backwater where new units could be raised and where formations depleted on the Eastern Front could refit. Consequently, a significant number of formations in the west were not combat ready. This was true even at the beginning of June 1944, especially for the mechanized formations."

    Dispatch of the majority of available equipment to the Eastern Front[]

    While German personnel losses during the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive were heavy, the equipment losses were even worse.[24] The scope and speed of the collapse of the German front-lines in Ukraine between March–April 1944, meant that enormous quantities of tanks, assault guns, self-propelled tank destroyers and artillery pieces, motor vehicles of all types, artillery of all calibers, were lost, mainly through their abandonment in the spring mud.

    One of the key reasons for such a rapid collapse of Army Group South in Ukraine in the conditions of rasputitsa was the usage by the Red Army of all of its tank armies in Ukraine.[118] For the first and only time in the history of Soviet-German War, all six Soviet tank armies, the elite of the Red Army's mechanized formations, were deployed for one massive offensive, with Zhukov‘s 1st and Konev‘s 2nd Ukrainian Fronts having three tank armies each.

    As the Red Army's tank armies advanced deep into the German rear areas, the suddenness of the Soviet advance frequently stampeded their rear echelons into panicked flight and forced the Germans to conduct hurried retreats.[24] However, the combination of a lack of towing vehicles, spring mud, and limited rail net precluded the possibility of evacuating heavy weapons and non-operational equipment of various kinds in a timely manner. These problems were further exacerbated by Hitler's persistent refusals to organize planned withdrawals. The result was that huge quantities of precious equipment were lost, principally through their abandonment in the vast muddy fields of Ukraine.

    For example, during the Soviet Uman-Botoshany Offensive, the region around the city of Uman was littered with huge numbers of abandoned German equipment during the retreat of the 8th Army from the south-western Ukraine. According to Soviet sources, in the region around the city of Uman, the Germans abandoned 500 tanks, of them 200 operational, 600 various artillery pieces and 12,000 motor vehicles of all types.[119]

    Numerous German accounts support these claims.[24] For example, the 3rd SS Panzer Division Totenkopf and the 11th Panzer Division, both of which were part of the 8th Army during the same Soviet Uman-Botoshany Offensive, reported about enormous quantities of equipment lost during their retreat into Romania. On 1 March 1944, before the start of the Soviet offensive, Totenkopf had 90 operational and non-operational armored vehicles, 2,512 motor vehicles of all types and 50 pieces of artillery.[120] By 15 April 1944, Totenkopf had a mere 2 armored vehicles, 668 motor vehicles and 21 artillery pieces left.[120] Similarly, the 11th Panzer Division on 1 February 1944 had 102 armored vehicles, 2,574 motor vehicles and 26 artillery pieces at disposal.[120] By 1 April 1944, it had shrank to just 10 armored vehicles, 639 motor vehicles and 4 artillery pieces.[120]

    Heinz Guderian, as Inspector General of Armoured Troops, reported to Hitler on 27 March 1944:[121]

    "Near Uman approximately 300 tanks fell into enemy hands. Army Group South reports with full responsibility: repair of the damaged tanks left in Uman was impossible due to lack of spare parts. If spare parts had been sufficiently delivered, most of the damaged tanks in Uman would have been returned to service. The transportation of damaged tanks from Uman was impossible due to the lack of towing vehicles and the poor situation with the transport."

    Even greater equipment losses were sustained by the 1st Panzer Army during the encirclement and subsequent breakout from the Kamenets-Podolsky Pocket in late March to early April 1944.[121] After the breakout, the 1st Panzer Army was in extremely poor shape equipment wise. It retained virtually no heavy weapons and very little armored vehicles and motor transport.[121][120] The table below shows the armored strength of some units of the 1st Panzer Army before the start of the Soviet Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation on 4 March 1944, which in late March succeeded in encircling the 1st Panzer Army in Kamenets-Podolsky Pocket, and the subsequent armored strength reported after the breakout from the pocket.

    Armored strength (tanks, assault guns, self-propelled tank destroyers) of various units of the 1st Panzer Army before Proskurov-Chernovtsy Offensive and after the breakout from Kamenets-Podolsky Pocket
    Unit AFV strength on 1 March 1944 AFV strength on 7 April 1944
    1st SS Panzer Division LSSAH Operational and in short-term repair- 128;[122]

    In long-term repair- 77.[123]

    Operational and in short-term repair- 11;[99]

    In long-term repair- most to all lost.[124]

    6th Panzer Division Operational and in short-term repair- 30;

    In long-term repair- 14.[123]

    Operational and in short-term repair- 1;[125]

    In long-term repair- unknown.

    19th Panzer Division Operational and in short-term repair- 28;[126]

    In long-term repair- unknown.

    Operational and in short-term repair- 0;[125]

    In long-term repair- unknown.

    509th Tiger Tank Battalion Operational and in short-term repair- 30;[127]

    In long-term repair- unknown.

    Operational and in short-term repair- 1;[125]

    In long-term repair- unknown.

    88th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion (Hornisse) Operational and in short-term repair- 45.[126] Operational and in short-term repair- 14.[125]

    Konstantin Simonov, a famous Soviet poet and front-line correspondent of the 1st Ukrainian Front, described the scenes that he saw during the retreat of the 1st Panzer Army:[128]

    "It has long been difficult to surprise my imagination with such things, and yet, having come here, day after day I am amazed at the number of vehicles of all brands and systems abandoned by the Germans- both combat and transport. Here are the notorious "Tigers" and "Panthers", burned and whole, older types of tanks, self-propelled guns, huge armored personnel carriers and small transporters with one drive wheel similar to motorcycles, stolen in France Renault trucks, and endless Mercedes, and Opel's, command vehicles, radios, field kitchens, anti-aircraft guns, disinfection chambers- in a word, everything that the Germans invented and used in their former rapid offensives. And that now, broken, burned and simply abandoned, is stuck in the mud of these roads."

    The enormous equipment losses of Army Group South in Ukraine in the spring of 1944, coupled with the anticipation of the German High Command that the southern sector of the Eastern Front would be the place where the Soviets will launch their main 1944 summer offensive, meant that the speedy restoration of the German divisions deployed in those areas, panzer divisions foremost, was a matter of urgent necessity.[81]

    Thus, regardless of the urgent needs of the German forces in the West that were preparing for the Allied invasion, large consignments of equipment had to be allocated to the German Eastern Front, which far surpassed the deliveries to the West. Specifically, between April–June 1944, 2,605 tanks, assault guns, self-propelled tank destroyers and artillery pieces were delivered to the Eastern Front, compared to 1,593 delivered to the German forces in the Western Europe.[81] Similarly, 45,266 motor vehicles of all types were delivered to the Eastern Front between April–June 1944, compared to just 20,129 delivered to the West for the same period.[81]

    While this allowed to partially restore the mobility and offensive capabilities of the German forces deployed in the East, this allocation of resources proved detrimental to the operational readiness of the German panzer and panzergrenadier divisions stationed in Western Europe, which were preparing to repel the upcoming Allied invasion.[129] This was especially harmful to the five and a half panzer and panzergrenadier divisions that arrived to Western Europe for rebuilding only in late spring 1944, after being heavily battered during the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive.

    With the majority of the available equipment having been dispatched to the Eastern Front over the preceding months, equipment shortages among the mobile divisions stationed in the West, especially in terms of motor vehicles, could only be rectified at a slow pace.[130] As a result, by early June 1944, seven of the eleven panzer or panzergrenadier divisions stationed in Western Europe were still only partially operational.

    Had the Soviet command decided not to launch a new series of powerful offensives in the adverse conditions of spring thaw in Ukraine in 1944, the Wehrmacht would‘ve been given the most precious gift of respite and time, necessary to rebuild its severely decimated and worn out divisions from continuous heavy combat.[131] The Soviet decision to continue the offensive operations in Ukraine without major pauses, despite atrocious mud, meant that Army Group South was given no time to recover from previous defeats. As a result, by the end of spring 1944, most of the panzer divisions of Army Group South were shattered formations that required thorough refitting and rest, hence many of them were withdrawn to Western Europe, Germany and Denmark. Heinz Guderian, as Inspector General of Armoured Troops, reported to Hitler on 27 March 1944:[132]

    "At present time, nearly all panzer divisions have sunk and perished in unbearable defensive battles, in which we found ourselves since last year [1943]."

    Had the Red Army not launched the spring 1944 offensives in Ukraine, known as the second-stage of the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, the frontlines would have stabilized for several months. In turn, this would‘ve given Army Group South sufficient time to improve its situation with transport and bring the spare parts, which would allow to repair most of its armored and motor vehicles.[131] In turn, this would have considerably reduced the corresponding need to divert large numbers of new equipment to the Eastern Front, thereby making it readily available to the armored units in Western Europe, making them far more prepared to oppose the Allied invasion.

    Although it is little appreciated today, the Soviet success during the second stage of the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive have sped up the eventual Allied victory and thereby saved the Allies a great deal of time, blood and equipment.[34]

    Impact of the offensive on the Soviet 1944 summer Operation Bagration[]

    The Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive played a key role in the subsequent catastrophe of Army Group Center during the Soviet Operation Bagration in the summer of 1944.[133] In the course of the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, Army Group Center was forced to transfer large number of divisions to the crumbling front of Army Group South in Ukraine, which critically weakened the army group prior to Operation Bagration.[134] Furthermore, the Soviet success in Ukraine during this offensive had led the German command to conclude that the southern sector of the Eastern Front would be the staging place for the main Soviet 1944 summer offensive,[135] which meant that German forces deployed in those sectors, panzer divisions foremost, received priority in personnel and equipment,[81] which were urgently needed since they were badly depleted after the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive.

    Direct weakening of Army Group Center prior to Operation Bagration[]

    During the course of the Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive in winter-spring 1944 against Army Group South in Ukraine, Army Group Center was significantly weakened by being forced to transfer large number of divisions to the crumbling German front in Ukraine.[136]

    The start of the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive west of Kiev on the Christmas Eve of 1943 and the subsequent collapse of the front-lines of the 4th Panzer Army there, forced the German High Command to transfer one fresh panzer division from Army Group Center to Army Group South in early January 1944,[26] which only recently arrived to the former army group from Italian Front with 152 tanks and assault guns.[137]

    While the Red Army continued to make deep advances in Ukraine against Army Group South, Army Group Center have managed to successfully repulse numerous Soviet offensives during the same period in Belorussia, with minimal loss of the ground. This led to the creation of the so-called "Belorussian Balcony"- a salient in which the main frontlines of Army Group Center protruded deep to the east, while Army Group South's frontlines were pushed far west.[138][139]

    In this regard, the German 2nd Army of Army Group Center, as a result of the Soviet successes during the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, was detached from the main front of Army Group Center and found itself in a peculiar position, guarding the Pripet Marshes and being more closely positioned to the 4th Panzer Army of Army Group South (from April 1944 re-designated to Army Group North Ukraine), rather than to its technical neighbor to the north, the 9th Army, which was actually over 300 km to the east in the "Belorussian Balcony", stationed around the city of Bobruysk.[140]

    The biggest transfer of forces followed in the spring of 1944, during the Soviet Polesskoe Offensive, better known as Battle of Kovel.[141] Being a key railway junction at the boundary of Army Group Center and Army Group South, the town of Kovel was declared to be a fortified place (Fester Platz) by Hitler. While in terms of importance, this offensive was secondary to Stavka, compared to the offensives of the three Ukrainian fronts, the westward Red Army advance towards Kovel then Brest, was considered to be promising since it brought the Red Army deep to the rear of Army Group Center, completely severing its links with Army Group South.[142] Furthermore, the German forces in the Kovel region, consisting of elements from the 4th Panzer Army of Army Group South and 2nd Army of Army Group Center, were weak. After the Soviets had launched their offensive, Kovel and its garrison was encircled by the Red Army in a matter of days.[143]

    Threatened with the collapse of the entire German front-line around Kovel and the subsequent Red Army advance towards Brest, which would envelop the entire right flank of Army Group Center, OKH took urgent measures to reinforce the Kovel sector. For this, the divisions of the armies of Army Group Center, stationed in the "Belorussian Balcony", became the main source of reinforcements.[27]

    From 18 March to 30 April 1944, five infantry divisions, two panzer divisions and one jager division, eight divisions in total, as well as one Tiger tank battalion and one StuG Assault Gun brigade, were withdrawn from the main front of Army Group Center in the balcony to its far right flank at boundary with Army Group South.[37] In addition, one division-sized ski brigade of the 2nd Army, guarding the Pripet Marshes, and two StuG Assault Gun Brigades, was transferred to the Kovel sector as well.

    All told, nine divisions, one Tiger tank battalion and three StuG Assault Gun Brigades of Army Group Center were transferred from its main front to its far right flank in the Kovel region, located deep in the rear at the junction with Army Group South, in the spring of 1944. In late spring-early summer 1944, these forces were detached from the 2nd Army of Army Group Center and attached to the 4th Panzer Army of Army Group North Ukraine, with responsibility of defending the entire Kovel area being given to the latter army.[144][136]

    The diversion of these reinforcements from Army Group Center to Army Group South was disastrous to the German fortunes during Operation Bagration.[136] The withdrawal of these units in the spring of 1944 to counter the Soviet threat around Kovel, meant that Army Group Center was effectively deprived of over 100,000 men[136] and a staggering 552 tanks, assault guns and self-propelled artillery pieces.[145]

    While the extent to which the nine divisions and numerous non-divisional armored formations, lost by Army Group Center during the spring of 1944, could have prevented the catastrophe or at least reduced the scale of German defeat can only be speculated upon, it is clear that at the very least their presence at the start of the Soviet Operation Bagration would have significantly improved the odds stacked against the army group.[38]

    Already in possession of about 695 tanks, assault guns, and self-propelled anti-tank guns at the start of Operation Bagration, and with the forces that had been detached during the spring equipped with at least another 552, the number of such armored vehicles with Army Group Center would have totaled 1,247.[38] Initially faced by 4,070 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns, the ratio of German to Soviet armor would have declined from highly unfavorable 1 to 6, to a far more manageable 1 to 3.3.[146] This does not include the potential armored strength of one more panzer division, which, as already mentioned, was withdrawn from Army Group Center to Army Group South in January 1944.

    The infantry divisions, withdrawn from Army Group Center in the spring of 1944 to the Kovel sector, would have reduced the average divisional frontage of the army group from 25 to 30 kilometers to 20 kilometers.[145] As a result, this would have permitted the creation of a much larger number of tactical reserves, increased the density of defensive fire-support systems, and produced a main battle position of considerably greater depth.

    Confronted by a far more formidable German defensive system, which would be backed by a greatly increased quantity of armor, it becomes doubtful whether the attacking Soviet units would have had the ability to quickly breech the German line during the initial stage of Operation Bagration.[145] At the very least, fighting their way through the German defences would have taken far longer than it did, and at a considerably greater cost, which would give Germans the time to shift their powerful armored reserves to the danger areas.

    While the overwhelming weight of the Soviet offensive would certainly have pressed the Germans back, the likelihood of a rapid Soviet breakthrough deep into the German rear areas, to create potential large encirclements, would have been sharply reduced.[145] Indeed, it would have been possible for Army Group Center to repeat its performance of winter 1943–44, when it managed to maintain its cohesion by conducting a slow and orderly retreat while simultaneously repulsing repeated Soviet attacks.

    The table below shows the number of units transferred from the armies of Army Group Center stationed in the Belorussian Balcony, as well as the 2nd Army, to the southern sector of the Eastern Front, in response to the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive.

    Divisions and other units withdrawn from Army Group Center to the southern sector of the Eastern Front in response to the Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, January–April 1944[147][26]
    Army of Army Group Center Area of operations No. of divisions No. of Tiger tank battalions No. of StuG assault gun brigades No. self-propelled tank destroyers (Nashorn)
    3rd Panzer Army Vitebsk 2 infantry divisions, 1 jager division- 3 divisions in total. - 1 -
    4th Army Orsha-Mogilev, along the Moscow-Minsk Highway 2 infantry divisions 1 - -
    9th Army Bobruysk 3 panzer divisions, 1 infantry division- 4 divisions in total - - -
    2nd Army Pripet Marshes 1 ski division - 2 1
    Total: - 10 divisions (5 infantry, 3 panzer, 1 jager, 1 ski) 1 3 1

    German anticipation that the main Soviet 1944 summer offensive would take place in the south[]

    The Soviet success in the spring of 1944 in Ukraine against Army Group South, during the second stage of the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, had led the German High Command to conclude that the southern sector of the Eastern Front would be the staging place for the main Soviet 1944 summer offensive.[81][139]

    While during the 1944 winter-spring campaign Army Group Center successfully repulsed a series of large Soviet offensive, the front-lines of heavily battered Army Group South, by contrast, were pushed far west. As a result, by summer of 1944, Army Group Center occupied the "Belorussian Balcony", which protruded far to the east, while in the southern sector of the Eastern Front the "Ukrainian Balcony", conquered by the Red Army during the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, bulged out far in the western direction.[139] The Ukrainian balcony was considered an ideal springboard for future Red Army offensives by the Germans. As a result, the German military operations staffs, above all Foreign Armies East, had their eyes fixed on that salient. Since the Soviets had concentrated all six of their tank armies in Ukraine in the spring of 1944 during the second stage of the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, the German command took it for granted that, after a break of a few weeks, the Soviets would resume their offensive operations in that vast area, south of the Pripet Marshes.[139]

    During the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, Army Group South was split into two parts- north and south of the Carpathian Mountains. The northern portion, consisting of the 1st and 4th Panzer Armies, was pushed back into Galicia (Poland), while the southern portion, consisting of 6th and 8th Armies, was pushed back into Romania. The northern portion was renamed to Army Group North Ukraine, while the southern portion to Army Group South Ukraine. In this situation, in assessing Soviet offensive intentions for the summer of 1944, two likely directions of thrust crystallized: one to the south-west, designated as the "Balkans Option", another to the north-west, designated as the "Baltic Option".[139]

    The Germans feared that Stavka would launch a large-scale encirclement operation from the Ukrainian Balcony against either the northern or the southern German wing, delivering a powerful blow that would cause the collapse of the entire German Eastern Front.[148]

    Initially, the German operations staffs considered the Balkans Option most probable.[149] They feared that the Soviets intended to thrust into the rear of Army Group South Ukraine in Romania, which was positioned between the Carpathians and the Black Sea. The Soviets would probably try to break through the eastern front to the north of the army group, in the area of Lvov, and advance westwards across the San River. The Soviet attacking units could then veer south through the Carpathians to the Great Hungarian Plain and push into Romania.

    The loss of Romanian oil would severely handicap the German war effort.[150] Furthermore, the loss of Romania would precipitate the collapse of the entire German front in the Balkans and would establish Soviet hegemony in the region.

    In late spring 1944, however, the German command began to consider the Baltic Option more possible.[150] In this regard, the north-western corner of the Ukrainian balcony, known as the ‘Kovel bend’, became the focal point of the German High Command. In the spring of 1944, the town of Kovel became a site of fierce fighting during the Soviet Poleskoe Offensive, which was part of the second stage of the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive. The German front around Kovel threatened to collapse and as a result, Army Group Center was forced to transfer large number of divisions from its front in the Belorussian Balcony to the Kovel sector, located at the boundary with Army Group South.[27] In addition, the 5th SS Panzer Division Wiking, which was rebuilding nearby in Poland after being previously shattered in the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket in February 1944, was also dispatched to the Kovel sector.[151] These reinforcements helped to stabilize the frontlines in the Kovel region by the end of April 1944.

    Now the German fear was that the Red Army would concentrate its upcoming 1944 summer offensive wholly on this sensitive point- this time with a strategic, rather than merely operational objective, that is, a thrust towards the Baltic coast.[150] At Kovel, which is near the source of the Pripet River, the geographical obstacle of the river and the difficulty of passing through its marshes ended. After taking the town, the Soviet forces would be able to swerve north unimpeded, between the Pripet marshes and the Vistula, towards Warsaw. After that, the Red Army would make a sharp turn north, towards the Baltic Coast. A successful Soviet attack to the Baltic would enclose both Army Group Centre and Army Group North in an enormous pocket on the coast.[152] Most worrying of all, a Soviet breakthrough at Kovel would leave the two army groups with no chance of reacting to the mortal danger in their rear. Because of the unfavourable curve of the front salient, the main forces of both army groups were far to the east. Rapid withdrawal to the Vistula near Warsaw was also considered impossible by the German command because of the large distance.

    Furthermore, the Belorussian Balcony bulged like an enormous shield in front of the section of the Vistula that would have to be crossed by the Red Army in its advance towards Berlin. For example, starting from city of Vitebsk, held by the 3rd Panzer Army of Army Group Center, the Red Army forces would have to fight their way to the Vistula through 700 kilometres of Belorussian forests and swamps, whereas from Kovel the distance was less than 200 kilometres and the terrain was favourable to tanks.[152] By German logic, rather than beating down the German troops in the Belorussian Balcony by means of a direct frontal attack, the Stavka must have been tempted to achieve the collapse of the front by the ‘indirect’ method of a thrust in the rear in the direction of Warsaw.

    As a result, the town of Kovel was perceived as the ‘solar plexus’ of the entire German Ostfront, where the Wehrmacht could be delivered a fatal knockout blow.[152]

    With the Red Army now posed to either push northward through Poland towards the Baltic Coast and thereby isolate two entire army groups, or advance into Romania and seize Germany's primary source of oil, or perhaps both, the speedy restoration of the German formations, panzer divisions foremost, deployed in those areas was a matter of urgent necessity.[81] This was a particularly pressing issue, since nearly all German panzer divisions were heavily damaged during the Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive and required thorough refitting. As a result, Army Group North Ukraine and Army Group South Ukraine received priority in personnel replacements and deliveries of new equipment in late spring to early summer 1944, compared to Army Group Center and North.[153]

    The strengthening of Army Group North Ukraine and South Ukraine in the spring of 1944 is what made Stavka to reconsider its plans and switch the Soviet point of concentration from the southern sector of the Eastern Front, where most of the Red Army's resources were concentrated at since the end of the Battle of Kursk in August 1943, to the central sector of the Eastern Front, which until the summer of 1944 brought much disappointment to Stavka and fell far short of its expectations.[154]

    While the Red Army had major successes in Ukraine during the winter-spring 1944, the prospects of new offensive in Western Ukraine in the summer of 1944 were rather cautious due to strengthening of German forces opposite the Red Army. Stavka‘s staff officer Sergei Shtemenko wrote:[154]

    "The overall favorable operational and strategic situation we had by the summer of 1944 was still very difficult. It was impossible to continue the offensive in Ukraine and Moldavia because powerful and almost equal groups of troops encountered each other on the Lvov, Yassy-Kishinev sections of the front. All six of our tank armies were drawn here against the main mass of the German tanks. The troops were exhausted and their supply needed serious improvement. Element of surprise was ruled out. If we had tried to attack immediately in these directions, we would have faced a long bloody fight under unfavorable conditions and with doubtful outcome."

    Under these circumstances, the Soviet offensive in Belorussia, codenamed Operation Bagration, was considered the only one with a guarantee of success, which would subsequently create the conditions for a general offensive across the entire Eastern Front.[154]

    Exhaustion of German reserves[]

    The German need for reinforcements during the second stage of the Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive in March–April 1944 had ended the attempt by OKW to create a sizeable strategic reserve.[133] The dissolution of this reserve meant that Wehrmacht was no longer capable of effectively responding to crises in either France or Russia.

    Although from late November 1943 some divisions would be designated as OKW reserves and occasionally shifted to various theaters of war, the majority were tied down to the regions they were initially assigned, since their redeployment to other places would otherwise produce a corresponding weakening of German defences in their respective areas.[155]

    As a result, the German formations stationed in Generalgouvernement, the German-occupied Poland, constituted Germany's main reserve.[155] It consisted of new formations, raised as part of the 21st wave (welle) of mobilization, as well as formations that were refitting there after being badly battered on the Eastern Front. For a moment, Germany disposable reserves consisted of eight divisions. By April 1944, however, these reserves had been dissipated when most of these formations were dispatched to deal with the crisis that unfolded in the western Ukraine during the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, where they were quickly embroiled in heavy combat.

    Although seemingly modest in size, the potential impact that this reserve may have had in the summer of 1944 during Operation Bagration could still have been signifficant.[156]

    In this regard, the eight-division reserve could‘ve either prevented or at the very least reduced the scale of catastrophe of Army Group Center.[157] In a scenario where the army group had managed to retain the formations that it had to transfer to Army Group South during the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive in the spring of 1944, Army Group Center would‘ve had over 40 divisions at dispoal at the start of Operation Bagration, instead of actual 33 in the Belorussian Balcony. The injection of eight-division reserve would have significantly strengthened the ability of Army Group Center to seal off any penetrations, reinforce crisis areas, and maintain the general cohesion of its front. The vastly superior resources of the Red Army would have surely pushed the Germans back, but with Army Group Center reinforced to nearly 50 divisions, the possibility that the Soviet tank and mechanized units may have achieved the deep penetrations, needed to effect the encirclement of large bodies of German troops, would have been greatly diminished.[157]

    Under the actual circumstances faced by Army Group Center, even the quick arrival of the reserves may not have been enough to prevent a disaster, but it may at least have reduced its scale and subsequent impact. A fast forward deployment could have allowed the Germans to establish blocking positions further east than was in fact the case, resulting in the interception and wearing-down of the leading Red Army's armored units at an earlier stage of the battle.[157]

    As a result, this would have increased the possibility of rescuing the large numbers of German forces that had been trapped within a series of isolated, wandering pockets. In this respect, it is noteworthy that small elements of the 12th Panzer Division alone did in fact manage to rescue between 15,000 and 20,000 personnel of the German 9th Army, which was trapped around the city of Bobruisk during the Bobruisk Offensive.[157]

    Whatever the scenario may be, it is clear that this reserve would have significantly improved the odds stacked against the Army Group Center. The way it actually turned out, nearly the entire reserve was spent to deal with multiple crises in Ukraine during the Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive in the spring of 1944.[155] This meant that it was no longer available for the summer of 1944.

    Usage of many of Soviet elite formations and leading Generals in Operation Bagration[]

    Since during the 1944 winter-spring campaign on the Eastern Front the southern sector in Ukraine was the area where the main fighting took place, the majority of Soviet elite formations, tank armies foremost, as well as nearly all leading Generals, participated in the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive and subsequent Crimean Offensive.[20]

    When Stavka decided to shift its main offensive effort in the summer of 1944 from the southern to the central sector of the Eastern Front, many of the elite formations and leading Generals participated in planning and executing Operation Bagration.[158][159][160]

    The invaluable experience gained during the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, with regards to planning the operations, ensuring the secrecy of them, executing them, sustaing them over long distances in poor weather conditions and spring thaw, crossing numerous water barriers without significant delays, attacking fortified places (Fester Platz) was instrumental when planning and executing Operation Bagration.[161]

    The first table below show the formations that fought during the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive in Ukraine and where then transferred to Belorussia for Operation Bagration. The second table shows the General Officers who planned and executed the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive and subsequently did the same in Operation Bagration.

    Soviet formations that fought during the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive and Crimean Offensive, and were then transferred to participate in Operation Bagration[162][159][158][160]
    Formation Front Participation in the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive Transferred then to
    5th Guards Tank Army 2nd Ukrainian Front Kirovograd Offensive, Korsun-Schevchenkovsky Offensive, Uman-Botoshany Offensive, positional battles in Romania 3rd Belorussian Front
    2nd Tank Army 2nd Ukrainian Front Korsun-Schevchenkovsky Offensive, Uman-Botoshany Offensive, positional battles in Romania 1st Belorussian Front
    8th Guards Army 3rd Ukrainian Front Nikopol-Krivoy Rog Offensive, Bereznegovatoye–Snigirevka Offensive, Odessa Offensive 1st Belorussian Front
    Pliev's Cavalry-Mechanized Group (KMG) 3rd Ukrainian Front Nikopol-Krivoy Rog Offensive, Bereznegovatoye–Snigirevka offensive, Odessa Offensive 1st Belorussian Front
    28th Army 3rd Ukrainian Front Nikopol-Krivoy Rog Offensive, Bereznegovatoye–Snigirevka offensive 1st Belorussian Front
    70th Army 2nd Belorussian Front Polesskoe Offensive 1st Belorussian Front
    19th Tank Corps 4th Ukrainian Front Nikopol-Krivoy Rog Offensive, Crimean Offensive 1st Baltic Front
    Transferred after the Crimean Offensive:
    2nd Guards Army 4th Ukrainian Front 1st Baltic Front
    51st Army 4th Ukrainian Front 1st Baltic Front
    Prominent Soviet Generals who planned and executed the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive and did the same during the Operation Bagration[163][164]
    Name of the Soviet General Role during the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive Role during Operation Bagration
    Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov Stavka representative, planner and coordinator of operations of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts. From late February 1944, after Vatutin was mortally wounded, to April 1944, Zhukov commanded the 1st Ukrainian Front during the Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation. One of five original planners of the operation. During the operation Zhukov served as Stavka representative, coordinating the operations of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts.
    Marshal of the Soviet Union Aleksandr Vasilevsky Stavka representative, planner and coordinator of operations of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts. One of five original planners of the operation. During the operation Vasilevsky served as Stavka representative, coordinating the operations of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic Fronts.
    General of the Army Ivan Chernyakhovsky Commander of the 60th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front. Commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

    Dismissal and irrevocable loss of senior German officers[]

    Soviet success during this offensive has prompted Hitler to take repressive measures against his commanders in the southern sector of the Eastern Front. Constant defeats, retreats, multiple crisis situations, as well as disagreements over the conduct of war, meant that German General Officers fell out of favor with Hitler.[165][20] The table below shows the list of high-ranking German generals that were dismissed by Hitler in the course of this Soviet offensive. It does not include regimental, battalion and other commanders.

    German General Officers dismissed by Hitler in the course of the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive
    Name of a dismissed General Officer Commander of Date of dismissal Replaced by Notes
    Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein Army Group South Late March 1944[20] Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model[20] From April 1944 the army group was renamed to Army Group North Ukraine. It was the end of Manstein's career in the Wehrmacht.
    Generalfeldmarschall Ewald von Kleist Army Group A Late March 1944[20] General der Gebirgstruppe Ferdinand Schörner[20] From April 1944 the army group was renamed to Army Group South Ukraine. It was the end of Kleist's career in the Wehrmacht.
    Generaloberst Karl-Adolf Hollidt 6th Army of Army Group A Late March 1944[166] General der Artillerie Maximilian de Angelis[167] Dismissed after a costly defeat in southern Ukraine. It was the end of Hollidt's career in the Wehrmacht.
    Generalleutnant Gerhard Graf von Schwerin 16th Panzergrenadier Division of the 6th Army Late January 1944[168] Oberst Günther von Manteuffel[168] Dismissed after writing a personal letter to Hitler, asking him to widthraw the heavily damaged division from the front for extensive refitting. When the remnants of the destroyed 16th Panzergrenadier Division were transferred to France in April 1944 for rebuilding, Schwerin took command of the division again, now converted to 116th Panzer Division.[168]
    Generalleutnant Hellmuth Koch 454th Security Division of the 4th Panzer Army of Army Group South Early February 1944[169] Oberst Joachim Wagner Dismissed after ordering his division to abandon the city of Rovno, the capital of Reichskommissariat Ukraine, when threatened with envelopment by the Red Army during the Rovno-Lutsk Offensive, despite orders to hold the city. Hitler, looking for a scapegoat, immediately ordered a court-martial inquiry into the circumstances leading to the loss of Rovno. Sentence of death was passed upon Koch. Following an intervention by Manstein and Raus, the commander of the 4th Panzer Army, Hitler subsequently cancelled the sentence. Koch was nonetheless imprisoned and lost his rank. He was then transferred back to the front in 1945 as a mere Major on probation.
    Generalmajor Johannes Schrepffer Commandant of Fester Platz (Fortified Place) Tarnopol March 1944[170] Generalmajor Heinrich Kittel[170] Relieved of his command after protesting that Tarnopol could not be held.
    Generalmajor Heinrich Kittel New Commandant of Fester Platz (Fortified Place) Tarnopol March 1944[171] Generalmajor Egon von Neindorf[171] Also relieved of his command after protesting that Tarnopol could not be held.
    Dismissed during the neighboring Crimean Offensive:
    Generaloberst Erwin Jaenecke 17th Army Start of May 1944[172] General der Infanterie Karl Allmendinger[173] Dismissed by Hitler for the loss of Crimea. He was then arrested and court-martialed. Heinz Guderian was appointed as a special investigator in the case. Guderian proceeded slowly and eventually Jaenecke was quietly acquitted. Jaenecke was dismissed from the army on 31 January 1945.

    In addition to dismissals of a number of senior German officers, a sizable number of prominent senior German and Axis officers were also irrevocably lost by being either killed in combat or captured by the Red Army. The table below shows the corps, divisional and other high ranking German officers lost during this Soviet offensive.

    List of senior German officers lost in combat during the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive
    Name of the officer lost Commander of Cause of loss Date Battle Notes
    General der Artillerie Wilhelm Stemmermann[174] Overall commander of the encircled XI and XXXXII Army Corps, known as Gruppe Stemmermann KIA February 1944 Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket Killed during the breakout attempt from the Korsun Pocket, when his car was hit by Soviet artillery. Dead from multiple shrapnel wounds in the back and head. His corpse was captured in the Soviet war footage during this battle. Marshal Konev personally ordered the German POW's to bury Stemmerman with military honors in a separate grave near the battlefield.
    Generalmajor Egon von Neindorff[175] Commandant of Fester Platz (Fortified Place) Tarnopol KIA April 1944 Proskurov-Chernovtsy Offensive Killed during the failed breakout attempt from Tarnopol.
    Generalmajor Adelbert "Diamonds" Schulz[176] 7th Panzer Division DOW (Died of Wounds) January 1944 Rovno-Lutsk Offensive Schulz was 1 of only 27 recipients of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds of Nazi Germany.
    Generalmajor Siegfried Marseille 324th Site Command Office KIA January 1944 Rovno-Lutsk Offensive Killed behind the frontlines by Soviet partisans in the Volyn region during the Soviet Rovno-Lutsk Offensive. His son, Hans-Joachim Marseille, was a famous Luftwaffe Flying Ace, killed during the North African Campaign.
    Oberst Wolfgang Bucher[177] Corps Detachment B (division-sized unit, similar to German infantry division in size and organization) KIA February 1944 Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket Killed during the breakout attempt from the Korsun Pocket.
    Oberst Hans-Joachim Fouquet[178] Corps Detachment B (division-sized unit, similar to German infantry division in size and organization) POW→DOW February 1944 Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket After Bucher was killed, Fouquet took over the command of the unit. During the breakout attempt from the Korsun Pocket, Fouqet was seriously wounded and taken prisoner by the Red Army when he was unconscious. He died later on the same day.
    Oberst Karl Baer 306th Infantry Division KIA January 1944 Nikopol Bridgehead
    Oberst Otto Büsing[179] "Grossdeutschland" Panzer Regiment of the "Grossdeutschland" Panzer-Grenadier Division KIA March 1944 Uman-Botoshany Offensive
    Oberst Hermann Stempel Panzergrenadier Regiment 46 of the 16th Panzer Division DOW January 1944 Zhitomir-Berdichev Offensive
    Oberst Gerhard Weber Panzergrenadier Regiment 41 of the 10th Panzergrenadier Division KIA January 1944 Kirovograd Offensive
    Oberst Carl-August von Schönfeld[175] Commandant of Fester Platz Tarnopol KIA April 1944 Proskurov-Chernovtsy Offensive After Neindorff was killed as a commandant of Tarnopol, Schönfeld took over his position and was killed shortly afterwards too.
    Oberst Wolfgang Elster 121st Artillery Command KIA February 1944 Nikopol Brigdehead
    Oberst Christian Pagels Grenadier Regiment 337 of the 208th Infantry Division KIA January 1944 Zhitomir-Berdichev Offensive
    Oberst Erich Günther Grenadier Regiment 203 of the 76th Infantry Division KIA May 1944 Odessa Offensive
    Oberst Georg Höcherl Grenadier Regiment 311 KIA April 1944 Proskurov-Chernovtsy Offensive Killed near Tarnopol Fortified Area (Fester Platz Tarnopol)
    Oberstleutnant Heinrich Cayenburg[180] Adjutant of the Commandant of Fester Platz Tarnopol POW April 1944 Proskurov-Chernovtsy Offensive
    Oberstleutnant Alfred Gudelius Panzer-Grenadier Regiment 8 of the 8th Panzer Division KIA March 1944 Proskurov-Chernovtsy Offensive Killed when his unit attempted to de-blockade the encircled Fester Platz Tarnopol.
    Oberstleutnant Karl Baacke Grenadier Regiment 226 MIA April 1944 Proskurov-Chernovtsy Offensive Missing in action during the breakout from the Kamenets-Podolsky/Hube Pocket.
    SS Obersturmbannfiihrer Lucien Lippert[181] SS Volunteer Sturmbrigade "Wallonien" KIA February 1944 Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket During the breakout attempt from the Korsun Pocket, Lippert was shot in the chest by a Soviet sniper, collapsing and dying on the doorstep after uttering an ear-piercing scream. The command of the brigade was taken over Leon Degrelle.
    SS Sturmbannführer Johannes Jansen[182] 17th SS Cavalry Regiment DOW March 1944 Polesskoye Offensive (Battle of Kovel) Most of the regiment's and its squadron commanders were either killed or wounded during the Battle of Kovel.
    Major Karl von Sivers[183] I./Panzer Regiment 15 of the 11th Panzer Division KIA April 1944 Proskurov-Chernovtsy Offensive
    Major Heinz Glässgen[184] I./Panzer Regiment 26 KIA January 1944 Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket Killed in his combat debut outside Korsun Pocket.
    Major Rudolf Geisler Engineer Battalion 662 DOW April 1944 Polesskoye Offensive (Battle of Kovel)
    SS Hauptsturmführer Alfred Lex[97] I./SS Panzer-Grenadier Regiment 4 "Der Führer" of the 2nd SS Panzer division "Das Reich" KIA March 1944 Proskurov-Chernovtsy Offensive
    SS Hauptsturmführer Max Vögtel[97] Operations Officer of 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler KIA March 1944 Proskurov-Chernovtsy Offensive Killed in an ambush by Soviet Partisans
    SS Hauptsturmführer Hermann Friedrichs[185] 8th Company of the 21st SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment of the 10th SS Panzer Division KIA April 1944 Proskurov-Chernovtsy Offensive
    Hans Dammers Luftwaffe fighter ace DOW March 1944 Proskurov-Chernovtsy Offensive

    Arrival of German reinforcements during this offensive[]

    The Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive proved to be a massive sponge that drew in German resources from across Europe and other army groups of the Eastern Front.[34] As the frontlines of Army Group South in Ukraine continued to collapse time and time again and the Germans were facing the prospect of a new Stalingrad, the Wehrmacht was forced to divert huge amounts of men, equipment, and reinforcements to Ukraine. They were urgently needed to prepare the German forces in France for the upcoming Allied invasion and whose diversion critically weakened Army Group Center prior to Operation Bagration.[34]

    Given the heavy German commitments elsewhere, especially in preparing the forces in Western Europe for Allied invasion, and that by this point Germany was well into its fifth year of the war, the overall scale of this reinforcement effort was enormous.[34] From over 30 German divisions transferred to Ukraine between January to May 1944, the overwhelming majority arrived in response to the second stage of the Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive in March–May 1944. The table below shows the number of German divisional and non-divisional armored reinforcements that arrived to Ukraine during this period in response to this Soviet offensive.

    German reinforcements sent to the southern sector of the Eastern Front between January–May 1944 in response to the Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive[186][187][188][189]
    Arrived from No. of divisions No. of Tiger tank battalions No. of Panther tank battalions No. of StuG brigades No. of self-propelled tank destroyer battalions (Nashorn and Ferdinand)
    From across Europe:
    France 3

    (including 2 SS panzer divisions comprising the II SS Panzer Corps)

    1 1 2
    Germany 2
    Denmark 1
    Balkans 4
    Poland 8
    From other army groups and sectors of the Eastern Front:
    Army Group North 6
    Army Group Center 10 1 3
    Crimea 1
    Other 1
    Total 34 2 1 5 2

    In addition to these divisional and non-divisional armored reinforcements from across Europe and other army groups of the Eastern Front, Army Group South and its units received hundreds of thousands of personnel replacements, as well as numerous armored vehicle replacements in the course of the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, especially during its second stage in the spring of 1944.

    Thus, Army Group South and A, re-designated from April 1944 as Army Group North Ukraine and South Ukraine respectively, received a combined total of 118,900 personnel replacements during March-April 1944, followed by a further 79,000 distributed in May 1944, for a grand total of nearly 200,000 replacements in the spring of 1944.[190]

    Added to these were large number of armored vehicle replacements for various armored divisions and non-divisional armored units, which also played a major role in stabilizing the southern sector of the Eastern Front by late April 1944. For example, after heavy winter fighting, the depleted 506th Tiger tank battalion was withdrawn from the front in early March 1944 to Army Group South's rear area near Lvov for refitting, just before the start of the Soviet Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation.[191] This Soviet offensive in late March 1944 succeeded in encircling the 1st Panzer Army in Kamenets-Podolsky Pocket. By the first week of April 1944, the refitting of the 506th battalion was complete, as it received 45 new Tigers from the factories.[192] The refitted battalion was part of the German relief force, assigned to de-blockade the encircled 1st Panzer Army. It was attached to the 100th Jager Division, which arrived from the Balkan theater of operations and protected the left flank of the II SS Panzer Corps, which was transferred from France and spearheaded the relief operation.[193] [194] The initial attack of the 100th Jager Division without the 506th battalion did not go entirely according to plan, but once the Tiger tank battalion joined the divison, the strike force of German attack signifficantly increased, and the Soviet forces, defending the outer western perimeter of the pocket, suffered heavy personnel and equipment losses, and began to retreat.[195] In addition to these reinforcements, an infantry division was transferred from the Balkan theater of operations as well, being part of the assembled de-blockading force, protecting the right flank of the II SS Panzer Corps.[196][197] Furthermore, on the fourth day of the relief operation, as the first contact with the 1st Panzer Army was established, a tank destroyer battalion arrived from Germany (Austria), equipped with 31 Ferdinand self-propelled tank destroyers, thereby further augmenting the capabilities of the de-blockading forces.[198]

    Thus, at the cost of tremendous expenditure of resources, the Germans evaded another Stalingrad, rescuing most of the 1st Panzer Army, albeit depleted in personnel and having lost most of its armored vehicles, motor vehicles and various pieces of artillery during the breakout.[199]

    Impact of the offensive on Hungary and Romania[]

    The Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive had a major military and political effect on Germany's Axis allies, Hungary and Romania.[40] The successful Soviet advances in the Ukraine, coupled with Soviet approach to Hungarian and Romanian borders, prompted the leaders of both countries to seek peace with the Allies and leave the Axis.[41]

    The Germans were aware of this and with the Soviets approaching the borders of these two countries, the German side suspected that Hungary and Romania would follow Italy's example.[42] To prevent this, Hitler ordered Operation Margarethe, a codename for German occupation of Hungary in March 1944. The same operation was planned against Romania, in case it decided to surrender to the Soviets, but it did not materialize.

    While Hungarian and Romanian governments were already in negotiations with the Allies, both countries also began mobilizing an entire army each to face the approaching Soviets.[43] The German occupation of Hungary did not signifficantly influence this process, as the mobilization of the 1st Hungarian Army was already underway.[200] The same case was with Romania.

    Hungary[]

    Miklós Horthy and Adolf Hitler 1938

    Hungarian leader Miklós Horthy and German leader Adolf Hitler in 1938.

    After the catastrophic German defeat at Stalingrad and the destruction of the Hungarian 2nd Army in southern Russia in early 1943, the Hungarian leader Horthy and his prime minister Kállay were increasingly taken up with the idea of making peace with the Allies.[201] The Hungarian leadership was willing to surrender to the British and U.S. forces, but they could not yet imagine capitulating to the Soviet forces. The Hungarian leaders pinned their hopes on a potential Allied landing in Dalmatia and on the Stavka deciding not to attempt the difficult breakthrough in the Carpathian Mountains.[202] Rather, the Hungarians hoped that the Soviets would continue its westward advance further north, across the Polish plains. In order to prevent a Soviet breakthrough in the Carpathians before the western Allies reached Hungarian territory, they set the goal of rebuilding its severely decimated Hungarian army.

    After the 2nd Hungarian Army’s catastrophe on the Don, the Kállay government, with the support of Horthy, endeavoured to keep Hungary’s contribution to the hostilities to a minimum.[203] Horthy had been convinced, ever since the U.S. entry into the war, that the German side could not win. The attempts to negotiate a separate peace with the western Allies began in 1943. The Hungarian government had been putting out feelers to the western powers and on 9 September 1943 it reached an agreement with the western Allies on the reduction of its military commitment.[204] The Hungarian air force was to make no further attacks on Allied aircraft from now on, and the occupying troops were ordered to avoid any action against regular troops.

    Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-669-7340-27, Flugzeuge Me 110 über Budapest

    German Bf 110s flying over Budapest in January 1944, two months before occupation. The occupation plan included a propaganda flight to drop leaflets on Budapest, code-named ‘Trojan Horse’.

    After the shock caused by the overthrow of Mussolini in Italy in the summer of 1943, coupled with the discovery of Hungarian secret negotiations by German counter-intelligence, Hitler decided in September 1943 to have plans drawn up for the occupation of Hungary.[205] The OKW produced the plans on 30 September. Accordingly, Hitler also gave orders in January 1944 for plans to be made for the occupation of Romania. With regards to Romania, Hitler ultimately decided that the occupation would not be necessary- according to Hitler Romania would not defect Axis, because as long as pro-Hitler Romanian dictator Antonescu stayed in power, the country had nowhere else to go.[206] Although the Germans assumed that the Hungarian forces would remain loyal to the Wehrmacht during the occupation operation, an order was issued to ‘crush any resistance ruthlessly’.[207] Orders were given that officers who defended themselves when being disarmed were to be shot ‘in action’. The plans also included a propaganda flight to drop leaflets on Budapest and a special mission, code-named ‘Trojan Horse’, against important targets in the capital, but were later called off because occupation was proceeding without problems.

    At the start of the Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive in late December 1943, Hungary had VII Royal Hungarian Corps stationed in the Ukraine for occupation duties as well as combating Soviet partisans.[208] It consisted of four light divisions. The Zhitomir-Berdichev Offensive in January 1944 had forced the VII Army Corps to withdraw to Galicia.[209] The Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive continued to go well- by the end of February 1944, as a result of the Rovno-Lutsk Offensive, the Soviet forces were close to the Hungarian borders and there was already a tremendous gap in the German front east of Lvov.[210]

    Furthermore, during the Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation in March 1944, the VII Army Corps was thrown back behind the Dniester river, where it was destroyed at the end of the month.[211] Most of its divisions were disbanded at the end of spring 1944.[212]

    Since the Soviet forces reached the Carpathian Mountains and were now approaching the Hungarian border at an alarming rate in March 1944, the occupation of Hungary was now a matter of the greatest urgency for Hitler.[213] 

    OperaciónMargarethe

    Operation Margarethe, the German occupation of the Kingdom of Hungary. Note that at the time of German operation, the Soviets were already closing in on the city of Czernowitz, as seen on this map, located near the eastern border of Hungary, during the Proskurov-Chernovtsy Offenisve.

    Hitler could no longer accept Hungary’s ambivalent attitude and on 28 February 1944 he gave orders for preparations to occupy the country.[214] Hungary was indispensable to Hitler’s strategy. From his perspective, the wavering Axis partner and the critical situation at the front represented an intolerable risk. On 11 March 1944, Hitler gave the order to proceed with Operation Margharethe I.[215] Significantly, Hitler ordered the occupation of Hungary only when the Soviet troops had already reached the Carpathians.[216] In addition, the Soviet success during the Proskurov-Chernovtsy Offensive had forced the Germans to transfer several divisions to the East, which were originally earmarked for Operation Margarethe, to oppose the Soviet offensive.[217] While German forces in Western Europe, which were preparing for Allied invasion, were already signifficantly weakened by being forced to transfer large number of units to the Eastern Front in the Ukraine to counter the Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, the Operation Margarethe led to a further transfer of valuable units from OB West area to Hungary.[218] German General Walter Warlimont, who was deputy chief of operations for the OKW from 1939 to 1944, wrote on this:[219]

    "The West was bled a second time for the occupation of Hungary. [...] A concentric move up to the Hungarian frontiers had to be hastily organized by the OKW Operations Staff. The forces originally earmarked had for the most part already been sucked in by the Eastern Front [Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive], but such was Hitler’s rage and thirst for revenge against the Hungarian Regent, Admiral Horthy, that he committed the error of raiding the western theatre once more, though the task was of secondary importance and the season now far advanced. A corps headquarters, certain army troops and the newly formed ‘Armoured Training Division’ (Panzer Lehr Division), a particularly valuable formation, was snatched from the forces preparing for defence against invasion and moved into Hungary on 19 March. Parts of another armoured division from the West (21 Armoured Division) were already on rail when Hitler was persuaded to cancel the move since the occupation was proceeding so smoothly. [...] Only with great difficulty, and then only a few weeks before the invasion, did OKW manage to get the formations withdrawn from the West, including the Panzer Lehr Division, returned to their proper station."

    On 15 March 1944 Horthy received Hitler's invitation to visit Klessheim on 18 March.[220] Although Horthy had already been faced with the German demands for greater participation of Hungary in the war a year earlier, he was not expecting the country to be occupied, and he hoped to save it from worse fate by making further material concessions. Although Hungarian intelligence was receiving reports of German preparations to occupy the country, the military and political leadership did not want to believe them. Resistance was unthinkable, for military reasons. The following sentence in a radio message from the commander of the Hungarian III Corps described the dilemma of the few officers loyal to Horthy:[221]

    "Russians in front of us, Germans behind us, English overhead, I request orders."

    Horthy was not prepared for Hitler’s reproaches at Klessheim, and they came as a shock.[222] After the first discussion session, in which the occupation was presented as a fait accompli, Horthy threatened to break off the negotiations immediately. However, following mediation by the Hungarian chief of the general staff he abandoned his resistance. Eventually Horthy gave his agreement to the occupation of Hungary and the dismissal of the Kállay government. On the train back to Budapest, Horthy was greeted by German officers.

    The German occupation of Hungary proceeded smoothly.[223] Only in a few cases there was resistance. It was decided not to disarm the Hungarians. The Hungarian armed forces were to remain in their barracks.

    One of the most important consequences of the occupation was the integration of the Hungarian army in Germany’s military operations.[224] The key positions on the general staff had to be reallocated in only a few cases, since most senior officers were convinced supporters of the German-Hungarian alliance from OKH perspective. The mobilization of the Hungarian 1st Army was speeded up, which was already underway before German occupation, and it took over the front east of the Carpathians by the start of April 1944 to oppose the advancing Soviet forces.

    Another major consequence of the occupation was mass deportation of Hungarian Jews to German death camps, such as Auschwitz.[225] Alongside German divisions that took part in the occupation, the notorious death squad Einsatzgruppe G and the Sonderkommando Eichmann (Eichman’s special unit) also marched into Hungary.[226] From the start of German occupation in March 1944 to the beginning of July 1944, more than 437,000 jews had been deported to Auschwitz, where those fit for work were selected and the rest, which constituted 70-75% of all deportees, were immediately put to death.[227]

    The Wehrmacht occupation of Hungary also meant that German authorities were given a free hand to extensively exploit Hungary's economic resources and reserves of raw materials.[228] Thus, up to 60% of Hungarian crude-oil production was delivered to Germany in the summer of 1944 and up to 80% in October 1944. 85,000 tonnes of mineral oil were already shipped out of Hungary in May 1944. In return, the Germans supposedly guaranteed monthly deliveries of military equipment, in accordance with ‘Buhle agreement’ of June 1944. However, these deliveries were not maintained by the German side, or were subject to long delays. Similarly, the Wehrmacht was not prepared to grant licences for modern weapons on favourable terms.

    As in all German-occupied countries, heavy burdens were imposed on the Hungarian budget.[229] Hungary was forced to pay Germany large sums of money in ‘occupation costs’. These sums bore no relation to the actual costs of the occupation and were simply used to replenish the German war budget. The fact that the Hungarian budget was able to bear these burdens can be explained only by the influx of Jewish assets, while jews themselves were being deported to German death camps.

    Arrival of Hungarian and Romanian reinforcements during this offensive[]

    As the Red Army began approaching the borders of Hungary and Romania in March 1944 during the Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, both Axis countries mobilized their full resources and committed a large number of fresh units to the German Army Group South and A, re-designated from April 1944 as Army Group North Ukraine and South Ukraine respectively.[230] While these Axis reinforcements are often overlooked, they nevertheless represented a significant reinforcement.

    Hungarian and Romanian reinforcements sent to the southern sector of the Eastern Front in response to the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, March-May 1944
    Unit No. of infantry/light/guards divisions No. of cavalry divisions No. of mountain divisions No. of armored divisions Total number of divisions No. of mountain brigades No. of assault gun battalions Total number of personnel
    Hungarian 1st Army[231] 6 - - 1 7 2 1 150,000-180,000[232]
    Romanian 4th Army[233] 13 3 1 1 18 3[234] - 300,000+[235]
    Total 19 3 1 2 25 5 1 450,000-480,000

    Territory recaptured[]

    In the course of the operation the Vinnytsia (Vinnitsa), Volyn, Zhytomyr (Zhytomir), Kiev, Kirovohrad, Rivne (Rovno), Khmelnytskyi (Khmelnitskiy) and parts of Poltava Oblasts, and the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic were taken by the Red Army.[236]

    Modern view[]

    During the Cold War the operation was not very widely recognized for the significant strategic victory that it really is in Western history.[76] After the end of World War II, some of the commanders involved were disgraced, and Stalin widely eliminated most references of the operation. Also, under the influence of German historiography and biographies, Western historians until the end of the Cold War focused on the German successes in the extrication of the 1st Panzer Army instead of the Soviet operations themselves that liberated much of Ukraine.[76]

    References[]

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    12. 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 Glantz, p. 298
    13. Frieser et al. 2007, p. 381.
    14. 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.3 Frieser et al. 2007, p. 441.
    15. Losses and Replacements of the Ostheer, December 1942- May 1944. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) T78/415. The same document can be found at Bundesarchiv– Militärarchiv (BA-MA) RH 2/1343.
    16. Пономаренко Р. О. Битва За Ковель. Москва: Вече, 2014, p. 249. Note: the Soviet Polesskoe Offensive, known as Battle of Kovel in the West, as part of the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, was launched on 15 March 1944 at the junction of the 4th Panzer Army of Army Group South and 2nd Army of Army Group Center. From the last decade of March 1944, the responsibility of defending the area of Kovel was assigned to the 2nd Army. In turn, the boundary line of Army Group Center and South was pushed south of Kovel. As a result, German losses sustained by the 2nd Army in the region of Kovel between 15 March to 30 April 1944 are not included in the count as part of Army Group South, but as of Army Group Center. Based on the losses of the encircled German Kovel garrison, forces stationed outside Kovel, the forces assigned to de-blockade the garrison, the subsequent German attempts in April 1944 to widen the Kovel corridor, the overall losses of the 2nd Army between 15 March- 30 April 1944 amounted to at least 10,000 killed, wounded and missing (p. 249). This does not include personnel listed as sick that had to be repatriated from the front.
    17. Frieser, Karl-Heinz. The Eastern Front 1943-1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts. Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 861-862.
    18. Frieser, Karl-Heinz. The Eastern Front 1943-1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts. Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 853.
    19. Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 265.
    20. 20.00 20.01 20.02 20.03 20.04 20.05 20.06 20.07 20.08 20.09 20.10 20.11 20.12 20.13 20.14 Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 255.
    21. Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 264
    22. Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, pp. 279-280.
    23. 62nd, 82nd, 123rd, 125th, 167th, 387th Infantry Divisions, Korpsabteilung B, 143rd, 147th Reserve Infantry Divisions, 5th Luftwaffe Field Division, were disbanded. 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler", 6th, 9th , 11th, 19th , 25th Panzer Divisions, 16th Panzergrenadier Division, 2nd Parachute Division, 34th, 198th Infantry Divisions were withdrawn from the front and sent to the West for a refit. As cited in Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, pp. 279-280.
    24. 24.0 24.1 24.2 24.3 Gregory Liedtke (2015). Lost in the Mud: The (Nearly) Forgotten Collapse of the German Army in the Western Ukraine, March and April 1944. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, p. 220.
    25. Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 171.
    26. 26.0 26.1 26.2 Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 279.
    27. 27.0 27.1 27.2 27.3 Gregory Liedtke (2015). Lost in the Mud: The (Nearly) Forgotten Collapse of the German Army in the Western Ukraine, March and April 1944. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, p. 227.
    28. 28.0 28.1 28.2 Gregory Liedtke (2015). Lost in the Mud: The (Nearly) Forgotten Collapse of the German Army in the Western Ukraine, March and April 1944. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, p. 229.
    29. 29.0 29.1 Jentz, T., L. Panzertruppen 2: The Complete Guide to the Creation & Combat Employment of Germany's Tank Force. Schiffer Publishing, 1996, p. 117, 130. Note: this is only for January 1944 period. According to Jentz (p. 130), in January 1944 Army Group South received I./Pz. Rgt. 26, which arrived from the West with fresh 76 Panthers. Furthermore, in late December 1943 (p. 117), 16. Panzer Division arrived from Italy to Army Group Center with 152 tanks and assault guns and was almost immediately transferred to Army Group South in response to the start of the Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive on 24 December 1943.
    30. 30.0 30.1 Gregory Liedtke (2015). Lost in the Mud: The (Nearly) Forgotten Collapse of the German Army in the Western Ukraine, March and April 1944. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, p. 227, 229. Note: this is for March–April 1944, in response to the second stage of the Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive. During this period, the Germans "brought at least 853 tanks, assault guns, and self-propelled anti-tank guns with them" (p. 227), as shown in the list of reinforcements and known replacements (p. 229). However, Liedtke's numbers for the given period are incomplete. The other reinforcements and replacements that arrived during this period are mentioned in another works.
    31. 31.0 31.1 Алексей Исаев. "Котёл" Хубе. Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция 1944 года. Яуза, 2017, p. 196, 270, 359. Reinforcements and replacements that arrived in March–April 1944, which are not mentioned in Liedtke's work, are the following: 653. Schwere Panzerjager Abteilung that arrived from Austria in April 1944 with 31 Ferdinand's (p. 359); 506. Schwere Panzer Abteilung that returned to service in April 1944 after being refitted with 45 new Tigers; 40 new Panzer IV's that arrived near Chernovtsy for the 1. Panzer Division in March 1944 (p. 196).
    32. Максим Коломиец. «ПАНТЕРА». Первая энциклопедия легендарного танка. Яуза: Эксмо, 2013, pp. 315-319. Note: as the name of the book suggests, this book and the referenced pages in it specify the shipment of all new Panther tanks from manufacturing plants to every single Panther tank battalion of panzer divisions belonging to Army Group South as replacements from 1 January to 30 April 1944. During this period, the panzer divisions belonging to Army Group South altogether received 657 new Panther tanks as replacements. Of them, 176 were delivered in January 1944 (pp. 315-316), 97 in February 1944 (pp. 316-317), 130 in March 1944 (pp. 317-318) and 254 in April 1944 (pp. 318-319), for a grant total of 657 Panther tanks between January–April 1944. Among the panzer divisions that received new Panthers, the Panzergrendier Division Grossdeutschland is included too, which in size and organization actually resembled SS panzer divisions. Thus, from 1 to 12 April 1944, 55 new Panthers were sent to Grossdeutschland as replacements (p. 318) in Romania, where they played a key role in stopping the Soviet offensives in the first (April 1944) and second (May 1944) Battle of Târgu Frumos.
    33. 33.0 33.1 As shown already, these armored reinforcements and new replacements between January–April 1944 amounted to approximately 1,850 armored vehicles. However, it is certain that the actual number was considerably higher, since the specific number of new Panzer IV tank replacements for each panzer division and new Tiger tank replacements for each Tiger tank battalion belonging to Army Group South between January–April 1944 are unknown.
    34. 34.0 34.1 34.2 34.3 34.4 34.5 34.6 Gregory Liedtke (2015). Lost in the Mud: The (Nearly) Forgotten Collapse of the German Army in the Western Ukraine, March and April 1944. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, p. 238.
    35. Gregory Liedtke (2015). Lost in the Mud: The (Nearly) Forgotten Collapse of the German Army in the Western Ukraine, March and April 1944. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, pp. 227-228.
    36. 36.0 36.1 36.2 36.3 Gregory Liedtke (2015). Lost in the Mud: The (Nearly) Forgotten Collapse of the German Army in the Western Ukraine, March and April 1944. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, p. 235.
    37. 37.0 37.1 37.2 Gregory Liedtke (2015). Lost in the Mud: The (Nearly) Forgotten Collapse of the German Army in the Western Ukraine, March and April 1944. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, p. 228.
    38. 38.0 38.1 38.2 Gregory Liedtke (2015). Lost in the Mud: The (Nearly) Forgotten Collapse of the German Army in the Western Ukraine, March and April 1944. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, p. 233.
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    154. 154.0 154.1 154.2 22 июня– 9 мая. Великая Отечественная война. Алексей Исаев, Артем Драбкин. Москва: Эксмо: Яуза, 2015, p. 560.
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    174. Nash, D. Hell's Gate: The Battle of the Cherkassy Pocket, January–February 1944. Rzm Imports Inc, 2002, p. 325.
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    177. Nash, D. Hell's Gate: The Battle of the Cherkassy Pocket, January–February 1944. Rzm Imports Inc, 2002, p. 256.
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    180. Алексей Исаев. "Котёл" Хубе. Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция 1944 года. Яуза, 2017, p. 389.
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    182. Роман Пономаренко. Битва за Ковель. Вече, 2014, p. 21.
    183. Ganz, A., H. Ghost Division: The 11th "Gespenster" Panzer Division and the German Armored Force in World War II. Rowman & Littlefield, 2016, p. 226.
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    185. Stenger, D. Panzers East and West: The German 10th SS Panzer Division from the Eastern Front to Normandy. Stackpole Books, 2017, p. 66.
    186. Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, pp. 279-280. Note: this is for all German divisional reinforcements sent to the Ukraine between January–May 1944. Grylev's work is based on captured German wartime documents about Army Group South and A order of battle, divisional movements in and out of the army groups during this period.
    187. Gregory Liedtke (2015). Lost in the Mud: The (Nearly) Forgotten Collapse of the German Army in the Western Ukraine, March and April 1944. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, p. 228. Note: this is for March–May 1944, in response to the second stage of the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, as the dates in the name of this work suggests. Compared to Grylev's work, Liedtke's work, in terms of German divisional reinforcements sent to Ukraine between March–May 1944, is essentially the same. However, given the fact that it is a contemporary work with more information available, Liedtke's work is more detailed, specifically in terms of the date the particular division arrived, divisional personnel and armored strength. Unlike Grylev, Liedtke also includes non-divisional independent armored units (Tiger and Panther tank battalions, StuG brigades etc.) that arrived to Ukraine in the spring of 1944.
    188. Jentz, T., L. Panzertruppen 2: The Complete Guide to the Creation & Combat Employment of Germany's Tank Force. Schiffer Publishing, 1996, p. 130. Note: this is only for January 1944 period. In January 1944, Army Group South received a Panther tank battalion, which arrived from France with 76 Panthers.
    189. Алексей Исаев. "Котёл" Хубе. Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция 1944 года. Яуза, 2017, p. 45, 359. Note: this includes only 2 self-propelled tank destroyer battalions that arrived from Germany and is not mentioned in the works already used. One of them arrived from Germany in late February 1944 equipped with "Nashorn" tank destroyers (p. 45), while another one arrived from Germany in April 1944 equipped "Ferdinand" tank destroyers (p. 359).
    190. Gregory Liedtke (2015). Lost in the Mud: The (Nearly) Forgotten Collapse of the German Army in the Western Ukraine, March and April 1944. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, p. 227, 229.
    191. Алексей Исаев. "Котёл" Хубе. Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция 1944 года. Яуза, 2017, p. 270.
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    234. Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 280. Note: this is only for Romanian mountain brigades, which are not mentioned in the Liedtke's work. Thus, between 2-28 April 1944, the 101st, 102nd and 103rd Romanian Mountain Brigades arrived as part of reinforcements.
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    Sources[]

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    The original article can be found at Dnieper–Carpathian offensive and the edit history here.