Battalion tactical group

A battalion tactical group (Russian: Батальонная тактическая группа, batal'onnaya takticheskaya gruppa), abbreviated as BTG, is a combined-arms manoeuvre unit deployed by the Russian Army that is kept at a high level of readiness. A BTG typically comprises a battalion (typically mechanised infantry) of 2–4 companies reinforced with air-defence, artillery, engineering, and logistical support units, formed from a garrisoned army brigade. A tank company and rocket artillery also typically reinforce such groupings. BTGs formed the mainstay of Russia's military intervention in Ukraine from 2013–2015, particularly in the Donbass war. According to the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, as of August 2021 Russia had about 170 BTGs. Each BTG has approximately 600–800 officers and soldiers, of whom roughly 200 are infantrymen, equipped with vehicles typically including roughly 10 tanks and 40 infantry fighting vehicles.

History

Creation

As early as the Second World War, the Soviet Army had experimented with combined arms battalions of 1–2 tank companies, 1–2 infantry companies, and an artillery battery, for use as a flexible and fast unit for manoeuvre combat. However, a focus on flexibility at the operational level and rigidity at the tactical level, as well as a lack of professional non-commissioned officers needed for such a model, militated against the formation of such units during the Soviet era. However, the lack of standing military units that could be deployed quickly without a major mobilisation of reservists proved problematic throughout the Soviet era, particularly during the Soviet deployment in Afghanistan. Battalion tactical groups were first seen in the Soviet Army during the war in Afghanistan as an expedient way of creating small, battle-ready forces for rapid deployment.

Ad-hoc battalion tactical groups were formed in the Russian army as an expediency due to lack of manpower and equipment to field full-strength brigades and divisions during both the first and second Chechen Wars, and also in the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. Following the Georgian War, in October 2008, the Ministry of Defence announced that it intended to reform the Russian army by creating "permanent readiness" brigades, however, after Anatoliy Serdyukov was dismissed as defence minister and replaced with Shoigu in November 2009, this plan was shelved in favour of forming “permanent readiness” BTGs within garrison brigades. These were planned to be 100% staffed by contract soldiers (i.e., non-conscript volunteers). According to sources quoted by the Russian Interfax agency, the reason for this was lack of manpower to form full-strength brigades.

Russo-Ukrainian War

Reports from the Russo-Ukrainian War cited in the July-September 2016 edition of the US military journal Armor identified BTGs as the preponderance of Russian units deployed there. These BTGs comprised a tank company, three mechanised infantry companies, two anti-tank companies, two or three artillery batteries, and two air-defence batteries. The majority of BTGs deployed in the Donbass war came from Russia's 49th Army and 6th tank brigade, though BTGs were deployed from nearly every field army and corps in the Russian Army. Typically BTGs composed roughly half the equipment and personnel of the deploying brigade, and a third of their personnel was made up of "contract" soldiers.

Organisational chart of the Russian Battalion Tactical Group, published by the US military journal Armor

Battles involving BTGs in the war in Ukraine included the Battle of Mariupol, the Battle of Donetsk Airport, and the Battle of Debaltseve.

Following the Donbass War, in 2016 the Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov announced plans to expand the number of BTGs from 96 to 125 by 2018. At the same time Gerasimov also claimed that BTGs would be primarily staffed by contract soldiers by 2018. By September 2018 Gerasimov claimed that Russia had 126 "permanently battle-ready" BTGs. Six months later in March 2019, Shoigu, addressing the lower house of the Russian Duma, claimed that Russia had 136 BTGs, and by August 2021 was claiming that Russia had around 170 BTGs.

During the March-April 2021 escalation in tensions between Russia and Ukraine, US officials estimated that around 48 of Russia's BTGs had moved to the border with Ukraine, whilst Ukrainian officials estimated that 56 BTGs would be moved to the border. During the tensions on the border between Russia and Ukraine in late 2021 US officials estimated that the Russian deployment opposite Ukraine would reach 100 BTGs by January 2022, with around 50 BTGs estimated as already being in place by December 2021.

Advantages and disadvantages

The combination of different weapons systems including heavy ones at a low organisational level allows heavy artillery bombardments to be laid on more easily and makes them available for use tactically. As such a BTG can engage opposing units out to a longer range than, for example, a US Brigade Combat Team (BCT), which does not have such heavy weapons devolved down to it. Up to two BTGs can comprise a brigade, in the Russian army. Divisions and regiments have been superseded by brigades.

However, the BTG's relative lack of manpower (they deploy with about 200 infantrymen) compared to a BCT makes it reliant on proxy troops and paramilitaries (such as the pro-Russian militias in the Donbass war) to provide security along the flanks and rear. The BTG commander will likely have to communicate with the proxy troops through unsecure and unreliable means such as mobile phones. By Russian law, conscripts are not allowed to serve in BTGs outside of Russia; outside Russia, the troops of a BTG serve on a volunteer basis. The limited manpower of the BTG makes the commanders less likely to engage in urban combat than a BCT commander. As they derive their manpower and equipment primarily through the cannibalisation of a larger unit, their sustainability in long-term operations is also in doubt.