Battle of Tacna

Battle of Tacna
Part of War of the Pacific
Date May 26, 1880 Location Department of Tacna, Peru Result Decisive Chilean victory
Belligerents
Chile	Peru Bolivia
Commanders and leaders
Gen. Manuel Baquedano	Gen. Narciso Campero
Strength
11,779 - 14,147 soldiers 37 cannons 4 Gatling guns	8,930 – 12,000 soldiers 16 cannons 7 Gatling guns
Casualties and losses
2,200 casualties	3,500 – 5,000 casualties

The Battle of Tacna, also known as the Battle of Alliance Heights (Spanish: Batalla del Alto de la Alianza), effectively destroyed the Peru-Bolivian alliance against Chile, forged by a secret treaty between both countries signed in 1873. On May 26, 1880, the Chilean northern operations army led by General Manuel Baquedano González, conclusively defeated a Peru-Bolivian army commanded by Bolivian President, General Narciso Campero, after almost five hours of fierce combat. This battle took place at the Intiorko hill plateau, a few miles north of the Peruvian city of Tacna. As a result of this battle, the Bolivian army returned to its country, and never participated in the conflict again, leaving Peru to fight the rest of the war alone. Also, this victory consolidated the Chilean domain over the Tarapacá Province, territory definitively annexed to Chile after the signing of the Tratado de Ancón (English: Treaty of Ancon), in 1884, which ended the war. Tacna itself would remain under Chilean control until 1929.

Prologue

File:Batalla-de-tacna.djvu After the Bolivian government threatened to confiscate and clinch the Chilean Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company by a decree on February 1, 1879, a Chilean disembarkation at Antofagasta on February 14 seized control of the city. Obliged by a secret cooperation treaty signed with Bolivia on February 6, 1873; Peru was forced into the conflict. Although the latter tried to mediate between both nations, Chile — by then aware of the secret pact — issued a war declaration against the Allied countries on April 5. Once the war started, the conflict initially developed into a naval campaign, due to the strategic relevance of sea domination. The Chilean Navy had serious problems with its Peruvian counterpart at the beginning, as the ironclad Huáscar, commanded by Admiral Miguel Grau Seminario inflicted several defeats on the Chileans at Iquique and other confrontations. An eight-month chase conducted by the Chilean fleet concluded with the capture of the Peruvian vessel and the death of Peru's highest naval figure during the decisive victory of Angamos on October 8. With this encounter Chile controlled the sea, so that its headquarters were free to move to the theatre of operations. The next step planned by the Chilean command was the invasion of the Tarapacá Department.

Accordingly to this purpose, the Chilean army launched an amphibious operation at Pisagua on November 2, successfully pushing the Allies inland and isolating their strongholds in the Peruvian department, Arica and Iquique, from each other. This initial success was consolidated after the consecutive victories of Pampa Germania, on November 6, and Dolores, on November 19. However, the chain of Chilean victories ended with the setback at Tarapacá on November 27, when a Chilean force of 2,000 men recklessly attacked an Allied army of 4,000 soldiers, suffering a heavy defeat.

The Allies

Despite their victory at Tarapacá, the demoralized Allied army led by General Juan Buendia left the entire Peruvian department under Chilean control by retreating to Arica in an extenuating and perilous march, losing almost 2,000 men in this long voyage. Additionally, the lack of results generated popular dissatisfaction in the Allied countries with their government's conduct of the war, and it was determinant for the deposition of the President of Peru, Mariano Ignacio Prado, and his Bolivian counterpart, Hilarión Daza. Both saw themselves deposed and replaced by Nicolás de Piérola and General Narciso Campero, respectively. Also, the loss of the Tarapacá Department stopped the earnings of the saltpetre trade, making the war financial weight heavier for the Allies.

The Chileans

Krupp artillery

After the defeat of Tarapacá, the Chilean army did not make any incursions for some time. The Chilean government believed that with the loss of Tarapacá, Peru would be inclined to sign a truce, allowing them to keep the recently gained Tarapacá territory as a war compensation. Also, Chile saw civilian volunteers increase the number of their soldiers up to 10,000 men. Besides, the control of Antofagasta meant an extra cash-flow from the saltpetre exportation, making it possible to purchase weapons, clothes, food and other war materials that an expanding army would require, easing the burden of war expenditures.

Allied Army

The Allied Army had about 11,000 men between Tacna and Arica. Also, the new Bolivian President Narciso Campero managed to send another infantry division to Tacna. There were disagreements about how to face the Chilean development between Peruvian Admiral Lizardo Montero and Piérola's deputy, Pedro del Solar, wasting precious time in internal disputes whilst the Chilean army marched towards Tacna. Meanwhile, the Peruvian vessel Unión broke through the Chilean blockade on Arica, delivering supplies, medicines and shoes to the port garrison. The army present in Tacna had about 10,000 men and thirty one cannons — six Krupp cannons, six machine guns, two La Hitte cannons, seven 4" strayed cannons and 12" Blackey cannons. The Allied infantry had to fight with different types of rifles, making it harder to supply them.

Chilean Army

Chilean infantrymen

The Chilean High Command planned a landing at Ilo and Pacocha in order to scout the country and to gain knowledge of the Allied army status. After two incursions, a main landing took place at Ilo, unshipping 10,000 men. After the resignation to the High Command of Gen. Erasmo Escala, due to the constant arguments with the War Minister Rafael Sotomayor, the Chilean Minister appointed General Manuel Baquedano Gonzalez, a veteran of the Peru-Bolivian Confederacy war who had the sympathies and respect of the soldiers as Commander-in-Chief of the Operations Army. Since the beginning of the conflict, the infantry was equipped with Comblain and upgraded Gras rifles, using the same type of bullets. The artillery had thirty-seven cannons — twenty Krupp cannons and seventeen mountain cannon.

Preliminary moves

A Chilean expeditionary force disembarked at Ilo on December 31, under orders to take the port and to eliminate resistance in the region. This task was commended to Lt. Col. Aristides Martinez, who achieved control of the town and severed the telegraph line to Moquegua, allowing him to move freely in the zone. Afterwards, the expedition took the train to Moquegua, taking the population by surprise and accepting the surrender of the town the following morning. After these events Martínez' troops returned to Ilo, sailing back to Pisagua on January 2. With the result of this campaign, Sotomayor decided to attack Tacna and Arica with the entire army leaving Moquegua alone.

Due to the success of the scouting mission, a massive landing took place between February 18 and February 25. 9,500 troops disembarked in three divisions, whereas another one was unshipped a few days later. On February 27, the Chilean Navy began the bombardment of Arica where the ChileanHuáscar (new captain) Manuel Thompson died. On March 8, another Chilean expedition of 900 soldiers under Colonel Orozimbo Barbosa was sent to Mollendo. Ten days later, Gen. Campero's 5th Division reached Tacna, reinforcing the Allied position. On the 22, Baquedano defeated Peruvian Col. Andres Gamarra at Los Angeles hill, a position considered unbreakable by the Allies. Shortly after this victory the Chilean army marched across the desert to Tacna, but the artillery was re-embarked and shipped to Ite, taking four days to unload these batteries; while on April 9, the Peruvian port of El Callao found itself under naval blockade. On May 20, War Minister Rafael Sotomayor died due to a stroke at Las Yaras. The Chilean President Anibal Pinto appointed José Francisco Vergara as the new War Minister in Campaign.

Whilst the Chilean Army developed in the Tacna Department, the Allies had their own problems. Montero wanted to wait for the Chilean troops at Tacna, but Col. Eliodoro Camacho supported the idea to march and ambush the Chileans at the Sama river valley, easing the communications with Arequipa. Trying to avoid any confrontation, Gen. Campero traveled to Tacna to take charge of the Allied Army, assuming his command on April 19. On the night of May 25, Campero's troops tried to ambush the Chileans at Quebrada Honda, but the night's darkness and mist prevented the Allies from doing so, forcing their return to Tacna for defense preparations.

The battle

Battlefield

The Intiorko plateau is an arid and soft-sloped terrain located a few miles north from Tacna, becoming an excellent shooting ground. It has on the rear a series of little sand accumulations, allowing the concealment of reserve units behind them. The flanks are protected by the Sama-Tacna road from the east, and to the west by an almost impossible to walk terrain, where no artillery could ever been placed, and a harsh field for the movement of infantry or cavalry.

Allies plan and distribution

Allied defenses at Tacna

The Allied plan consists in exploiting the terrain tactical advantages, so it was decided to fight on the southern edge of the Intiorko plateau. The troops did not make any defenses or trenches, apart from little sand defences for the artillery on their right wing, but just wait the Chilean Army deployed in a 3 km. defensive line.

Campero divides his army into three major sectors, with the right wing under the command of Lizardo Montero, the centre led by Col. Castro Pinto, and the left flank commanded by Col. Eliodoro Camacho. The Southern Peruvian Army and the Bolivian Army add up twenty one battalions and eight machine guns with nine cannons, plus eight cavalry squadrons.

Chilean plan and troop deployment

Two plans are presented before Baquedano. The first one is a flanking manoeuvre on the Allied right proposed by Minister Vergara. On the other hand, Col. Velasquez has the idea to engage in a simultaneous frontal charge on the entire front, so the troops could not be moved from one point to another, avoiding the reinforcement of weaker points generated during the battle, exploiting the thinness of the Allied defensive line which makes it susceptible to be broken at any point. Besides, the lack of trenches and fortifications would make this breaking easier.

Baquedano decides to use Velasquez' plan. Thus, the infantry splits into five divisions, placing on the first line the 1st Division of Col. Santiago Amengual right next to the 2nd Division of Col. Francisco Barceló. Right behind them is Col. Jose Amunátegui's 3rd Division and Col. Orozimbo Barbosa's 4th Division deployed on a third line, and behind these two is the reserve of Col. Mauricio Muñoz. Velasquez' artillery has thirty-seven cannons and four machine guns, and the cavalry is composed of three regiments, with a fraction detached to the 2nd Division and the rest with Baquedano's chief staff. The Chilean army presents at Tacna a total of sixteen battalions, three cavalry regiments and thirty-seven cannon.

The beginning

Bolivian Colorados Regt. soldier

The battle starts with useless artillery cross-fire, because the projectiles bury in the sand without any detonation. According to Velázquez' plan, around 10 am Amengual marches against Camacho followed by Barceló who is to charge the Allied center. Both divisions advance under heavy fire, but fail in their objective to engage combat at the same time, with Amengual's men entering into battle first, allowing Campero to send in Herrera's division, followed by the Alianza and Aroma battalions from the right flank reserve. When Barceló approaches to Castro Pinto's forces, the 2nd Line Regiment notices the Peruvian Zepita Battalion — unit which took its banner at Tarapacá — in front of it, and charges driven by vengeance, disregarding superior orders to detain. Until now, only 4,500 soldiers have assaulted the Allied front.

At 11 am, Camacho has lined up several units, among them the Amarillos, Libres del Sur and Viedma battalions. A brief calm due to Chilean 1st and 2nd divisions' reorganization makes him believe in a Chilean vacillation, and he then sends his soldiers to charge. However, an unseen maneuver performed by Velásquez' artillery proves deadly and decimates the Allied left by entire ranks; soon entered into battle, the new Allied battalions are obliterated by a precise and concentric fire, causing them to lose 80% of their effectiveness within an hour. Camacho urges for reinforcements, and the Allies' elite units, the Colorados and Aroma battalions, are sent in his help. Once arrived, the reserve counterattacks Amengual who is forced to retreat since his soldiers have exhausted the ammunition. The Esmeralda, Santiago and Navales battalions retreat under heavy fire. Barceló faces the same problem, and is forced to retreat as well, sustaining heavy casualties, as his Atacama Regiment lost almost half of its personnel in this maneuver.

Decisive manoeuvres

To retire the divisions and resupply them, War Minister Vergara orders Yávar’s grenadiers to charge the Bolivians, but gets rejected shortly after being received in square formations. Nevertheless, the charge put the Allied advance at a standstill, allowing the refolding divisions to refill their weapons. Then, after the cavalry withdraws, half of Amunátegui’s division assails the Colorados and the Aroma suddenly, catching them along with the 1st Division in a cross fire tearing apart what’s left of them.

The Chilean infantrymen continue pushing forward until both armies are at close range, then draw their bayonets and corvos and rush the defensive line in a melee. The Peruvian Victoria Battalion gives under the attack pressure and withdraw, splitting the defensive line and so deciding the battle.

Burying soldiers after the battle

The Ending

Meanwhile, the Chilean 4th Division engages the weakened (due to the constant reinforcement of the left flank) Allied right wing, encountering light resistance and outflanking the position. Once the Peruvians are outmaneuvered and forced to retreat, Barboza's forces focused on the artillery batteries on this sector taking them with a bayonet charge. Baquedano sends the reserve to the front, with the Atacama Battalion making a conversion to the left, engaging the Allied right flank too. With this final movement, the entire defensive front collapsed, and the Allies leave the battlefield after 5 hours. While the Allies retreat to Tacna, Amengual chases them until reaching the city. Later Tacna was shelled in order to force surrender, and finally Col. Santiago Amengual enters into the city around 18:30.

Aftermath

Battle of Tacna monument

The Chilean Army had casualties 2,200 men. Amengual's, Barceló's and Amunátegui's divisions, which added up 6,500 men, had 1,639 casualties. Barbosa's division lost 15% of its force. The Chilean reserve almost did not fight, having only 17 wounded. The Atacama and Santiago regiments lost almost 50% of their effective force. Also the 2nd Line, Navales and Valparaíso regiments had severe losses. The 2nd Line Regiment banner lost at the battle of Tarapacá was found on a church in Tacna by Ruperto Marchant Pereira.

The Allies had casualties estimated between 3,500 and 5,000 men. The Bolivian Army lost 23 officers from Major to General. The "Colorados" Battalion had only 293 survivors, while the Aroma Battalion — also known as "Amarillo" – lost 388 soldiers, since these units chose to fight to the end instead of retreating. The Peruvian army lost 185 officers, and more than 3,000 soldiers died. Accordingly to a communication of Solar to Piérola, only 400 Peruvian men escaped from the battle.

Military and political results

The Chileans' victory had a decisive impact upon the Allies. Gen. Campero withdrew to Bolivia, taking the road to Palca. Montero retired to Puno, passing through Tarata. Bolivia would never participate in the conflict again, leaving its ally with no support whatsoever. Hence, Peru had to face Chile alone for the rest of the war.

See also

• Order of Battle at Tacna

Bibliography

• Bulnes, Gonzalo (1911). La Guerra del Pacífico 1879 - 1884. Editorial del Pacífico. 
• Mellafe, Rafael; Pelayo, Mauricio (2004). La Guerra del Pacífico en imágenes, relatos... testimonios. Centro de Estudios Bicentenario. 
• Ejército de Chile. "Batalla de Tacna". http://www.ejercito.cl/historia/combates_tacna.php. Retrieved 2008. 
• Museo Histórico Militar de Chile. "Batalla de Tacna o del Alto de la Alianza". http://www.mhm.cl/html/agenda_02a.php?id=443&cate=2. Retrieved 2008. 
• Harvard College Library. "La Batalla de Tacna". http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/view/4464527?n=1&s=4&imagesize=1200&rotation=0. Retrieved 2008. 

External links

• The Victorious Chilians