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259th Rifle Division

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259th Rifle Division (July 5, 1941 – 1946)
Active 1941–1946
Country Flag of the Soviet Union Soviet Union
Branch Red Army
Type Division
Role Infantry
Engagements Leningrad strategic defensive
Staraya Russa offensive operation
Tikhvin offensive
Battle of Lyuban
Donbas strategic offensive (July 1943)
Donbas strategic offensive (August 1943)
First Jassy–Kishinev offensive
Second Jassy–Kishinev offensive
Belgrade offensive
Battle honours Artyomovsk
Commanders
Notable
commanders		 Maj. Gen. Fyodor Nikolaevich Shilov
Maj. Gen. Afanasii Vasilevich Lapshov Hero of the Soviet Union medal
Col. Pavel Petrovich Lavrov
Col. Miron Lazarevich Porkhovnikov
Maj. Gen. Aleksei Mitrofanovich Vlasenko
Col. Terentii Terentevich Belinskii

The 259th Rifle Division was formed from reservists as a standard Red Army rifle division, very shortly after the German invasion, in the Moscow Military District. It was largely based on what would become the shtat (table of organization and equipment) of July 29, 1941. It was assigned to the 34th Army of Reserve Front before the end of July, but this Army was soon reassigned to Northwestern Front. Under these commands it took part in the Staraya Russa offensive operation in August.

Formation[]

The 259th Rifle Division began forming just over two weeks after the start of the German invasion on July 5, 1941, at Serpukhov, in the Moscow Military District.[1] Its order of battle was as follows:

  • 939th Rifle Regiment
  • 944th Rifle Regiment
  • 949th Rifle Regiment
  • 801st Artillery Regiment[2]
  • 314th Antitank Battalion
  • 336th Reconnaissance Company
  • 427th Sapper Battalion
  • 683rd Signal Battalion (later 363rd Signal Company)
  • 322nd Medical/Sanitation Battalion
  • 300th Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Company
  • 68th Auto Transport Company (later 504th)
  • 314th Field Bakery
  • 517th Divisional Veterinary Hospital
  • 308th Field Postal Station
  • 567th Field Office of the State Bank

Col. Fyodor Nikolaevich Shilov was appointed to command on the day the division began forming; he would be promoted to the rank of major general 10 days later. This NKVD officer had commanded the Ordzhonikidze School of NKVD troops before the war. As of July 10 the division was still forming up in the Moscow Military District, but as soon as August 1 it had been assigned to 34th Army in Reserve Front.[3]

Defense of Leningrad[]

On August 6 the 259th was reassigned, with 34th Army, to Northwestern Front.[4] Three days later the German X Army Corps of 16th Army seized Staraya Russa, a vital transportation hub in a nearly roadless region. This left a 48km-wide gap between it and the II Army Corps at Kholm.[5] In response to an overambitious plan proposed by Lt. Gen. N. F. Vatutin, the chief of staff of the Front, the STAVKA issued orders late that day:

3. The 34th Army will occupy jumping-off positions in the Kulakovo and Kolomna sector along the eastern bank of the Lovat River by the evening of 11 August...
4. Conduct your main attack with the 34th Army and a simultaneous attack by the 11th Army's left flank in the direction of Vzgliady and the 48th Army along the Utorgosh and Peski axis. The 34th Army will deploy one rifle division behind its right flank to protect the junction between 11th and 34th Armies and the 181st Rifle Division behind the junction of the 34th and 27th Armies.
The offensive by all armies will begin on the morning of 12 August.

In the event, this plan was partly preempted when X Corps attacked toward Novgorod on August 10, disrupting the 11th and 48th Armies' attacks.[6]

34th Army, spearheaded by the 202nd and 163rd Motorized Rifle Divisions, joined the 25th Cavalry Division in a lunge that pushed 40km westward through the German defensive cordon and reached the Staraya Russa–Dno rail line early on August 14. This determined assault enveloped X Corps in Staraya Russa, separated it from II Army Corps on its right flank and threatened the rear of the main German panzer force advancing on Novgorod. The situation was restored by August 22 through the intervention of the LVI Motorized Corps and three days later the 34th and 11th Armies had been driven back to the line of the Lovat. Although suffering heavy losses (from August 10–28 34th Army suffered 60 percent casualties in personnel, 89 percent losses in tanks and 58 percent in other vehicles) the operation delayed Army Group North's drive on Leningrad for another 10 days which may have been decisive in keeping the city in Soviet hands.[7]

While the 259th survived its first battle, General Shilov was not as fortunate. He was severely wounded in combat on August 30 and succumbed to his wounds on September 4.[8] He was replaced on September 1 by Col. Pyotr Vasilevich Borisov, but this officer was in turn replaced on September 20 by Col. Afanasii Vasilevich Lapshov, who had been serving as commander of the 74th Rifle Division's 109th Rifle Regiment. He would be made a Hero of the Soviet Union on March 27, 1942 for his leadership of that regiment in fighting on the Dniestr River,[9] and he would be promoted to the rank of major general on May 13 of that year.

Battles for Demyansk[]

Following the Staraya Russa fighting the commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal W. J. F. von Leeb, resolved to ensure that his right flank was secure before beginning the final push on Leningrad. Constant Soviet attacks from the Valdai Hills region enticed 16th Army to keep pushing farther eastward. Given the losses the 34th Army had suffered and the priority for Soviet reinforcements on the Moscow and Leningrad axes there was little it could do to stop this advance, although the 11th and 27th Armies held firm on the flanks. Demyansk was taken in early September, but by now the LVI Motorized Corps was in an absurd position at the end of a single 90km-long dirt road through swamps back to the railhead at Staraya Russa. LVI Motorized was soon withdrawn in preparation for the renewed offensive on Moscow, and was replaced by II Corps. As winter began to arrive in October the 16th Army's offensive came to a halt and a period of stalemate settled over the area.[10] On October 20 the 259th was transferred north to 52nd Army in the area of Tikhvin.[11]

Tikhvin Offensive[]

Volkhov river front (early november 1941) (no operations)

Tikhvin Offensive. Note position of 52nd Army.

This Army was under command of Lt. Gen. N. K. Klykov. On October 16 two German infantry divisions had stormed across the Volkhov River, followed later in the day by the 12th Panzer and 20th Motorized Divisions of XXXIX Motorized Corps. The assaulting forces penetrated the 4th Army's fragile defenses in four days of heavy fighting in roadless terrain covered by 9-10cm of snow. This created an immense gap between 4th and 52nd Armies that, given the lack of reserves, the defenders were unable to close. It was in response to this situation that the 259th and other reinforcements were dispatched.[12]

Once reinforced, the two Soviet armies should have been capable of driving the German forces back to the Volkhov. Convinced that this was the case, at 1345 hours on October 26 the STAVKA sent Klykov a blistering directive:

1. The withdrawal of the 52nd Army beyond the Msta and Mda rivers is untimely.
2. The decision to withdraw to the Zelenshchina, Okzovo, Kuz'minka and Zador'e line is incorrect since it is based on unverified aviation reconnaissance data...
3. The army's forces will firmly defend their occupied positions.

However, the two Armies' defenses continued to collapse because they committed their reserves in piecemeal fashion and without adequate support. Once it arrived the 259th joined the 267th and 288th Rifle Divisions in delaying the 8th Panzer and 18th Motorized Divisions long enough to occupy new defenses along the Malaya Vishera River north and south of Malaya Vishera. So strenuous was their defense that, by October 27 the German advance in this sector ground to a halt. At this point, stiffening resistance west of Tikhvin forced a redeployment of these two mobile divisions to Sitomlya to reinforce the main attack.[13]

On October 26, Hitler had insisted that the offensive continue. At the same time the STAVKA was planning a series of counterstrokes to defeat the German forces on the Tikhvin axis. Taking advantage of a vicious blast of cold weather on November 6 that began freezing rivers and streams in the area, the German mobile forces brushed aside the 191st Rifle Division and captured the city in a snowstorm on November 8, cutting the last rail line from Moscow to Lake Ladoga. Despite this success it was clear they had "shot their bolt." The weather and terrain were both taking their toll on vehicles and soldiers alike, and Soviet resistance was stiffening both at Tikhvin and Malaya Vishera. Temperatures had fallen to -40 degrees (C and F) and many soldiers were frostbitten or simply froze to death.[14]

Tikhvin Counteroffensive[]

In late November the 52nd, 4th and 54th Armies faced a German force of 10 infantry, two motorized and two panzer divisions deployed between Lakes Ladoga and Ilmen. The German force, whose divisions were at about 60 percent strength, numbered roughly 120,000 men, 100 tanks and assault guns, 1,000 artillery pieces. The STAVKA was able to concentrate 17 rifle and two tank divisions, one cavalry division, and several smaller units, totalling 192,950 men, a considerable superiority in manpower and artillery but a slight inferiority in armor. The main counterattack would be made by 4th Army with one objective being a linkup with 52nd Army at Gruzino. The four divisions (111th, 259th, 267th, 288th) of the 52nd were to destroy the German forces in the Malaya Vishera area, advance to the Volkhov, capture bridgeheads, and help cut German withdrawal routes from Tikhvin.[15]

The counteroffensive began in piecemeal fashion, with 52nd Army initiating the process on November 12. 4th Army joined in on November 19 and 54th Army attacked west of Volkhov on December 3. 8th Panzer, 20th Motorized and the newly-arrived 250th Spanish "Blue" Division clung precariously to a string of strongpoints scattered along the overextended right flank of XXXIX Corps, all the way from Tikhvin to Malaya Vishera. General Klykov again mishandled his force, failing to concentrate and making fruitless frontal attacks with inadequate artillery support against the positions of the 126th Infantry Division. The four rifle divisions were spread along a 48km-wide front, and only two rifle regiments of the 259th were allocated against the essential strongpoint of Malaya Vishera. The only result of the first four days of battle was to convince the OKH to send reinforcements, including the 223rd Infantry Division from France to Malaya Vishera.[16]

Urged on by the STAVKA, Klykov regrouped his forces on November 16 and 17 and resumed his attack overnight on November 17/18. This time he infiltrated two detachments formed from the 259th and 111th Divisions into the German rear area west of Malaya Vishera, and the two divisions successfully stormed and captured the village the next morning. This unhinged the 126th's defenses and forced it to withdraw westward. Although Klykov's forces pursued the retreating force toward Bolshaya Vishera, Gruzino, and Selishchenskii Poselok on the Volkhov, the pursuit was too slow to do much further damage. Nevertheless, this would prove to be one of the first permanent regains of territory by the Red Army. Later, on December 7, the 4th Army reached the outskirts of Tikhvin and early the next day Hitler reluctantly agreed to evacuate the city. 52nd Army continued pushing west, liberating Bolshaya Vishera on December 16.[17]

On December 11 the STAVKA had decided to form a new Volkhov Front, effective December 17, which would contain the 4th and 52nd Armies, which had been under direct STAVKA command, plus the 26th (soon redesignated 2nd Shock Army) and the new 59th Army. This was accompanied by an ambitious plan to accomplish nothing less than the complete lifting of the Leningrad blockade. This proposed Leningrad-Volkhov offensive depended, among many other things, on the establishment of adequate bridgeheads over the river. To Stalin's obvious disgust the commander of the Front, Army Gen. K. A. Meretskov, moved very slowly. 4th and 52nd Armies reached the river near Kirishi, Gruzino and north of Novgorod on December 27. By now utterly exhausted and at the end of their logistical ropes, Meretskov's forces had no choice but to dig in and go over to the defense. The grand new offensive would have to await the new year.[18]

Battle of Lyuban[]

Defensive pincers in battle of Volkhov

Lyuban Offensive, January 10 – June 28, 1942

Despite delays due to German actions and horrendous weather, Stalin insisted that the offensive begin on January 6, 1942. In the event only the 59th, 4th and 52nd Armies attacked on that date, with 2nd Shock joining in the next day; the 259th had been transferred to this Army just days earlier. In fact none of these forces had completed their concentrations or preparations, with predictable results. From the start, the attackers suffered from acute and persistent ammunition and fuel shortages, unavailability of reserves necessary to exploit success, and poor command, control and communications. 2nd Shock was to begin its assault with the 259th and five rifle brigades. Meretskov signalled the STAVKA at 0700 hours:

The principal difficulties are: the 2nd Shock Army's army artillery has not arrived, its guards divisions have not arrived, aviation is not concentrated, auto-transport has not arrived, ammunition reserves have not been stockpiled, and the serious situation regarding foodstuffs and fuel has not yet been corrected.

2nd Shock and 59th Armies were expected to advance into the frozen swampy wastelands south of Lyuban. The two Armies attempted to penetrate the German defenses along the Volkhov, but the fire was so heavy that 2nd Shock alone lost more than 3,000 men in the first 30 minutes of its assault. Both Armies were forced to retreat to their original positions and struggled fruitlessly for two more days before collapsing in utter exhaustion and confusion. The STAVKA called a three-day halt in the attacks. Stalin's solution, in part, was to send his special emissary, Army-Commissar 1st Rank L. Z. Mekhlis, to supervise Meretskov's attack preparations. Although he was feared and loathed, his role was not altogether negative:

For example, when he learned that the attacking armies were without artillery and that the available guns lacked vital parts, including optical instruments and communications equipment, Mekhlis informed Stalin. Soon, General N. Voronov, the chief of the Red Army's Artillery, was sent to Malaya Vishera with several railway cars containing the missing equipment.

In addition, he immediately recognized the incompetence of the existing commander of 2nd Shock, and had him replaced by General Klykov, former commander of 52nd Army.[19]

After regrouping his forces, Meretskov renewed the offensive early on January 13, this time with something approaching proper artillery preparation. However, ammunition was still in short supply. Attacking across swampy, roadless, and snow-covered terrain in bad weather, none of the attacking forces were able to maneuver freely or to be resupplied. Meretskov repeatedly asked for and received STAVKA assistance; for example, on January 19 he was sent 3,000 PPSh submachine guns and 300 antitank rifles and released nine ski battalions and an aerosan transport battalion to his control. In the 2nd Shock's sector the artillery preparation and subsequent ground assault shattered German defenses at the junction of the XXXVIII Army Corps' 126th and 215th Infantry Divisions, producing panic in the former. In heavy fighting during January 13-16, Klykov's forces managed to carve small wedges in the German defenses west of the Volkhov and Tigoda Rivers. They were not able to capture key German strongpoints, again due to a lack of force concentration. On its flanks the 4th and 52nd Armies failed to record any progress and were soon back on the defense.[20]

On January 21, after a four-day halt for regrouping, 2nd Shock resumed its struggle, this time focusing on capturing the German strongpoints at Spasskaya Polist, Mostky, Zemtitsy, and Miasnoi Bor at the base of the shallow penetration. Meretskov reported early on January 22, in part:

The penetration is developing successfully, albeit slowly, along the 2d Shock and 52d Armies' front. The penetration has developed along a 12-kilometre front from Selishchenskoe village to Krasnyi Udarnik State Farm, which is encircled. The forces have advanced to a depth of 10 kilometres and are approaching the Leningrad road.

He went on to propose a major regrouping of his Front's forces in order to exploit 2nd Shock's and 52nd Army's success. On the night of January 23/24, Meretskov finally convinced himself that Klykov's forces had blasted enough of a hole through German defenses to commit his exploitation force. The next morning the 13th Cavalry Corps lunged through the narrow gap and into the German rear area. However, once the cavalry and some of Klykov's infantry made it through, the XXXIX Motorized and XXXVIII Army Corps hurriedly assembled forces to hold the flanks of the penetration and contain the exploiting 2nd Shock Army south of Lyuban. Meretskov's offensive once again stalled, this time with about 30,000 Soviet troops lodged precariously in the German rear. The 259th was tasked with holding the gap open.[21]

A further effort was made on January 28 after a further regrouping, but 2nd Shock's assaults on Spasskaya Polist and Zemtitsy again failed. Klykov was able to pass most of the rest of his forces through the gap, joining 13th Cavalry Corps, and there were now some 100,000 men in the German rear, but still without any secure communications or supply lines to the rear. In early February, Meretskov prepared a special assault group, consisting of the 11th Rifle Division and 22nd Tank Brigade, which took the German strongpoints at Lyubino Pole and Mostky on February 12. This widened the mouth of the Army's penetration to 14km. During the following weeks of fighting Klykov was able to expand 2nd Shock's "pocket" west of the Volkhov but was unable to break out decisively toward Leningrad.[22]

Battle in Encirclement[]

In early March, Army Group North began preparing a counterstroke to cut off the Soviet Lyuban force in with an effort to relieve its own II Army Corps encircled at Demyansk. While the ground troops were ready by March 9, the counteroffensive was delayed until March 15 due to the Luftwaffe's commitments elsewhere. When it began at 0730 hours two shock groups totalling five divisions with strong air support attacked from Spasskaya Polist and Zemtitsy toward Lyubino Pole at the base of 2nd Shock's penetration. On the first day the northern shock group gained 3km and the southern group gained 1,000m. After two days of crawling through boggy terrain against heavy resistance the northern group cut one supply route on March 18 and the southern group severed the second the next day. The two groups linked up on March 20, trapping 2nd Shock in the half-frozen wastes south of Lyuban.[23]

Even as the counterstroke was underway, Meretskov frantically formulated plans to thwart it. Despite these exertions, by March 26 German forces had formed outer and inner encirclement lines along the Glushitsa and Polist Rivers. He ordered Klykov to form an operational group to spearhead a breakout to the lines of 52nd Army. This assault by the two Armies, which employed all of his reserves, began early on March 27, and by the end of the day the desperate and costly attacks managed to carve out a narrow gap 3-5km wide through the German cordon near Miasnoi Bor.[24]

References[]

Citations[]

  1. ↑ Walter S. Dunn, Jr., Stalin's Keys to Victory, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2007, p. 75
  2. ↑ Charles C. Sharp, "Red Tide", Soviet Rifle Divisions Formed From June to December 1941, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, vol. IX, Nafziger, 1996, p. 50
  3. ↑ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, pp. 26, 32
  4. ↑ David M. Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941 - 1944, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2002, p. 48
  5. ↑ Robert Forczyk, Demyansk 1942-43: The frozen fortress, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, UK, 2012, Kindle ed.
  6. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941 - 1944, p. 54
  7. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941 - 1944, pp. 54-58
  8. ↑ Aleksander A. Maslov, Fallen Soviet Generals, ed. & trans. D. M. Glantz, Frank Cass Publishers, London, UK, 1998, p. 38
  9. ↑ https://www.warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=5618. In Russian. Retrieved July 23, 2023.
  10. ↑ Forczyk, Demyansk 1942-43: The frozen fortress, Kindle ed.
  11. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941 - 1944, p. 97
  12. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941 - 1944, pp. 96-97
  13. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941 - 1944, pp. 97-99
  14. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941 - 1944, pp. 99-100
  15. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941 - 1944, pp. 104-06
  16. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941 - 1944, pp. 106-07
  17. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941 - 1944, pp. 107-10
  18. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941 - 1944, pp. 111-12
  19. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941 - 1944, pp. 156-61
  20. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941 - 1944, pp. 161-62
  21. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941 - 1944, pp. 157, 163-65
  22. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941 - 1944, pp. 165-68
  23. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941 - 1944, pp. 174-76
  24. ↑ Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad 1941 - 1944, pp. 176-78

Bibliography[]

External links[]



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