Battle for Vozuća

Battle for Vozuća
Vozuća Sarajevo The location of Vozuća.
Date July 1995. - 10. September 1995 Location Vozuća Result ARBIH victory
Belligerents
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnian Mujahideen Black Swans (special forces)	Republika Srpska
Commanders and leaders
Refik Lendo Muatez Billah	Unknown
Strength
3rd Corps of the ARBIH	3rd "Ozren" brigade 4th "Ozren" brigade "Srbačka" brigade
Casualties and losses
129	Unknown number of KIA 60 Captured

Battle for Vozuća (Bosnian language: Bitka za Vozuću), also Operation Uragan was a successful attack by the 3rd Corps and the foreign troops of the Bosnian Mujahideen against the strategically important village Vozuća.

The attack

The attack itself, was carried out by the El Mujahed Detachment of the 3rd Corps, they also were accompanied by some regular members of the ARBIH. The attack was planned already in May 1995 and had 3 phases which were carried out. The first one was called "Crveni lav" and the main goal in this operation was to cut the communication of the VRS in Vozuća. They succeed and pushed the Serb forces. The second part of the operation was called "Battle for pride". The goal was to prepare refugees from Srebrenica and Žepa to move into the area after it's liberated. It was planned but after the attack, only small group of people arrived at destroyed Vozuća area.

Final phase

Everything was ready and the final attack code named "Uragan" (English: Hurricane). The attack started on the 10th September and ended the same day with the total victory of the Bosnian forces. They used the planning very good and were ahead of the Serb forces. The Army and the Mujahideen got help from a special paramillitary force called Black Swans. The aftermath of the battle is infamous for the brutal behaving of the Mujahideen forces against left soldiers and civil population. The Bosnian forces continued advancing trough the Ozren area.

Further reading

• Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, Volume 1. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis. 2002. ISBN 978-0160664724.