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241st Rifle Division

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241st Rifle Division (13 December 1941 – July 1945)
Active 1941–1945
Country Flag of the Soviet Union Soviet Union
Branch Red Army
Type Division
Role Infantry
Engagements Demyansk Pocket
Battle of Demyansk (1943)
Belgorod–Kharkov offensive operation
Battle of the Dniepr
Battle of Kiev (1943)
Zhitomir–Berdichev offensive
Uman–Botoșani offensive
Lvov–Sandomierz offensive
Battle of the Dukla Pass
Western Carpathian offensive
Moravia–Ostrava offensive
Prague offensive
Decorations Order of the Red Star Order of the Red Star
Battle honours Vinnytsia
Commanders
Notable
commanders		 Maj. Gen. Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovskii Hero of the Soviet Union medal Hero of the Soviet Union medal
Maj. Gen. Pavel Grigorevich Arabei
Col. Timofei Andronikovich Andrienko
Maj. Gen. Stanislav Antonovich Ivanovskii

The 241st Rifle Division was formed as an infantry division of the Red Army from the remnants of the 28th Tank Division in November/December 1941. It was based on the shtat (table of organization and equipment) of 29 July 1941 and was reformed in the 27th Army of Northwestern Front. It was soon moved to 34th Army and later to 53rd Army in the same Front, playing a relatively minor role in the battles against German 16th Army's forces in the Demyansk salient into the first months of 1943.

Formation[]

By October the 28th was a tank division in name only and its remaining men were fighting as infantry. Sources differ as to the exact date of the division's official reformation, some stating it was in November,[1] but Grylev (see Bibliography) gives it as 13 December, the same date that Col. Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovskii was appointed to command. This officer had previously led the 28th Tanks and would be promoted to the rank of major general on 5 May 1942. Once formed the division had the following order of battle:

  • 264th Rifle Regiment (later 303rd)
  • 318th Rifle Regiment
  • 332nd Rifle Regiment
  • 1010th Artillery Regiment[2]
  • 12th Antitank Battalion
  • 68th Antiaircraft Battery (until 28 February 1943)
  • 32nd Mortar Battalion (until 5 October 1942)
  • 114th Reconnaissance Company (later 241st)
  • 698th Sapper Battalion
  • 898th Signal Battalion (later 792nd Signal Company)
  • 506th Medical/Sanitation Battalion
  • 486th Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Company (later 286th)
  • 552nd Auto Transport Company
  • 404th Field Bakery
  • 881st Divisional Veterinary Hospital
  • 838th Field Postal Station (later 1538th, 23857th)
  • 689th Field Office of the State Bank (later 1017th)

As of 1 December the division was one of just three in 27th Army, along with the 23rd and 33rd Rifle Divisions.[3] On 16 December the Army was redesignated as the 4th Shock Army,[4] and the 241st was reassigned to the 34th Army, still in Northwestern Front.[5]

Battle of Demyansk[]

34th Army was under command of Maj. Gen. N. E. Berzarin. As the Red Army's winter counteroffensive widened from the Moscow area he was ordered to form two division-sized shock groups to support the efforts of 11th and 3rd Shock Armies but otherwise to fix as much of German 16th Army in place as possible with diversionary attacks. The first shock group was based on the 254th Rifle Division which faced the weakened 290th Infantry Division. Beginning on 10 January the 254th infiltrated the positions of the 290th with ski troops through frozen marshes and cut the supplies of three company-sized strongpoints which were gradually eliminated by the rest of Berzarin's forces. Over the following week the 241st advanced to the west of Lake Seliger. The combined advances left the 290th in a long, thin salient between 34th and 11th Armies.[6]

At the beginning of February, the 290th Infantry was still holding east of the Pola River but its II Army Corps and several other German units were vulnerable to encirclement at Demyansk. The bridge at Davidovo over the Redya River was the target for 11th Army's 1st Guards Rifle Corps and was taken 5 February, after which the Corps reached the village of Ramushevo on the Lovat River three days later, cutting the last road to Demyansk. The 290th was virtually surrounded with Soviet ski troops operating freely in its rear. To avoid annihilation it was permitted to pull back south from the Pola. On 25 February the full encirclement of II Corps was completed. The STAVKA ordered that Northwestern Front should crush the pocketed force within four or five days; meanwhile reinforcements were arriving from Germany and the airlifting of supplies was well underway.[7]

Demyansk 1943

Soviet positions at Demyansk, spring 1943. The 241st was in the 53rd Army sector southeast of Demyansk.

The German attempt to relieve the pocket, Operation Brückenschlag, began on 21 March but the linkup with the besieged grouping was not achieved until 21 April. The so-called "Ramushevo corridor" was less than 4km wide and often under Soviet artillery fire so II Corps was still heavily dependent on air supply.[8] During April the 241st was reassigned to 53rd Army.[9] Chernyakhovskii had already taken over the 18th Tank Corps when he left the 241st on 24 June; he was replaced two days later by his chief of staff, Col. Pavel Grigorevich Arabei. Chernyakhovskii would go on to command 60th Army and 3rd Belorussian Front, being promoted to the rank of army general and being twice made a Hero of the Soviet Union before being mortally wounded in East Prussia in February 1945. Arabei would be promoted to major general on 15 September 1943. From May to October Northwestern Front made several attempts to sever the corridor. German engineers turned the area into a fortified zone, complete with deep barbed wire obstacles and extensive minefields. 11th Army was on the north side of the corridor while 1st Shock Army held the south side; 34th and 53rd Armies covered the remainder of the salient.[10]

One of the victims of those minefields was the deputy commander of the 241st, Maj. Gen. Ivan Pavlovich Shevchuk. He had distinguished himself during the Russian Civil War in the Far East as commander of the 1st Tungussk Partisan Detachment, winning the Order of the Red Banner in 1928, and up to 1938 served as acting chief of the Construction Section of the Pacific Fleet. He had been given command of the 2nd formation of the 55th Rifle Division in December 1941, but his previous experience was not adequate to lead a division in modern warfare. As a result he was overly "coarse" in his dealings with his subordinates; as well, his unskillful leadership led to excessive casualties during offensive fighting in May 1942. In consequence, Shevchuk was brought before an 11th Army military tribunal. He was relieved of command of the 55th on 10 May, but due to his status as a Civil War hero he kept his rank and was appointed as deputy commander of the 241st. In the following months Shevchuk displayed excessive and ostentatious foolhardiness in combat situations, which seemed to indicate he was courting death to atone for his disgrace. If so, he got his wish on 28 October, when he embarked on a mounted reconnaissance of the division's frontage. His horse stepped on a German landmine, which killed the horse and blew off both of his legs; he died a few hours later and was buried the next day with full military honors.[11]

On 31 January 1943, the German High Command ordered that the Demyansk salient be evacuated, in the wake of the encirclement and upcoming destruction of 6th Army at Stalingrad. By this time most of Northwestern Front's best divisions were battered wrecks. Not knowing the German plan, Marshal G. K. Zhukov was making plans for his Operation Polyarnaya Zvezda to finally crush the salient as a preliminary to the relief of Leningrad. The division had been earmarked for this operation, which began on 15 February 1943, but was repulsed with heavy losses. Operation Ziethen began on 17 February, at which time the 241st was still near the northwest tip of Lake Seliger, facing the 32nd Infantry Division. 53rd Army attempted to harass the withdrawing forces, primarily with ski troops, but the German withdrawal freed up the reserves they needed to reinforce their lines along the Lovat, and the "pursuit" through the devastated landscape achieved little.[12]

Redeployment to the South[]

With the end of Ziethen the Red Army was left with redundant forces in the Demyansk area, while German forces were threatening the gains made in the central sector of the front during the late winter. Under the terms of STAVKA Order No. 46088 of 29 March the 241st was named as one of four rifle divisions to be moved to the Reserve of the Supreme High Command for redeployment to the Kursk region.[13] Consequently, on 1 April it was located in the reserve of Northwestern Front, and a month later it was part of the 2nd formation of 27th Army in the Reserve of the Supreme High Command. By the start of June, as both sides prepared for their summer offensives, it was with that Army in the Steppe Military District.[14]

Into Ukraine[]

Battle of Kursk, southern sectorV2

Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev. Note initial position of 27th Army.

The Battle of Kursk began on 5 July, and four days later the Steppe Military District was redesignated as Steppe Front. 27th Army was deployed along a line from Rossoshnoye to Nikolskoye and consisted of six rifle divisions (71st, 147th, 155th, 163rd, 166th and 241st) plus the 93rd Tank Brigade.[15]

27th Army saw no significant action during the German offensive, and by the beginning of August it had been transferred to Voronezh Front,[16] which was still holding the southern half of the salient. In preparation for the counteroffensive, which began on 3 August, the Army, which had been reinforced with additional armor and artillery assets, was concentrated behind the 40th Army's center in the Marino–Krasnaya Yaruga–Borisopole area. On the night of the operation's third day the Army was to deploy along the 11km-wide front from Kresanov to Soldatskoye while its main forces concentrated in the center to break through the German defense along the 6km sector Kasilovo–Novo-Berezovka. The Army was organized in two echelons, with four rifle divisions, a tank brigade, a Guards heavy tank regiment, and other reinforcements in the first echelon. The shock group consisted of the 241st and 163rd Divisions in first echelon, two second echelon divisions (155th and 71st), two tank corps, and the greater part of the reinforcements.[17]

Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev[]

The Front commander, Army Gen. N. F. Vatutin, ordered 27th Army on 4 August to organize a powerful reconnaissance-in-force along its entire front and prepare for attacking with its main forces. Along a number of sectors this reconnaissance penetrated up to 2-3km into the German defense. Later that day Marshal G. K. Zhukov issued instructions for the STAVKA that included:

1. For the purpose of widening the breach toward the west, on the morning of 5 August the 27th and 40th armies are to begin their offensive in the general direction of Graivoron.

On the morning of 5 August the shock groups of the two Armies attacked; due to the success of 27th Army's reconnaissance in disrupting the German defense system it limited itself to a 15-minute powerful artillery onslaught. Having crushed the resistance of the 57th Infantry Division both Armies broke through the German front along a 26km-wide sector and by the close of the day had advanced in fighting 8-20km and reached the line Starosele–Kasilovo–Ivanovskaya Lisitsa–Nikitskoe. During the day the 11th Panzer Division had made repeated counterattacks with no success and at considerable cost in casualties.[18]

The orders for 6 August directed 27th Army, along with the 4th Guards Tank Corps, to attack southwest towards Okhtyrka and reach the front Oposhnya–Bolshaya Rublevka–Kachalovka; it was subsequently planned to attack along both banks of the Vorskla River in the general direction of Poltava, while part of the Army's forces would assist the 6th Guards Army in destroying the German Tomarovka–Borisovka group of forces. On 7 August units of Panzergrenadier Division Großdeutschland, along with the 51st Heavy Tank Battalion (Tiger Is), arrived from the Karachev area and took part in fighting against 27th Army in the Bolshaya Pisarevka area. Following the elimination of the German forces in the Borisovka the Army continued to attack to the southwest along the Vorskla, liberating Bolshaya Pisarevka, an important paved road junction.[19]

Fighting for Okhtyrka[]

During 8–11 August the 27th Army developed the offensive toward Okhtyrka. Continuing on the morning of 8 August to pursue units of the 323rd and remnants of the 255th Infantry Divisions along both banks of the Vorskla, and throwing back elements of Großdeutschland, by the close of the next day the Army's units had reached a line from Kyrykivka to the northern and eastern outskirts of Staraya Ryabina to Kupevakha. On 10 August it outflanked the Staraya Ryabina and Yablochnoye strongpoints from the northwest and south, defeated their garrisons and opened a path for the subsequent development of the offensive on Okhtyrka and Kotelva. The following day the 4th Guards Tanks, which was operating with the Army, broke into the eastern outskirts of Okhtyrka, while the 5th Guards Tank Corps broke into Kotelva and completely captured it. By this time the Army's divisions had reached the line Petrovskii–Vysokoe–Parkhomivka–Krasnokutsk, having covered more than 50km in four days.[20]

27th Army was now tasked with reaching the line from Shilovka to Oposhnya to Artemovka and from 12–17 August was engaged in stubborn fighting along the line of the Vorskla. On the first day the Army's right flank formations continued to be involved in street fighting for Okhtyrka while its left wing reached the river's east bank along the sector Khukhrya–Kotelna–Kolontaev. On 14 August the Army continued to wage fierce battles in the Okhtyrka area, beating back German counterattacks. During the afternoon Vatutin gave the Army its mission for the following day: to destroy the German's Okhtyrka group of forces, capture a bridgehead along the western bank of the Vorskla, and reach a line 5km west of Okhtyrka. During the second half of 15 August, due to the difficult situation along the front of 6th Guards Army, which was being forced to fall back in the face of a German counterattack, the Army was ordered to secure its left flank along the Merla River with the 241st and the 5th Guards Tanks. On 16–17 August German resistance along the Army's front increased sharply. With the support of significant air groups the Army's units were repeatedly counterattacked and a number of villages changed hands several times. On the second day the Army, which was dispersed along a 170km-wide front, was not able to advance along a single sector and control of Okhtyrka remained disputed.[21]

At this point the German command, which had previously been defeated in its efforts to recapture Bohodukhiv by 6th Guards Army, began regrouping to attempt to reach the objective via Okhtyrka. To this end it concentrated Großdeutschland, the 7th and part of the 19th Panzer Division, the 10th Panzergrenadier Division, two heavy tank battalions, and four artillery regiments near and to the west of the town. As a result it managed to achieve a significant superiority of force by mid-month along the front from Okhtyrka to Oposhnya to Krasnokutsk. On 18 August this grouping began an attack along the Okhtyrka axis against 27th Army's right flank. At 0830 hours, following a powerful artillery preparation and massed air attacks against the 155th and 166th Divisions the German grouping committed up to 200 tanks plus motorized infantry along the Pologii–Moshenki sector with continuing air support. the front of the 166th was pierced and by the end of the day the defense had been penetrated to a depth of 24km, creating a narrow pocket up to 7km in depth. During the morning the 4th Guards Army's 7th and 8th Guards Rifle Divisions had entered the battle against the breakthrough units, while the 166th's artillery claimed more than 30 panzers out of action. On the same day the 3rd SS Panzer Division Totenkopf attacked from the Kovalevka–Konstantinovka area in the direction of Kolontaev and Lyubovka but was beaten off by the 241st and units of the 5th Guards Tanks.[22]

With the German arrival in the Kaplunovka area the situation along 27th Army's left flank quickly became more difficult as the 71st and 241st Divisions, plus the 4th and 5th Guards Tanks, faced the danger of encirclement. Stalin personally instructed Zhukov, who was at Vatutin's headquarters, as to the necessity of eliminating the German Okhtyrka grouping as quickly as possible and also to adopt emergency measures to ward off the possible isolation the Army's left flank formations. At 1650 hours Vatutin issued orders to his armies to restore the situation in the Okhtyrka area through joint attacks. On the basis of Stalin's instructions the 71st was ordered to withdraw its main forces from the west bank of the Vorskla during the night of 18/19 August. At about the same time the 241st was operationally subordinated to 6th Guards Army and was defending along the Merchik River with the help of 5th Guards Tanks. The heavy fighting against the German breakthrough continued through 19 August, as the German efforts to deepen the thrust through repeated attacks to the east largely failed. The 241st, now defending along the Merla, fought off all attacks during the day and held its positions. The next day, having failed to reach Bohodukhiv, the German command suspended its offensive along this axis and dispatched it main forces to eliminate the Soviet salient that had formed in to Kotelva area, but this fared no better. In three days of fighting the 27th Army claimed 180 tanks, 50 guns, and four batteries of Nebelwerfers destroyed, plus two regiments of motorized infantry nearly completely destroyed and 30 planes shot down by its antiaircraft guns.[23]

On the morning of 21 August the 27th Army received orders to attack toward Okhtyrka to complete the defeat of the German grouping in conjunction with 47th Army, but 6th Guards Army was to remain holding its present positions. The town was finally liberated on 24 August, one day after Steppe Front recaptured Kharkiv for the final time.[24] By the start of September the 241st had been re-subordinated to 27th Army as the advance through eastern Ukraine began.[25]

Battles on the Dniepr[]

As of 20 September, as it closed on the Dniepr River, the division had 3,651 personnel on strength, armed with 24 82mm and 13 120mm mortars, just four 76mm regimental and 19 76mm divisional guns, plus 10 122mm howitzers, making it the weakest of 27th Army's four remaining rifle divisions.[26]

References[]

Citations[]

  1. ↑ Walter S. Dunn, Jr., Stalin's Keys to Victory, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2007, p. 88
  2. ↑ Charles C. Sharp, "Red Tide", Soviet Rifle Divisions Formed From June to December 1941, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, vol. IX, Nafziger, 1996, p. 40
  3. ↑ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, p. 73
  4. ↑ Robert Forczyk, Demyansk 1942-43: The frozen fortress, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, UK, 2012, Kindle ed.
  5. ↑ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1942, p. 9
  6. ↑ Forczyk, Demyansk 1942-43: The frozen fortress, Kindle ed.
  7. ↑ Forczyk, Demyansk 1942-43: The frozen fortress, Kindle ed.
  8. ↑ Forczyk, Demyansk 1942-43: The frozen fortress, Kindle ed.
  9. ↑ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1942, p. 81
  10. ↑ Forczyk, Demyansk 1942-43: The frozen fortress, Kindle ed.
  11. ↑ Aleksander A. Maslov, Fallen Soviet Generals, ed. & trans. David M. Glantz, Frank Cass Publishers, London, UK, 1998, pp. 68-69, 212-13
  12. ↑ Forczyk, Demyansk 1942-43: The frozen fortress, Kindle ed.
  13. ↑ David M. Glantz, After Stalingrad, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2011, p. 433
  14. ↑ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1943, pp. 81, 122, 147
  15. ↑ Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, ed. & trans. R. W. Harrison, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2016, Kindle ed., Book One, Part One, ch. 1
  16. ↑ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1943, p. 193
  17. ↑ Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, Kindle ed., Book Two, Part Two, ch. 1
  18. ↑ Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, Kindle ed., Book Two, Part Two, ch. 2
  19. ↑ Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, Kindle ed., Book Two, Part Two, ch. 2
  20. ↑ Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, Kindle ed., Book Two, Part Two, ch. 2
  21. ↑ Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, Kindle ed., Book Two, Part Two, ch. 2
  22. ↑ Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, Kindle ed., Book Two, Part Two, ch. 2
  23. ↑ Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, Kindle ed., Book Two, Part Two, ch. 2
  24. ↑ Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, Kindle ed., Book Two, Part Two, ch. 2
  25. ↑ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1943, p. 222
  26. ↑ Soviet General Staff, The Battle of the Dnepr, ed. & trans. R. W. Harrison, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2018, pp. 185-86

Bibliography[]

External links[]



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