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Battle of Cambrai
Part of the Western Front of the First World War
Bundesarchiv Bild 104-0941A, Bei Cambrai, zerstörter englischer Panzer Mark I.jpg
German soldiers recovering a British Mark IV tank. The effectiveness of the tank in combat was limited in the extreme.
Date20 November – 8 December 1917
LocationCambrai, France
Result small British victory; slim stretch of ground gained

 British Empire

  •  Newfoundland
  •  United Kingdom
 United States (30 November only)

 German Empire

  •  Baden
  •  Bavaria
  •  Prussia
  •  Saxony
  •  Württemberg
Commanders and leaders
United Kingdom Sir Julian Byng German Empire Georg von der Marwitz
2 Corps
476 tanks (378 combat tanks)
1 Corps
Casualties and losses
55,207 casualties
179 tanks
c. 45,000

The Battle of Cambrai (20 November – 7 December 1917) was a British campaign of the First World War. Cambrai, in the Nord département (Nord-Pas-de-Calais), was a key supply point for the German Siegfried Stellung (part of the Hindenburg Line) and the nearby Bourlon Ridge would be an excellent gain from which to threaten the rear of the German line to the north. The operation was to include an experimental artillery action. Major General Tudor, Commander Royal Artillery (CRA) of the 9th Division, suggested trying out new artillery-infantry techniques on his sector of the front. During preparations, J. F. C. Fuller, a staff officer with the Royal Tank Corps (RTC), was in the process of looking for a place to use tanks as raiding parties. General Julian Byng, commander of the British Third Army, decided to incorporate them into the attack.

The battle is often erroneously noted for being the first mass use of tanks in a combined arms operation. However, the French had deployed large numbers of tanks in April (130+), May (48) and October (92) 1917, and the British more than 200 in Flanders in June and July. Despite the initial success of the Mark IV tanks at Cambrai, German artillery and infantry defences exposed the frailties of their armour and the vehicles became mostly ineffective after the first day. The battle was largely an artillery-infantry engagement that achieved, surprise and technical superiority against strong fortifications but weak German infantry and artillery defences, which were quickly reinforced. The British attack demonstrated that the Hindenburg Line could be penetrated and showed the value of new artillery and infantry methods, such as sound ranging and infiltration tactics that would later play a vital part during the Hundred Days Offensive.

The popular perception of the battle as a tank battle was largely from writing by Basil Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller, the latter erroneously claimed credit for the plan. Liddell Hart, whose position as Military Correspondent of the Daily Telegraph and The Times newspapers (1925–1939) gave him great public influence, was a critic of Douglas Haig and attempted to use the battle to indicate a "new" form of doctrine. Several modern studies have rejected their version of events and returned to a view nearer to that of the British Official History.[1]


British plan

Proposals for an operation in the Cambrai area using a large number of tanks originated from Brigadier H. Elles of the Tank Corps and the reliance on the secret transfer of artillery reinforcements to be "silently registered" in order to gain surprise came from Henry Hugh Tudor, commander of the 9th Infantry Division artillery.[2] In August 1917 he conceived the idea of a surprise attack in IV Corps sector that his unit occupied. Tudor suggested a primarily artillery-infantry attack, which would be supported by a small number of tanks to secure a breakthrough of the German Hindenburg Line. The German defences were formidable; Cambrai having been a quiet stretch of front thus far enabled the Germans to fortify their lines in depth and the British were aware of this. Tudor's plan sought to test new methods in combined arms, with emphasis on artillery and infantry techniques and see how effective they were against strong German fortifications.[3] Tudor advocated using the new sound ranging and "silent registration" of guns to achieve instant suppression fire and surprise. He also sought to use tanks to clear extensive barbed wire defences, while supporting the tank force with the No. 106 shell fuze, designed to explode high explosive (HE) ammunition without cratering the ground to supplement the armour.[4]


Third Army

Destroyed British tank, 29 November 1917

The battle began at dawn, approximately 6:00 a.m. on 20 November, with a carefully prepared and predicted but unregistered barrage by 1,003 guns on German defences, followed by smoke and a creeping barrage at 300 yd (270 m) ahead to cover the first advances. Despite efforts to preserve secrecy, the Germans had received sufficient intelligence to be on moderate alert: an attack on Havrincourt was anticipated, as was the use of tanks. The attacking force was six infantry divisions of the III Corps (under Lieutenant General Pulteney) on the right and IV Corps (under Lieutenant General Woollcombe) on the left, supported by nine battalions of the Tank Corps with about 437 tanks. In reserve was one infantry division in IV Corps and the three divisions of the Cavalry Corps, under Lieutenant-General Kavanagh. Initially, there was considerable success in most areas and it seemed as if a great victory was within reach; the Hindenburg Line had been penetrated with advances of up to 5 mi (8.0 km). On the right, the 12th (Eastern) Division advanced as far as Lateau Wood before being ordered to dig in. The 20th (Light) Division forced a way through La Vacquerie and then advanced to capture a bridge across the St Quentin canal at Masnières. The bridge collapsed under the weight of a tank halting the hopes for an advance across the canal.[5] In the centre the 6th Division captured Ribécourt and Marcoing but when the cavalry passed through late, they were repulsed from Noyelles.[6]

On the IV Corps front, the 51st (Highland) Division was held at Flesquières, its first objective and this left the attacking divisions on each flank exposed to enfilade fire. The commander of the 51st Division, George Montague Harper had substituted his own tank drill for the standard one laid down by the Tank Corps; that and excessive distance between the tanks and the infantry contributed to the failure.[Note 1] Flesquières was also one of the strongest points in the German line and was flanked by other strong points. Its defenders under Major Krebs also acquitted themselves well against the tanks, almost forty being knocked out by the Flesquières artillery. Some accounts claim five were knocked out by an artillery officer, Theodor Krüger Batterie Feld Artillerie Regiment 108. Field Marshal Haig's dispatch praised the gunner's bravery in his diary.[8] There is little evidence for Krüger's actions, although it is possible that he may have been responsible for as many as nine tanks. 28 tanks were lost in the action, through German artillery-fire and breakdowns. Haig concluded that skirmishing infantry was needed, to bring the artillery crews under small-arms fire to allow the tanks to operate.[9] The common explanation of the "mythical" German officer, ignored the fact that the British tanks were faced with the German 54th Division, one of the few divisions with specialised training in anti-tank tactics and with experience against French tanks in the Nivelle Offensive.[10] The Germans were nevertheless forced to abandon Flesquières during the night.[11]

Captured British tank at Cambrai

To the west of Flesquières, the 62nd (2nd West Riding) Division swept all the way through Havrincourt and Graincourt to within reach of the woods on Bourlon Ridge and on the British left, the 36th (Ulster) Division reached the Bapaume-Cambrai road. Of the tanks, 180 were out of action after the first day, although only 65 had been destroyed. Of the other casualties, 71 had suffered mechanical failure and 43 had ditched.[12] The British lost c. 4,000 casualties and took 4,200 prisoners, a casualty rate half that of Third Ypres (Passchendaele) and a greater advance in six hours than in three months there but the British had failed to reach Bourlon Ridge.[13] The German command was quick to send reinforcements and was relieved that the British did not manage fully to exploit their early gains.[14] When the battle was renewed on the 21 November, the pace of British advance was greatly slowed. Flesquières, which had been abandoned and Cantaing were captured in the very early morning but in general the British took to consolidating their gains rather than expanding.[15] The efforts of III Corps were officially halted and attention was turned to IV Corps.[16]

The effort was aimed at Bourlon Ridge. Fighting was fierce around Bourlon and at Anneux (just before the woods) was costly.[17] German counter-attacks squeezed the British out of Moeuvres on 21 November and Fontaine on 22 November; when Anneux was taken, the 62nd Division found themselves unable to enter Bourlon Woods. The British were left exposed in a salient. Haig still wanted Bourlon Ridge and the exhausted 62nd Division was replaced by the 40th Division under John Ponsonby on 23 November. Supported by almost a hundred tanks and 430 guns, the 40th Division attacked into the woods of Bourlon Ridge on the morning of 23 November and made little progress.[18] The Germans had put two divisions of Gruppe Arras on the ridge with another two in reserve and Gruppe Caudry was reinforced. The 40th Division attack reached the crest of the ridge but were held there and suffered more than 4,000 casualties in three days. More British troops were pushed in to move beyond the woods but the British reserves were rapidly depleted and more German reinforcements were arriving.[19] The final British effort was on 27 November by the 62nd Division aided by thirty tanks. Early success was soon reversed by a German counterattack. The British now held a salient roughly 11 km (6.8 mi) by 9.5 km (5.9 mi) with its front along the crest of the ridge.[20] On 28 November, the offensive was stopped and the British troops were ordered to lay wire and dig in. The Germans were quick to concentrate their artillery on the new British positions. On 28 November more than 16,000 shells were fired into the wood.[21]

German Second Army

The German counter-attack

As the British took the ridge, the Germans began reinforcing the area. As early as 23 November, the German command felt that a British breakthrough would not occur and began to consider a counter-offensive.[22] Twenty divisions were arrayed in the Cambrai area.[23] The Germans intended to retake the Bourlon salient and also to attack around Havrincourt while diversionary attacks would hold IV Corps; it was hoped to at least reach the old positions on the Hindenburg Line. The Germans intended to employ the new tactics of a short, intense period of shelling followed by a rapid assault using Hutier infiltration tactics, leading elements attacking in groups rather than waves and bypassing strong opposition. For the initial assault at Bourlon three divisions of Gruppe Arras under Otto von Moser were assigned.[24] On the eastern flank of the British salient, Gruppe Caudry attacked from Bantouzelle to Rumilly and aimed for Marcoing.[25] Gruppe Busigny advanced from Banteux. These two corps groups had seven infantry divisions.[24]

Lieutenant General Thomas D'Oyly Snow, commander of the British VII Corps to the south of the threatened area, warned III Corps of German preparations. The German attack began at 7:00 a.m. on 30 November; almost immediately, the majority of III Corps divisions were heavily engaged.[Note 2] The German infantry advance in the south was unexpectedly swift. The commanders of 29th and 12th divisions were almost captured, with Brigadier-General Vincent having to fight his way out of his headquarters and then grab men from retreating units to try to halt the Germans. In the south, the German advance spread across 8 mi (13 km) and came within a few miles of the vital village of Metz and its link to Bourlon.[27]

At Bourlon the Germans suffered heavy casualties. Despite this, the Germans closed and there was fierce fighting.[28] British units displayed reckless determination; one group of eight British machine guns fired over 70,000 rounds in their efforts to stem the German advance. The concentration of British effort to hold the ridge was impressive but allowed the German advance elsewhere greater opportunity. Only counter-attacks by the Guards Division, the arrival of British tanks and the fall of night allowed the line to be held. By the following day, the impetus of the German advance was lost but pressure on 3 December led to the German capture of La Vacquerie and a British withdrawal on the east bank of the St Quentin canal. The Germans had reached a line looping from Quentin Ridge to near Marcoing. Their capture of Bonvais ridge made the British hold on Bourlon precarious.[29]



Marwitz (right) and the Kaiser on the way to visit troops near Cambrai in December 1917

Frontlines before and after the battle

On 3 December, Haig ordered a retreat from the salient and by 7 December the British gains were abandoned except for a portion of the Hindenburg line around Havrincourt, Ribécourt and Flesquières.[30] The Germans had exchanged this territorial loss for land to the south of Welsh Ridge.[31] The Germans recovered most of their early losses and gained a little elsewhere, albeit with a net loss of ground. The battle showed that even the strongest trench defences could be overcome by a surprise artillery-infantry attack, using the new methods and equipment, with a mass tank attack as a bonus.[32] The German revival after the shock of the British attack improved morale but the potential for similar attacks, meant that the Germans had to divert resources to anti-tank defences and weapons, an extra demand that the Germans could ill-afford to meet

Wherever the ground offers suitable going for tanks, surprise attacks like this may be expected. That being the case, there can be no more mention, therefore, of quiet fronts. (Crown Prince Rupprecht)[33]

and showed the Germans the effectiveness of the Stormtrooper tactics, recently adopted by General Hutier against the Russians.[32]


Sheldon wrote that both sides had c. 40,000 casualties and questioned the British Official History figure of c. 53,000 German casualties, calling them "inflated for no good reason".[33] Miles recorded British casualties from 20 November – 8 December as 47,596 of whom 9,000 were taken prisoner and an official German total of c. 41,000 casualties, which Miles increased to 53,300 on the assumption that German figures omitted lightly wounded, which were counted in British casualty records.[34] Harris wrote that 11,105 German and 9,000 British prisoners were taken.[35]


The contributions of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment at the 1917 Battle of Cambrai are remembered in the village of Masnières at the Masnières Newfoundland Memorial.[36]


  1. Hammond refuted these claims which had been exaggerated by Miles the Official Historian, by C. Baker-Carr and others. The attack was the sixth occasion when the division operated with tanks and the ground in the 51st Division area had far more small fortifications. The methods chosen had been tested in training and were not the cause of the check at Flesquières on the first day of the offensive, which was due to the presence in the German 54th Division of Field Artillery Regiment 108, specially trained in anti-tank tactics and the reluctance of Harper the divisional commander, to commit his reserve brigade.[7]
  2. American troops played a slight role in the fighting on 30 November, when a detachment of the 11th Engineer (Railway) Regiment, working on construction behind British lines dug reserve trenches at Fins, becoming the first unit of the American Expeditionary Force to engage in combat and had 28 casualties.[26]


  1. Hammond 2009, pp. 429–430.
  2. Miles 1948, pp. 4–6.
  3. Miles 1948, pp. 17–30.
  4. Hammond 2009, p. 57.
  5. Miles 1948, p. 69.
  6. Miles 1948, pp. 66–67.
  7. Hammond 2009, pp. 83–86, 435.
  8. Sheffield & Bourne 2005, p. 348.
  9. Hammond 2009, p. 233.
  10. Miles 1948, p. 59.
  11. Miles 1948, p. 108.
  12. Miles 1948, p. 90.
  13. Miles 1948, p. 88.
  14. Miles 1948, pp. 98–100.
  15. Miles 1948, pp. 101–107.
  16. Miles 1948, pp. 88–93.
  17. Miles 1948, pp. 108–114.
  18. Miles 1948, pp. 115–126.
  19. Miles 1948, pp. 126–136.
  20. Miles 1948, pp. 144–161.
  21. Miles 1948, pp. 162–175.
  22. Rogers 2010, p. 180.
  23. Sheldon 2009, pp. 188–207.
  24. 24.0 24.1 Sheldon 2009, p. 208.
  25. Sheldon 2009, p. 207.
  26. Miles 1948, p. 187.
  27. Sheldon 2009, pp. 234–242.
  28. Sheldon 2009, pp. 255–268.
  29. Sheldon 2009, pp. 273–297.
  30. Miles 1948, pp. 257–258.
  31. Miles 1948, pp. 275–277.
  32. 32.0 32.1 Sheldon 2009, p. ix.
  33. 33.0 33.1 Sheldon 2009, p. 312.
  34. Miles 1948, pp. 273–274, 382.
  35. Harris 2008, p. 406.
  36. Nicholson 1964, p. 517.


  • Hammond, B. (2009). Cambrai 1917: The Myth of the First Great Tank Battle. Orion Publishing. ISBN 978-0-7538-2605-8. 
  • Harris, J. P. (2008). Douglas Haig and the First World War (2009 ed.). Cambridge: CUP. ISBN 978-0-521-89802-7. 
  • Miles, W. (1948). Military Operations France and Belgium 1917, Vol III: The Battle of Cambrai (IWM & Battery Press 1991 ed.). HMSO. ISBN 0-89839-162-8. 
  • Nicholson, G. W. L. (1964). The Fighting Newfoundlander: A History of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment (Carleton Library 2006 ed.). Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. ISBN 0-7735-3133-5. 
  • Rogers (ed.), D. (2010). Landrecies to Cambrai : Case Studies of German Offensive and Defensive Operations on the Western Front 1914–17. Solihull: Helion. ISBN 978-1-906033-76-7. 
  • Sheffield, G.; Bourne, J (2005). Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914–1918 (1st ed.). Weidenfeld & Nicholson. ISBN 0-297-84702-3. 
  • Sheldon, J. (2009). The German Army at Cambrai. Pen & Sword. ISBN 978-1-84415-944-4. 

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