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Abdi House raid

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Abdi House Raid/"Bloody Monday" (Operation Michigan)
Part of UNOSOM II
Sign at an anti American protest in Mogadishu depicting the "Abdi House" raid or "Bloody Monday" attack
Sign at anti-UNOSOM protest in Mogadishu depicting "Bloody Monday"
Type Air strike and Air assault
Location
Hodan District, Mogadishu, Somalia
Objective Kill/capture of SNA leadership
Date July 12, 1993 (1993-07-12)
10:18am (UTC+03:00)
Executed by 1st Bn, 22nd Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, on behalf of UNOSOM II[1]
Outcome
  • Multiple Habar Gidir clan members/leaders killed and increased popular support for Aidid
  • Increase in Somali anti-UN sentiment
  • International outrage at killing of Western journalists
  • Individual coalition governments' unease at provocative nature of attack
Casualties

UN forces casualties - none
Somali casualties:

  • UNOSOM II claim - 7 to 20 (All male combatants)
  • Red Cross claim - 215 casualties, including 54 killed
  • Habar Gidir claim - 73 killed, including women and children, multiple wounded
Foreign journalists - 4 killed by mob after the raid[2]


The Abdi House raid or Operation Michigan, better known to Somalis as Bloody Monday (Somali: Isniinta Dhiigii), was a United Nations military operation that took place in Mogadishu on July 12, 1993, as part of the UN intervention in the Somali Civil War, also known as UNOSOM II.[3][4][5][6] The raid, carried out by American QRF troops on behalf of UNOSOM II, was the single deadliest incident in Mogadishu since the start of the war and marked a decisive turning point in the UN mission, as it inflamed anti-UN and anti-American sentiments among Somalis, which contributed immensely to the scale of resistance that the US military faced during the Battle of Mogadishu three months later.[7][8][9][10][11]

As part of the campaign to capture General Mohammed Farah Aidid following the June 5, 1993, attack on Pakistani peacekeepers, US forces conducted a 17 minute raid on a villa belonging to Aidid's Interior Minister Abdi "Qeybdiid" Awale during a major gathering.[6][5][12] The meeting was being attended by high ranking elders of Aidid's clan, the Habr Gidir. The purpose of the meeting was contested–US and UN forces claimed that it was a command and control center and a legitimate military target.[13][14][15] Somalis claimed the meeting was to discuss a proposed diplomatic resolution to the growing conflict between the Somali National Alliance and UNOSOM II.[16][17][18][19]

Background[]

The day immediately following the 5 June attack on Pakistani forces, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 837, calling for the arrest of those responsible for the death of the peacekeepers. Though General Mohammed Farah Aidid was not directly named in Resolution 837, his political organization, the Somali National Alliance (SNA) was blamed; subsequent investigation would conclude that the SNA was most likely behind the attack.[20] This would mark the beginning of a new phase of escalating tit for tat violence that would begin with retaliatory AC-130 strikes on SNA sites and attempts to capture Aidid. These were met with response ambushes, mortar attacks, and assassinations of Somali UNOSOM II employees by the SNA.[21][3] But UNOSOM efforts to capture Aidid in the month following the passing of Resolution 837 would repeatedly end in failure.[22]

UN planning[]

The planned surprise attack was both unique and historic, in that it would the first attack where the target would be actual Somalis instead of weapon caches or other structures and is referred to by Washington Post reporter Keith B. Richburg as, "the UN's first ever officially authorized assassination".[4][23][24]

Abdi "Qeybdiid" Awale's residence, a villa in the Hodan district of southern Mogadishu, was well known to have been holding regular clan meetings for the Habar Gidir and became a target, as Qeybdiid was a high ranking member of the SNA, and the organization was in large part comprised of members from the Habr Gidr.[5][25] Notably, in the days and weeks following the commencement of military operations, UNOSOM had (via radio broadcast and propaganda leaflets dropped over Mogadishu) made the clear distinction that it was not the enemy of the Habar Gidir, but only wanted to capture Aidid.[26]

Detailed planning for a strike on a future gathering at Abdi Qeybdiid Awale's villa would begin on July 7, 1993.[1] Turkish commander of UNOSOM II forces, General Cevik Bir had privately declared on July 9, 1993, "I will kill Aidid within four days."[27] UNOSOM command regarded the planned assault as, "a legitimate defensive action, one that would undermine Aidid's support in the Habr Gidr clan" and feared that the Italian contingent of the force had been making a secret unilateral agreement with Aidid, which ran the risk of increasing his popular support if completed.[28]

Unlike in previous raids, Çevik Bir, his deputy US Maj Gen Thomas M. Montgomery, and other coalition military leaders decided, after weeks of agonizing, not to issue any warnings prior to the attack.[4] The purpose of this was twofold: first it would, in theory, enable them to fully decapitate the leadership of the SNA; second, it would reduce the risk of friendly casualties.[5][29][30][12][31] The first reason was pragmatic in nature and based on past experiences where cordons had failed and key targets had slipped away.[29] The second reason was partly pragmatic and partly political. As head of UNOSOM II, retired US Adm Johnathan Howe could have overruled the military, but chose not to, in no small part due to these political considerations. Given the multinational nature of UNOSOM, Howe needed to canvas the more than 30 countries whose troops were involved in UNOSOM. Consensus was necessary to preserve the coalition. Heavier casualties sustained from recent firefights, partly due to the SNA's deliberate use of human shields to test the UN peacekeepers' rules of engagement, had made the force's commanders wary and lowered the bar for acceptable risk to civilians during military operations.[32] Dr. Sebastian Kaempf, a Senior Lecturer at the University of Queensland's Political Science department, argued that by not issuing a warning, UNOSOM II leadership had concluded that "military necessity and concerns for US casualties overruled concerns for Somali civilians".[33] The White House would directly sign off on permission for the operation, but it is disputed if President Clinton knew if Somalis were being directly targeted when he did.[12][34][35] The strike was directed by the deputy commander of UNOSOM II, Thomas M. Montgomery, who was seated in one of the Cobras participating in the strike.[36][37]

The meeting[]

While Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid would serve as nominal leader of the Somali National Alliance, his ability to impose decisions on the organization was limited, as a council of elders held decision making power for most significant issues and elections were held that threatened his leadership. Following a period of extensive deliberations and discussion, the elder councils would move forward via consensus decision-making.[38][39]

A handful of prominent Somalis, including the most senior of the Habr Gidr, Sheikh Haji Mohamed Iman Aden and former Deputy Prime Minster Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, had met with US Adm. Johnathan Howe, the special representative of the UN Secretary-General, on 9 July, 1993. Howe had requested that they search for a peaceful resolution to the then four week long war between SNA and UNOSOM II.[40][41][26][42][39][43] Under the mounting pressure of the UNOSOM hunt, six representatives of the different sub clans within the Somali National Alliance met and agreed to enter into a political dialogue with UNOSOM on 11 July, 1993. At the meeting, headed by Abdiqasim Salad Hassan (later President of Somalia), a decision was also made to untangle the Habr Gidr clan from politics and leave political national issues to the Somali National Alliance. It was agreed that a 25 member Supreme Council would be created in order to keep the clan united and an election for it was scheduled to take place on July 15, 1993.[39] Adm. Johnathan Howe's request for dialogue and the need to explain the developments of Abdiqasim Salad's 11 July, 1993 meeting to the other members of the Habr Gidr, prompted the unusually high profile Monday 12 July, 1993, gathering.[42][44][45][46] Aidid disapproved of the meeting taking place, as his authority in both the SNA and Habr Gidr was now being held in serious question.[16][47][19][48] Abdi Qeybdiid's villa was selected for the talks, as it possessed a large carpeted conference room on the second floor capable of holding a gathering of over a hundred people.[45] In an interview with journalists, Abdi Qeybdiid - one of the Somali National Alliances high ranking lieutenants, would remark on the conference, "Everybody was interested in stopping the fighting, to open a dialogue. It was in the interest of all."[16] A conference of high ranking elders, intellectuals, businessmen, former judges, military officers, representatives of women's organizations and other notable clansmen of the Habr Gidr was to take place in order to discuss how to respond to Howe's proposed peace initiative.[10][44][42][46][49][40] Also represented at the conference were prominent members of numerous other Somali clans such as the Ogadeni, Dir, Majerteen, Sheikhal, Murosade, Hawadle, Gaalje'el and Rahanweyne.[50][40] The meeting had been publicized in Mogadishu's newspapers as a peace conference the day before and an American war correspondent in Mogadishu who was a witness of the raid, Scott Peterson, corroborated the Somali account that a group of elders had gathered to discuss to how to end the violence between the SNA and UN forces.[50][23][17]

A CIA informant inside the clan passed intelligence that a meeting was to take place and present among the gathered would be some of those who had part taken in the June 5, 1993, attack.[1][5] Aidid was allegedly tipped off that something would happen to the conference a few hours prior, by his own intelligence network or by the Italian element of UNOSOM II, who were allegedly sympathetic to him.[36]

Attack[]

On the morning of July 12, 1993, Operation Michigan was commenced by the 10th Mountain Division and Task Force Safari air units of the American Quick Reaction Force (QRF) in Mogadishu under the provisions of UN Resolution 837.[5]

For at least a week before the raid, US Army Special Forces had staked out the compound, surveilling Aidid and other members of the SNA come and go.[51] The QRF had been on standby for the past few days and was prepared to launch the operation on just a five minutes notice.[28]

Earlier that morning, the US State Department issued a warning that the CIA had received a memo revealing a plan by the SNA to launch a large scale attack on United Nations officials in Mogadishu, possibly giving American commanders a plausible reason to launch the assault. In the aftermath of the raid would it be discovered that the CIA report had been incorrect.[42]

Air strike phase[]

Cobra live fire

An AH-1 Cobra firing a missile

Following confirmation of the codeword Michigan, an armada of 17 helicopters took off from Mogadishu International Airport and surrounded the villa within minutes.[51][25][52][39]

Around 10:18 am a CIA informant walked out of the meeting to the main gate of the compound, in full view of the waiting attack helicopters that had just begun encircling the villa, wearing an arranged set of clothing as a signal to begin the attack.[53] Seconds later, following visual confirmation of the signal and without any warning, six AH-1 Cobras and four OH-58 Kiowas launched a total of sixteen TOW missiles and 2,200 rounds of 20 mm caliber cannon fire into the building for a total of six to eight minutes.[44][54][1][55]

The AH-1 Cobras launched the TOWs into the second floor of the villa where the conference was taking place, then specifically targeted the building's stairwells to block any escape routes and finally aimed for the roof in an attempt to crush the occupants.[44][54][39][56]

"Our orders were to destroy the conference room on the second floor where everybody was supposed to be meeting, then we were to destroy the staircase in the back of the house so no one could get away...I was flying security for battle position one and my job was to wax anybody if they tried to leave the compound, or if they came outside and tried to shoot at us. Then I was supposed to destroy the front gate of the compound so that the infantry could get in." Chief Warrant Officer Christopher Roben[51]

Moments before the TOWs hit the villa, Abdi Qeybdiid had just begun addressing the crowd of approximately 80 to 100 Somalis that had gathered.[5][18] Present among them were prominent sheikhs, former judges, famous poets, professors, engineers, military officers, representatives of women's organizations and intellectuals who represented the most respected and best-educated of the Habr Gidr clan.[5][57][40] The first TOW broke through the second story wall, flew past Qeybdiid's face and exploded. A survivor recounted that the first missile had torn a hole in the wall and revealed the mass of encircling helicopters that appeared to be almost at eye level over the city.[53] The Habr Gidr's most senior elder, Sheik Haji Mohamed Iman Aden, who was over 90 years old, was instantly killed in the first TOW missile volley along with other elders, as they were all directly sitting against the walls of the conference room.[5][58][59][26]

"What Farah saw and heard was a flash of light and a violent crack. He stood and took one step forward and heard the whooosh! of a second missile. There was another flash and explosion. He was thrown to the floor. Thick smoke filled the room. He tried to move forward but his way was blocked by bodies, a bloody pile of men and parts of men a meter high...Those who survived the first blast were feeling along the wall, groping for the door when the second missile had exploded. The air was thick with dark smoke and smelled of powder, blood, and burned flesh. Farah found the stairs, stood, and had taken one step down when a third missile exploded, disintegrating the staircase. He tumbled to the first floor. He sat up stunned, and felt himself for broken bones and wet spots...There was another explosion above him. Then another and another."[60]

Those who escaped the initial attack had to jump from the second story of the building onto the ground.[39] Collateral damage occurred when a single TOW missile and multiple 20 mm rounds missed the villa and struck near the French Embassy.[28] Also among those killed were civilians who were not directly participating in the conference such as multiple women who had been serving tea for gathering, children who had happened to be playing in the villa's courtyard, and nearby pedestrians who had been hit by stray 20mm rounds.[44][23][61][62][63] Days later, UNOSOM would drop leaflets over Mogadishu proclaiming, "The SNA said women and children were killed, but that was pure propaganda."[26]

Aidid was not present at the meeting.[57][5][64][65]

Ground assault phase[]

Black Hawks land during the July 12 1993 Raid

Two UH-60 Blacks Hawks moments away from landing on the street outside the villa and deploying the Assault Platoon on 12 July 1993

At 10:23am, one minute after the Cobras had stopped their assault on the villa, three of the waiting Black Hawk helicopters, carrying 53 men, landed in the vicinity of the decimated building.[1][28]

One of the Black Hawks, containing the support platoon tasked with covering the assault platoon, landed on the roof of the nearby French Embassy, which provided a vantage point over the villa. The two other Black Hawks, landed on the street in front of the meeting and troops from them quickly streamed out and set up a cordon around the house.[1] Helicopters participating in the raid would drop a total of 22 CS gas grenades to chase away gathering crowds of onlookers.[28]

According to a primary participant in the raid, the assault platoon then made its way from the street into the compound and into the house to search for surviving "SNA leadership" and any valuable intelligence.[1] According to an eyewitness account from Hussein Sanjeeh, a survivor of the airstrike, American troops stormed the property and killed 15 survivors that were heard shouting as they swept through the villa with pistol shots to the head, an account which American commanders denied.[16][45] One helicopter pilot reported that the troops on the ground had engaged in sporadic gunfights with some of the survivors; the operation was filmed from one of the helicopters but was not released.[51] A Reuters correspondent who witnessed the ground assault claimed to hear heavy automatic fire coming from inside the compound.[44] The UN account detailed in the Blue Book, claims that it took nine minutes for troops to clear the area, search the villa, and depart, all while leaving earlier than expected, marking the Abdi House raid as the fastest operation that had been conducted by UNOSOM II.[37] The total time of the raid, from the first TOW hitting the villa to the last soldier departing on the Black Hawks, was about 17 minutes according to UN spokesman Lt. Col. David Haynes.[19][66] According to an American soldier who claims to have been present in one of the patrolling Black Hawks during the raid, after entering the building US soldiers radioed that the raid was not effective and that the targets from the asset list were not present.[37] Two of the survivors were taken prisoner and interrogated.[21][28]

Killing of foreign journalists[]

In response to the attack, multiple foreign journalists traveled to the site to gather information and provide coverage. Several went with SNA escorts who had insisted that the journalists see the carnage unhindered so they could tell the world. On arriving at the site, the enraged mob that had gathered turned on the journalists; five were enveloped by the crowd and separated from their colleagues and the escorts who, sensing the danger, evacuated the remaining journalists from the area. Of the five journalists, four were shot, stabbed, and bludgeoned to death while the fifth was able to escape despite multiple gunshot wounds. The fourth, Dan Eldon, was able to momentarily break away from the mob and ran. A Black Hawk from the American QRF spotted him but was allegedly ordered to stand down and not intervene, possibly due to the rules of engagement which prevented engagement unless they or other UN individuals were directly threatened.[67][37]

Eldon's body was later recovered by a Black Hawk. The bodies of the other three journalists were mutilated and dumped in the Bakara Market, however, armed gunmen prevented their recovery. Reuters and Associated Press personnel hired their own security to retrieve the other three bodies as the UN reportedly refused to lend aid for this. Their hired fighters fought those gunman before they could recover the bodies.[68] A significant amount of the international press on the incident was primarily focused on the deaths of the four journalists—Dan Eldon, Hos Maina, Hansi Kraus, and Anthony Macharia–with minimal attention paid to the UN attack that had preceded it.[69][70][71][5] Because of the killings, most western news organizations completely withdrew from Somalia which greatly contributed to the lack of any substantial press during the Battle of Mogadishu on 3–4 October 1993.[72][73]

Casualties[]

UNOSOM commanders initially claimed that only 7 Somalis had been killed, all men and all combatants. This number was later revised to 13 and then 20 as the body count rose at Bandair Hospital through the remainder of the day.[74][72][75][47][69]

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, there were 54 Somalis killed and 161 wounded, though this was based on a survey of the dead and injured at two large hospitals in Mogadishu.[76][77] The actual casualty count is possibly higher as only two medical facilities in the entire city were canvassed, and since many Somalis follow the Islamic tradition of burying the dead immediately.[52]

Qebidbd House

A portion of the destroyed villa, a few minutes after the 12 July 1993 raid

Somali witness and SNA accounts of the attack claimed 73 people, who could be named, were killed and 200 were wounded, which UNOSOM officials denied.[36][52][78][79][80] Mark Bowden would note that every eyewitness he interviewed placed the number of dead at 70 or more and that former ambassador and that U.S. special envoy to Somalia Robert B. Oakley accepted this figure. He would further note that many of those interviewed, including non Somalis aid workers, would say that many of those killed in the attack had been well respected Habr Gidr moderates opposed to Aidid.[81] Scott Peterson, who was present on the scene of the attack, claims that the raid was far deadlier than US and UN officials acknowledged.[52]

Several of the notable figures killed were:

  • Sheikh Haji Mohamed Iman Aden, most senior elder of the Habr Gidr[59]
  • Sheikh Hassan Abdi Naleye, Habr Gidr Sheikh[40]
  • Dr. Khalife Adawe Ali, intellectual from the Hawadle[40]
  • Abshir Qahir Farah, Habr Gidr elder[40]
  • Osman Hassan Kulimye, Hawadle elder [40]
  • Moallim Soyan, highly regarded poet[82]

According to historian and Somali expert John Drysdale (who lost a close Somali friend in the attack) the majority of those killed were crushed by falling rubble as the villa was blown apart.[56][39] Drysdale, serving as an advisor to UNOSOM II at the time of raid, noted that it would have been impossible for American troops to have been able to get a proper count of the dead and injured as they were incapable of reaching the second floor of the villa, where the meeting had been taking place, since the stairs had been totally destroyed in the minutes preceding the ground raid.[39][56]

CNN had received footage of the raid from a Somali cameraman showing the conference room covered in "shattered limbs protruding through the rubble", but it was deemed too disturbing and gruesome to show to the public on air.[39] Reporter Keith Richburg would note that the video recorded of the attack showed women among the dead.[23] In the two and half years since the civil war had begun, Bloody Monday represented the deadliest loss from a single attack the city had seen.[83] Many of those who would die in the strike were vocal supporters of reconciliation and negotiations with UNOSOM.[35][26][47] Doctors Without Borders claimed that one of their high ranking Somali administrators for the city of Merca had been participating in the meeting and was killed.[18] Multiple children and numerous women had been killed in the missile strike, with one of the deceased confirmed to be pregnant.[40][44] Former National Security Adviser to the Clinton Administration in July 1993, Anthony Lake, remarked in a 1998 interview with Black Hawk Down author Mark Bowden, that the raid "was not specifically designed to kill people."[5]

Aftermath[]

International reaction[]

Numerous relief agencies, human rights organizations and journalists in Somalia would publicly decry the attack, and in Mogadishu UNOSOM II command was delivered copies of the Geneva Convention, specifically in relation to attacks on civilians and proportional retaliation.[84][85][86] Rony Brauman, then president of Doctors Without Borders would comment, "For the first time in Somalia there has been a killing under the flag of humanitarianism."[74] Human Rights Watch would go as far as to claim that the attack "looked like mass murder" and that UNOSOM had produced little evidence to justify its claims.[50]

Across the West, "Bloody Monday" caught the most press and attention in Italy:[87]

  • The surprise assault became front page news across the country and the newspaper representing Italian Catholic bishops, Avvenire, referred to it as a "vile American raid." [72][88][89]
  • Another paper, La Repubblica, would call it "...incomprehensible and unjustifiable" and likened the Americans in Somalia to Wild West lawmen that attempt to shoot an outlaw in a saloon but in the process kill innocent bystanders.[87][89][90]
  • The Vatican newspaper, L'Osservatore Romano would comment on the raid saying, "...the original objective of the mission has been abandoned or momentarily forgotten. This act of reprisal was a real massacre." [91][64][90]

In Rome, Somalis would take to the streets in protest.[92] Achille Occheto, head of Italy's Democratic Party of the Left, would publicly decry it as a, "useless and irresponsible act of war" and said that Italian troops should withdraw if the mission was not exclusively humanitarian.[93][91] In neighboring Kenya, one of the countries largest papers, The Standard, would run a headline aimed at the UN titled, "Who Are the Warlords Now?" and Kenyan state-run TV and Radio broadcasting would announce that it was joining "...those calling for a review of the UN's armed policy...Despite repeated attacks on Mohamed Farah Aideed's strongholds and even offers of cash rewards for his capture by the UN, this objective appears as elusive as ever."[90][52] In the United States, Sen. Robert C. Byrd would break with his fellow Democrats and call for the U.S. troops in Somalia to, ‘‘pack up and go home.’’[52] The following week on July 27, 1993, Ohio Congressmen Sherrod Brown introduced Resolution 227, urging the withdrawal of American forces from Somalia as soon as possible.[41] At the American embassy in London, England saw protests and a group of people were arrested in the House of Commons for attempting to unfurl a banner and shouting, "Get the American murderers out of Somalia!"[94] The Social Democrats in Germany would push against Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s offer to send a contingent of 1,600 German soldiers to Somalia, the first overseas deployment since the Second World War, and pushed for it to be withdrawn.[52]

The Pakistani and French governments strongly backed the raid and Pakistan's Foreign Ministry would argue that without the American air strikes there would be chaos in the country.[90]

UNOSOM II and United Nations reaction[]

The reason for the meeting, how many people were killed and even the very inhabitants of the house at the time is disputed by UNOSOM officials who claimed that the conference was a gathering of an SNA war council at a major command and control center, and that the operation was a successful strike.[36][37] UNOSOM claimed that:

  • No warning had been given to the occupants because the Abdi House was a purely military facility.[95]
  • ‘‘...no innocent civilians were injured in the attack" and ‘‘All were adult males. All were armed.’’[52]
  • Johnathan Howe would claim, “There was no evidence of non-combatant casualties from the raid itself” and that the raid had been conducted on a "very key terrorist planning cell".[96][44] He would also go on to claim that the footage recorded by the Somali cameraman was "suspect".[37]
  • Maj. Leann Swieczkowski, an Army spokeswoman, said that the photographs taken inside the villa proved that it was an SNA "forward command center," although UNOSOM later claimed that evidence of Somali casualties had not been recorded because the UN military photographer's camera had broken.[50]
  • An after action report on Somalia prepared by Montgomery and others, claimed that among those killed were a number of top financiers and military planners, including the overall planner of the June 5th ambush of Pakistani soldiers.[37] Montgomery acknowledged that some of the casualties were elders but stated that they were still militia combatants.[96]

According to the UN, "The raid was carried out on the basis of information that meetings would be held at the center, and that the militia leaders would likely attend." [97] The exact target of the operation is disputed, as UN officials later claimed Aidid rarely attended the meetings and was not the target.[72][98] Some of the American helicopter pilots involved in the raid claimed that Aidid had actually been the informant.[51]

UNOSOM II participant reactions[]

Post Abdi house raid anti UN poster at protest

Poster at an anti U.N. protest in Mogadishu depicting the Italians split with Howe over the escalation of force in UNOSOM II

The attack exposed deep rifts and dissension amongst coalition nations contributing troops to UNOSOM II, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Zimbabwe, but primarily the Italian contingent, who threatened to pull out of the whole operation a few days later citing concerns that the escalation was indicative that relief role of UNOSOM II had been overtaken by an American-led campaign against Mohammed Farah Aidid.[99][92][100][101]

The Italians, who had ruled Somalia as a colonial territory for half a century, believed that the unprecedented attack against the Habr Gidr threatened to widen the civil war and turn the Somalis against the entire UN peacekeeping force.[102][103][104] Fabio Fabbri, then Italian defence minister, would remark, "A choice of this nature, with its extremely high risk, indeed certainty, that human lives will be lost is shared neither by public opinion nor by parliament in our country."[105]

A Pakistani officer in Mogadishu noted that the clash between the Americans and Italians was destroying the cohesion of UNOSOM II, and that a review of strategy was desperately needed.[105] According to American envoy to Somalia Robert B. Oakley, following the raid, "...Italy, France, Zimbabwe and other contingents of UNOSOM, on orders from home, stopped participating in anti-Aidid operations, thus further weakening an already lame U.N. command authority. Much of the humanitarian activity stopped and various NGOs voiced their criticisms of both the United Nations and the United States."[106]

The strike also caused an outcry among UN civilian staffers and disenchantment over the direction of UNOSOM II for employees of the humanitarian section.[6][107][4] At least nine UN civilian employees in Mogadishu working for the humanitarian sector either resigned or walked away from their posts in protest, including the top UNOSOM Justice Division official in Somalia, Ann Wright.[4][6] Many of those who stayed would comment to reporters that the United Nations had relinquished its moral authority in its war against Aidid.[4]

Legality[]

The legality of the strike was a subject of disagreement within UNOSOM: while Ann Wright and colleagues in the Justice Division believed the strike was not legally justifiable, others, mostly within the military element of UNOSOM, publicly and privately justified the legality of the strike as within the authority granted by UN Resolution 837.[37][52] However, those justifications did not address the moral and ethical aspects of the attack; as Ann Wright put it "...[it] undercuts U.N. credibility when we can not with accuracy state how many persons were killed or injured, who they were and why they were in the facility."[108][37][6]

“From the legal, moral and human rights perspective, we counsel against conducting military operations that give no notice of attack to occupants of buildings...a deliberate attack meant to kill the occupants without giving all the occupants in the building a chance to surrender is nothing less than murder committed in the name of the United Nations.” [6][105][45] Ann Wright, top UNOSOM Justice Division official in Somalia wrote in a memo to head of UNOSOM Johnathan Howe

Some have argued that UNOSOM II never produced evidence to substantiate its claim that no civilians were present and that the Abdi House was a legitimate military target, while UNOSOM and its commanders pointed to clan members, who were present and neutralized, that they allege ordered attacks on UN peacekeepers. Furthermore, they contended that raid was within their authority as granted by the UN resolution.[57][109][85] So long as the operation was executed in good faith on the belief that it was a legitimate military target and that any civilian casualties were unintended, it would, for the most part, not contravene the laws of war. Dr Sebastian Kaempf, however, raises two issues with respect to proportionality of the response (was a helicopter gunship attack with cannon fire and missiles a proportional response?) and whether UNOSOM forces had done "everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects", [110]

The dissension in the U.N. ranks with the Italians and others over what had occurred on July 12, 1993 led to a significant lull in UNOSOM operations in Mogadishu until the August 8, 1993 killings of American soldiers.[6][93]

Somali Reaction[]

Protest sign depicting Bloody Monday

Sign at an anti American protest in Mogadishu depicting "Bloody Monday"

The unprecedented strike invoked outrage in Somalia.[111][72][112][113][114] The atmosphere in Mogadishu became very tense and humanitarian work in the city more or less came to a halt as the risk towards foreigners, especially Americans, had become the worst it had ever been since the start of the intervention.[115][99][116] The Americans had begun to be viewed as a rogue entity within UNOSOM by many Somalis and local cooperation in Mogadishu, necessary for UNOSOM to carry out its mandate, evaporated.[41][11] On the afternoon of July 12, 1993, the SNA announced that it would continue to fight "...until the last colonial soldier of the United Nations leaves."[26][117] In the following days and weeks parts of the city would turn into near anarchy as UNOSOM positions all over Mogadishu would repeatedly be directly assaulted.[94][118][41][63] Leaflets calling for reprisals against American soldiers and warning of a coming battle against international troops were spread across Mogadishu.[94][118][119] In the Kenyan border town of Wajr, an American pilot was assassinated in retaliation by the son of someone who had been killed during the raid.[80]

"It's absolutely incomprehensible...This attack was excessive and unjust. You can't explain it to the Somali people or international community. Now people are very, very angry. There is a total divorce between the U.N. and Somali people. The Somali people feel now that it is an occupation force with a hidden agenda to take over the country. They don't feel U.N. troops have come to protect the humanitarian assistance." Mohamed Sahnoun, a former Algerian U.N. envoy to Somalia, commenting on the change in Somali attitudes towards UNOSOM[112][120]

Until Bloody Monday, members of the SNA/USC believed that the UN, in particular its Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, had been manipulating the naïve Americans into supporting an imperialist Egyptian agenda under cover of a humanitarianism, but the ambush wiped away any residual sympathy for American misunderstandings.[35][121] A few years earlier, Ghali had been an Egyptian diplomat that had supported former President Siad Barre against the SNA/USC when the civil war had broken out.[35] Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, a prominent member of the Habr Gidr and the president of the future Transitional National Government during the early 2000's, had used his influence in the clan to press for diplomatic resolution to the war with UNOSOM, but gave up following the raid.[10] According to the Associated Press a Somali National Alliance spokesman by the name of Hussein Dimdil was quoted saying, "We only want peace and reconciliation, and all we get is bombs." [122]

The outrage was so significant that even Somali opponents of Aidid could not publicly approve of the raid and, after Bloody Monday, UNOSOM could not even count on the support of those politico-military groups which were in direct conflict with Aidid.[26] Aidid was now better able to count on the neutrality or even support of groups that had previously been unfavorable to him, as many Somalis from all walks of life felt that the peacekeepers had crossed a significant line.[26][88] This line, between peacekeeping and combat operations, would be termed the Mogadishu Line and would affect international foreign policy for years to come.[123] The SNA would put out a bounty for any American soldier or UN personnel killed, and attacks against UNOSOM II forces would double in July and August 1993.[124][97]

According to Robert Oakley the raid, "affected the Somali attitudes as much as the attack on Pakistanis had influenced attitudes with UNOSOM".[125][35] In the notes for Black Hawk Down, Mark Bowden would find while researching the book that, "The attack still stirs up deep anger and bitterness among the Somalis from all walks of life I interviewed in Mogadishu."[126]

Prelude to the Battle of Mogadishu[]

The raid was the first time the UNOSOM II forces in Somalia had deliberately targeted people, instead of buildings or armaments caches, marking a decisive turning point in what had, until then been a low-level intensity conflict.[4] To the Habr Gidr, including the former moderates and even other clans that had formerly opposed them, the attack marked a declaration of outright war from the United States and signified the point where a diplomatic solution to the "Somalia problem" had become inconceivable.[8][112][106][19] In the view of US special envoy to Somalia Robert B. Oakley, the incident caused many non–Habr Gidr Somalis to sympathize and even join forces with the Somali National Alliance and further increased Aidid’s support among those Habr Gidr who had not previously been with him.[98][8] He would also remark, "Before July 12th, the US would have been attacked only because of association with the UN, but the US was never singled out until after July 12th"[124]

Many Somalis, UN personnel, and humanitarian organizations believed that the strike had marked an unnecessary escalation that had devolved the Americans and UN peacekeepers into just another belligerent faction involved in the Somali Civil War, fears that were exacerbated by comments from UN officials who publicly warned that UNOSOM had a list of ten more alleged command and control centers to be raided in a similar fashion.[127][6][128][129] A 2004 US military sanctioned case study on military operations in Somalia would comment on the raid, saying that the, "...liberalization of the rules of engagement mirrored the shift to combat operations." [28]

To thousands of the city's residents, Aidid's anti-UNOSOM rhetoric warning of an ever growing neocolonialist and imperialist international intervention had been validated, which greatly enabled him to consolidate and expand power across the divisive clan lines of wartorn Mogadishu, making the city far more dangerous for international troops to operate in.[5][4][128][34] The attack was designed to destroy Aidid’s power base, but instead it resulted in increased support for Aidid and intensified opposition to UNOSOM across Mogadishu.[79][130][28][98][35] The raid massively undercut the growing internal opposition in the Habr Gidr to Aidid methods and solidified his political leadership in the Somali National Alliance.[125][131][132] The SNA portrayed the conflict as a David-and-Goliath-like struggle between patriots and foreign invaders to the residents of Mogadishu.[106] Abdi Abshir Kahiye, an SNA spokesman, would remark that the UN was no longer considered the main issue and that the goal had shifted to deliberating killing American troops in order to cause domestic political issues in the United States.[4][61] The events of Bloody Monday would lead Aidid to make the decision to specifically target American soldiers for the first time and would result in the August 8, 1993, killings of US troops that would push President Clinton to send in Delta Force and the Rangers to capture him.[12][37][35][78][133]

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  107. ↑ Cowell, Alan (16 July 1993). "ITALY, IN U.N. RIFT, THREATENS RECALL OF SOMALIA TROOPS" (in en-US). The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/16/world/italy-in-un-rift-threatens-recall-of-somalia-troops.html. 
  108. ↑ "How Military Operations in Somalia 25 Years Ago Influence Operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Yemen Today" (in en). https://www.codepink.org/how_military_operations_in_somalia_25_years_ago_influence_operations_in_afghanistan_iraq_syria_and_yemen_today. 
  109. ↑ "Resolution 837 (1993) / adopted by the Security Council at its 3229th meeting, on 6 June 1993.". United Nations. 6 June 1993. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/166972?ln=en. 
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  113. ↑ "UN envoy pleads for unity in Somalian peacekeeping; Mogadishu residents protest attacks on clan strongholds amid bickering over Italian general's removal". Edmonton Journal. 16 July 1993. 
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  116. ↑ "More UN troops ambushed in Somalia as criticism of U.S. military role mounts". The Gazette. 14 July 1993. 
  117. ↑ ""Es gibt kein Zurück"" (in de). Der Spiegel. 1993-07-18. ISSN 2195-1349. https://www.spiegel.de/politik/es-gibt-kein-zurueck-a-529fac6a-0002-0001-0000-000013680202. 
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  119. ↑ Dowden, Richard (15 July 1993). "UN woes mounting in Somalia". Ottawa Citizen. 
  120. ↑ "Mutiny simmers under the blue helmet, are blitzkrieg tactics in?" (in en). 1993-07-17. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/mutiny-simmers-under-the-blue-helmet-are-blitzkrieg-tactics-in-somalia-a-mark-of-new-un-resolve-or-is-it-just-the-us-calling-the-shots-peter-pringle-reports-from-new-york-1485517.html. 
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  132. ↑ Cassidy, Robert M., Ph.D. (2004). Peacekeeping in the abyss : British and American peacekeeping doctrine and practice after the Cold War. Westport, Conn.: Praeger. pp. 156. ISBN 0-313-04752-9. OCLC 62329891. 
  133. ↑ Iftin, Abdi Nor (10 August 2021). Call me American : the extraordinary true story of a young Somali immigrant. ISBN 978-1-9848-9713-8. OCLC 1222056293. http://worldcat.org/oclc/1222056293. 

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