Sayyid Ali Husayni al-Sistani (born 4 August 1930), also known as Ayatollah Sistani or al-Sistani, is one of the most powerful and influential Iranian Twelver Shia marja in Iraq and the head of many of the hawzahs (seminaries) in Najaf.
He is described as the spiritual leader of Iraqi Shia Muslims and one of the most senior clerics in Shia Islam. He has been included in the all of editions of "The Muslim 500: The World's Most Influential Muslims" mostly in the top 10 positions since 2009. He is one of the 8 maraji mentioned in the most recent edition. In 2005, Sistani was listed among the Top 100 intellectuals of the world. In 2005 and 2014, he was also nominated for Nobel Prize Award towards his efforts for establishing peace.
Biography[]
Early life[]
Sistani was born in 1930 to a family of religious clerics who can trace their roots to Husayn ibn Ali, the grandson of the prophet Muhammad. His father was Mohammad-Bagher Sistani. Sistani himself claims to have been born in Mashhad, Iran, however there are disputes as to whether or not he was born in Mashhad or in Sistan and then moved to Mashhad as a child due to Iran not issuing birth certificates in its eastern provinces (now known as Region 5) until decades later.
Sistani began his religious education as a child, first in Mashhad in his father's hawzah, and continuing later in Qom. In Qom he studied under Grand Ayatollah Hossein Broujerdi. Later in 1951, Sistani traveled to Iraq to study in Najaf under Grand Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei. Sistani rose to the Usooli clerical rank of 'mujtahid' in 1960. At the unusually young age of thirty-one, Sistani reached the senior level of clerical accomplishment, or ijtihad, which sanctioned him by the Hawzah to pass his own judgments on religious questions.
He has a son called Mohammad-Reza Sistani.
Grand Ayatollah[]
When Grand Ayatollah Khoei died in 1992, Sistani ascended to the rank of Grand Ayatollah through traditional peer recognition of his scholarship. His role as successor to Khoei was symbolically cemented when he led funeral prayers for Khoei, He also inherited most of Khoei's network and following, although there are many shias who continue to follow Khoei till today.
Ba'ath Party[]
During the years of Saddam Hussein's rule of Iraq through the Ba'ath Party, Sistani was untouched during the violent Ba'athist repression and persecution that killed many clerics including Mohammad Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr in 1999, for which Saddam denied any involvement. His predecessor, Khoei, sat down with Saddam on state TV. After the death of Grand Ayatollah Khoei in 1992, Sistani emerged as the prominent Shia cleric to guide the Shia people under Saddam's rule, although Sistani's mosque was shut down in 1994 and did not reopen until the US-led 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Role in contemporary Iraq[]
Since the overthrow of the Ba'ath Party, Sistani has played an increasingly prominent role in regional religious and political affairs and he has been called the "most influential" figure in post-invasion Iraq.
Shortly after the US invasion began, Sistani issued a fatwa advising Shia clergy to become engaged in politics in order to better guide the Iraqi people toward "clearer decisions," and to fight "media propaganda." As the summer of 2003 approached, Sistani and his followers began to petition the occupying forces for a constitutional convention. Later, Sistani called for a democratic vote of the people for the purpose of forming a transitional government. Observers described the move as being a path leading directly to Shia political dominance over Iraq's government, as Shia Muslims make up approximately 65% of the total Iraqi population. Subsequently, Sistani criticized plans for an Iraqi government for not being democratic enough.
In early August, 2004, Sistani experienced serious health complications related to a previously diagnosed heart condition. He traveled to London to receive medical treatment. It was, reportedly, the first time that Sistani had left Iraq in decades, and may have been due, in part, to growing concerns for his safety from sectarian violence. Though still recovering, Sistani returned later in the month to broker a military truce at the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf where Muqtada al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army had been cornered by American and Iraqi forces. Sadr, who rose rapidly to prominence through a series of independent military actions beginning in 2004, has since actively challenged Sistani's more progressive influence over Shia in the region.
Sistani's edicts reportedly provided many Iraqi Shia cause for participating in the January 2005 elections—he urged, in a statement on October 1, 2004, that Iraqis recognize the election as an "important matter," additionally, Sistani asked that the elections be "free and fair. . . with the participation of all Iraqis." Soon after, Sistani issued a fatwa alerting Shia women that they were religiously obligated to participate in the election, even if their husbands had forbidden them from voting. In an issued statement Sistani remarked that, "truly, women who go forth to the polling centers on election day are like Zaynab, who went forth to Karbala."
He has consistently urged the Iraqi Shia not to respond in kind to attacks from Sunni Salafists, which have become common in Sunni-dominated regions of Iraq like the area known as the "Triangle of Death," south of Baghdad. Even after the destruction of the Shia Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra in February 2006, his network of clerics and preachers continued to urge calm and told their followers that "it was not their Sunni neighbors who were killing them but foreign Wahhabis." Sistani's call for unity after the bombing of the mosque helped to control a potentially dangerous situation, preventing the country to enter in a bloody sectarian war. Sistani did the same when the same mosque was bombed again in 2007.
An alleged plot to assassinate Sistani was foiled on January 29, 2007, when three Jund al-Samaa gunmen were captured at a hotel near his office. It is believed to have been part of a larger attack against a number of targets in Najaf.
In an online open poll, 2005, Ali al-Sistani was selected as the 30th topmost intellectual person in the world on the list of Top 100 Public Cri by Prospect (UK) and Foreign Policy (US).
On June 13, 2014 Sistani appealed that Iraqis should support the government against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant militant group which had taken over Mosul and Tikrit and was threatening Baghdad. Later in June 2014, Sistani revised his statement and issued a fatwa calling for "Citizens to defend the country, its people, the honor of its citizens, and its sacred places," against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant terrorist group.
Shia patronage[]
As the leading Ayatollah in Najaf, Sistani oversees sums amounting to millions of US dollars. Sistani's followers offer him a fixed part of their earnings (tithe), which is used for educational and charitable purposes. Sistani's office has reported that it supports 35,000 students in Qom, 10,000 in Mashhad, and 4,000 in Isfahan. It also oversees a network of representatives (wakil) "who promote his (Sistani's) views in large and small ways in neighborhoods, mosques, bazaars, and seminaries from Kirkuk to Basra."
Additionally, Sistani has a substantial following within Shia communities all over the world and is the current Grand Marja of the Twelver sect of Shia Muslims. In Iran, as a result of the post-invasion opening of the Iraqi cities of Najaf and Karbala to Iranians, many Iranians are said to return from pilgrimage in Iraq as supporters of Sistani.
Criticism and controversy[]
Al Jazeera[]
In May 2007, hundreds of Shias demonstrated publicly in Basra and Najaf to protest comments made by television presenter and journalist Ahmed Mansour during a Qatari broadcast of Al Jazeera television programming. While presenting Bela Hodod (a.k.a. Without Borders), Mansour voiced skepticism of Sistani's leadership credentials while directing questions about the Iraqi-born cleric to his guest, Shia cleric Jawad al-Khalsi. Mansour also suggested that Sistani was not aware of contemporary problems in Iraq or of prevailing post-war conditions, and he alleged that Sistani's edicts were, largely, written and disseminated by aides. At another point, Mansour asked Khalsi whether the United States was using Iraqi politicians, and also Sistani, to promote Western interests in Iraq.
Saudi cleric[]
In January 2010, during a Jumu'ah khutba (Friday sermon), Saudi cleric Mohamad al-Arefe vehemently criticized Sistani by referring to him as an "atheist" and by describing his behavior as "debauched". The remarks prompted protest by his followers in Iraq, Qom and Lebanon. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki rebuked the Saudi religious authorities. Lebanon-based Islamist militant organization Hezbollah also condemned the attack on Sistani, calling the speech "inauspicious," while praising Sistani as one of Shia Islam's "most prominent religious references."
Corruption Expose[]
On 31 August 2019, Alhurra reported an exposé documentary on their Alhurra Investigates program titled "The Holy Persons of Sacred Corruption in Iraq", that Iraqi religious authorities including Ayatollah Sistani were involved in corruption involving public funds in partnership with Iraqi political figures. Sistani was reported to be personally gaining financially from religious sites and real estate deals involving state funds.
Following the airing of the exposé, Iraq's Communication and Media Commission suspended Alhurra's operations for three months, and threatened the news outlet with "a tougher punishment" if the "offense is repeated".
Reporters Without Borders has criticized the Iraqi government, stating "Iraq still has no law on access to state-held information. Investigative reporting on corruption or embezzlement exposes journalists to serious threats."
Alhurra defended their work in a statement, saying that the report was "fair, balanced and professional", and stated that the individuals named in the report were given a chance to respond, which they declined. The statement further read "Alhurra is committed to fair and professional journalism in Arabic throughout the region. Given the major political, economic and social challenges the region faces, there is a need for greater transparency and honesty, not less".
Nobel Peace Prize nomination[]
On 4 March 2014, the Daily Telegraph commentator Colin Freeman published an article naming Ali al-Sistani as the most appropriate Nobel Peace Prize candidate. He also reported that he had been nominated earlier in 2006, by a group of Iraqi Christians.
On 8 March 2014, The Tehran Times reported that a group of members of Iraqi parliament announced that they intended to nominate Ali al-Sistani for the 2014 Nobel Peace Prize.
Thomas L. Friedman, former bureau chief of The New York Times in Beirut and Jerusalem (1982–88), proposed Ayatollah Sistani for the prize in 2005 in a column published in the Times on 20 March 2005.
Guardianship of Islamic Jurists (Wilayat al-Faqih)[]
Like his predecessor Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, Sistani has not wholly embraced the post-Age-of-Occultation theory known as the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists, which was espoused and supported by the late Iranian Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and which is currently extant and enforced by the Iranian government through its own constitution and by its supreme leader and highest religious authority Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Sistani's scholarly views regarding guardianship resembles Khoei's views, but differs in several respects. Additionally, the primary difference between Sistani's interpretation and the interpretation of Grand Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei is reportedly in the range of power that a Grand Ayatollah has in ruling the Islamic community. Sistani has publicly stated and maintained that his interpretation of the doctrine is one that grants more power to the Ayatollahs than Khoei, but less than either Khoemeini or Khamenei:
On the specific question of obedience to a supreme leader, Sistani has said that any pronouncement given by a supreme leader "supersedes all, (including those given by other Maraji') unless the pronouncements are proven to be wrong or the pronouncements are proven to be against what is in the Qur'an or in Religious Tradition."[48]
Additionally, instead of advocating for the rule by Islamic clerics or for fundamentalist legal views, i.e. "the Quran as constitution," Sistani is said to favor a more relaxed perspective related to the provision of values and guidelines for social order (nizam al-mujama) as being the recognized, primary role of Islam.[49]
Also, according to Sadegh Zibakalam, professor of political science at Tehran University, Sistani has consistently avoided supporting a strict interpretation of the theory, especially of absolute guardianship, nor has he explicitly offered any substantive affirmation of the theory as a whole (including limited guardianship); thereby creating "a major lacuna" in the "grand ideological scenario" of the Islamic Republic of Iran.[50]
According to scholar Vali Nasr, despite Sistani's disagreements with Iran's ruling clerics, he has "never tried to promote a rivalry" between his religious center of Najaf and the Iranian center in Qom, and has never made any comments about the confrontations between reformists and conservatives in Qom or between clerics in Lebanon,] a reflection, Nasr believes, of Sistani's reluctance to become involved in politics.