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1948 Arab–Israeli War
Part of 1948 Palestine War
Ink flag.jpg
Captain Avraham "Bren" Adan raising the Ink Flag at Umm Rashrash (a site now in Eilat), marking the end of the war.
Date15 May 1948 – 10 March 1949
(9 months, 3 weeks and 2 days)
Final armistice agreement concluded on 20 July 1949
LocationFormer Mandatory Palestine, Sinai Peninsula, southern Lebanon
Result Israeli victory; Palestinian Arab defeat; Arab League strategic failure;[4] Armistice Agreements
Israel keeps area allotted to it by Partition Plan, captures 50% of area allotted to Arab state, Jordanian occupation of West Bank, Egyptian occupation of the Gaza Strip


Before 26 May 1948:

After 26 May 1948:
Israel Defense Forces

Foreign volunteers:

Arab states:
 Kingdom of Egypt[1]
 Kingdom of Iraq[1]
 Lebanon (Lebanon had decided to not participate in the war and only took part in the battle of al-Malikiya on 5–6 June 1948.[2])

All-Palestine Government Holy War Army
Arab Liberation Army

Foreign volunteers:
Muslim Brotherhood

Commanders and leaders

Israel David Ben-Gurion
Israel Yisrael Galili
Israel Yaakov Dori
Israel Yigael Yadin
Israel Mickey Marcus
Israel Yigal Allon
Israel Yitzhak Rabin
Israel David Shaltiel
Israel Moshe Dayan

Israel Shimon Avidan

Arab League Azzam Pasha
Jordan King Abdallah
Kingdom of Iraq Muzahim al-Pachachi
All-Palestine Government Haj Amin al-Husseini
Kingdom of Egypt King Farouk I
Syria Husni al-Za'im Commanders:
Jordan John Bagot Glubb
Jordan Habis al-Majali
Arab League Fawzi al-Qawuqji
Flag of Hejaz 1917.svg Hasan Salama
Kingdom of Egypt Ahmed Ali al-Mwawi

Kingdom of Egypt Muhammad Naguib
Israel: 29,677 initially rising to 117,500 by March 1949. This includes the entire military personnel count—both combat units and logistical units.[5] Egypt: 10,000 initially, rising to 20,000
Iraq: 3,000 initially, rising to 15,000–18,000
Syria: 2,500–5,000
Transjordan: 8,000–12,000
Lebanon: 1,000[6]
Yemen: 300
Arab Liberation Army: 3,500–6,000.
At maximum, not half of the forces of the Israelis but these numbers include only the combat units sent to the former mandate-territory of Palestine, not the entire military strength.[5]
Casualties and losses
6,373 killed (about 4,000 troops and 2,400 civilians) 8,000–15,000 killed.

The 1948 Arab–Israeli War or the First Arab–Israeli War was fought between the State of Israel and a military coalition of Arab states and Palestinian Arab forces. This war was the second stage of the 1948 Palestine war, known in Arabic as al-Nakba (Arabic language: النكبة‎, "The Catastrophe") and in Hebrew as the Milkhemet Ha'atzma'ut (Hebrew: מלחמת העצמאות‎, "War of Independence") or Milkhemet Hashikhrur (Hebrew: מלחמת השחרור‎ "War of Liberation").

The war was preceded by a period of civil war in the territory of the Mandatory Palestine between Jewish Yishuv forces and Palestinian Arab forces in response to the UN Partition Plan. Yishuv forces had already been engaged in attacking and expelling residents from Arab villages, some of which lay outside the designated boundaries of the proposed Jewish state.[7] The Hagannah was preparing for the expected Arab invasion by conquering important military regions. Their orders were that only if the village resist — to annihilate the armed force and expel the population. Otherwise the villagers will remain in the village.[qt 1]

An alliance of Arab states invaded[8] Israel and the zone proposed for the Arab state, on behalf of the Palestinian Arab side. The civil war was subsequently transformed into a war between the newly declared State of Israel and the Arab states. The fighting took place mostly on the former territory of the British Mandate and for a short time also in the Sinai Peninsula and southern Lebanon.[9]

As a result of the war, the State of Israel kept nearly all the area that had been recommended by the UN General Assembly Resolution 181 and took control of almost 60% of the area allocated to the proposed Arab state,[10] including the Jaffa, Lydda and Ramle area, Galilee, some parts of the Negev, a wide strip along the Tel-Aviv-Jerusalem road, West Jerusalem, and some territories in the West Bank. Transjordan took control of the remainder of the West Bank and East-Jerusalem, and the Egyptian military took control of the Gaza Strip. No Arab Palestinian state was created. Armistice agreements were signed between all belligerents except Iraqis and Palestinians.

Important demographic changes occurred in the country. Between 600,000 and 760,000 Palestinian Arabs fled or were expelled from the area that became Israel and they became Palestinian refugees.[qt 2] The war and the creation of Israel also triggered the Jewish exodus from Arab lands. In the three years following the war, about 700,000 Jews immigrated to Israel, residing mainly along the borders of the State.[11]


UN Partition Plan

Proposed separation of Palestine

Following World War II, on 14 May 1948, the British Mandate of Palestine came to an end. The surrounding Arab nations were also emerging from mandatory rule. Transjordan, under the Hashemite ruler Abdullah I, gained independence from Britain in 1946 and was called Jordan in 1949, but it remained under heavy British influence. Egypt gained nominal independence in 1922, but Britain continued to exert a strong influence on the country until the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, which limited British presence to a garrison of troops on the Suez Canal until 1945. Lebanon became an independent state in 1943, but French troops would not withdraw until 1946, the same year that Syria won its independence from France.

In 1945, at British prompting, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan, and Yemen formed the Arab League to coordinate policy between the Arab states. Iraq and Transjordan coordinated policies closely, signing a mutual defence treaty, while Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia feared that Transjordan would annex part or all of Palestine, and use it as a stepping stone to attack or undermine Syria, Lebanon, and the Hijaz.[12]

On 29 November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending the adoption and implementation of a plan to partition Palestine into two states, one Arab and one Jewish, and the City of Jerusalem.[13] Each state would comprise three major sections, linked by extraterritorial crossroads. The Arab state would also have an enclave at Jaffa. The territory of the proposed Jewish state was to include the fertile eastern Galilee and coastal plain, where most of the Jewish population lived, as well as most of the Negev desert, which was more than half of the total area. The Arab state was to have the central Galilee, the mountainous area later known as the West Bank, and part of the southern coastal area, extending into the Negev, where 5% of the Arab population lived.[14]

The Jews, roughly 33% of the population and owning approximately 7% of the land,[15] were to get 55% of the Mandatory territory. The Palestinian Arabs, about 67% of the population and owning roughly 47% of land, would be allotted 43% of the territory.[16][17][18][19] In consideration of its religious significance, the Jerusalem area, including Bethlehem, with 100,000 Jews and an equal number of Palestinian Arabs, was to become a Corpus separatum, to be administered by the UN.[20][21]

The Jewish leadership accepted the partition plan as "the indispensable minimum",[22] glad to gain international recognition but sorry that they did not receive more.[23] Nevertheless, Menahem Begin, leader of the Irgun (IZL) rejected this, considering nothing was more sacred than the integrity of the whole territory of "Eretz Israel"[24] Arguing that the partition plan was unfair to the Arabs with regard to the population balance at that time, the representatives of the Palestinian Arabs firmly opposed the UN action and rejected its authority to involve itself in the matter at all.[25][26]

1947–1948 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine

The beginning of the Civil War

In the immediate aftermath of the General Assembly's vote on the Partition plan, the explosions of joy among the Jewish community were counterbalanced by the expression of discontent among the Arab community. Soon after, violence broke out and became more and more prevalent. Murders, reprisals, and counter-reprisals came fast on each other's heels, resulting in dozens of victims killed on both sides in the process. The impasse persisted as British forces didn't intervene to put a stop to the escalating cycles of violence generated by Arab ambushes and IZL and LHI terrorism.[27][28][29][30][31]

Between 30 November 1947 and 7 April 1948, 959 Palestinian Arab civilians died, and 1,941 were wounded, while Jewish civilian deaths were 840, with 1,785 wounded.[32]

From January onwards, operations became increasingly militarized, with the infiltration of a number of Arab Liberation Army regiments inside Palestine. They consolidated their presence in Galilee and Samaria.[33] Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni came from Egypt with several hundred men of the Army of the Holy War. Having recruited a few thousand volunteers, al-Husayni organized the blockade of the 100,000 Jewish residents of Jerusalem.[34] To counter this, the Yishuv authorities tried to supply the city with convoys of up to 100 armoured vehicles, but the operation became more and more impractical as the number of casualties in the relief convoys surged. By March, Al-Hussayni's tactic had paid off. Almost all of Haganah's armoured vehicles had been destroyed, the blockade was in full operation, and hundreds of Haganah members who had tried to bring supplies into the city were killed.[35] The Jews in Jerusalem were on the verge of starvation. The situation for those who dwelt in the Jewish settlements in the highly isolated Negev and North of Galilee was even more critical.

While the Jewish population had received strict orders requiring them to hold their ground everywhere at all costs,[36] the Arab population was more affected by the general conditions of insecurity to which the country was exposed. Up to 100,000 Arabs, from the urban upper and middle classes in Haifa, Jaffa and Jerusalem, or Jewish-dominated areas, evacuated abroad or to Arab centres eastwards.[37] By the end of March, 2,000 had been killed and 4,000 injured.[38] These figures correspond to an average of over 100 deaths and 200 injuries per week, all of this in a country with 2,000,000 inhabitants.

This situation caused the US to withdraw their support for the Partition plan, thus encouraging the Arab League to believe that the Palestinian Arabs, reinforced by the Arab Liberation Army, could put an end to the plan for partition.[citation needed] The British, on the other hand, decided on 7 February 1948, to support the annexation of the Arab part of Palestine by Transjordan.[39]

Although a certain level of doubt took hold among Yishuv supporters, their apparent defeats were due more to their wait-and-see policy than to weakness.[citation needed] David Ben-Gurion reorganized Haganah and made conscription obligatory. Every Jewish man and woman in the country had to receive military training. Thanks to funds raised by Golda Meir from sympathisers in the United States, and Stalin's decision to support the Zionist cause, the Jewish representatives of Palestine were able to sign very important armament contracts with the Czechs, who sold arms to Syria too. Other Haganah agents recuperated abroad stockpiles from the Second World War. The first shipment of significant numbers of light arms and ammunition arrived at Tel Aviv at early April 1948. Ben-Gurion invested Yigael Yadin with the responsibility to come up with a plan in preparation for the announced intervention of the Arab states. The result of his analysis was Plan Dalet, which was put in place from the start of April onwards. The adoption of Plan Dalet marked the second stage of the civil war, in which Haganah passed from the defensive to the offensive.

The Haganah on the offensive

Six weeks before the announced end of the mandate, the Yishuv took the offensive. The first operation, named Nachshon, consisted of lifting the blockade on Jerusalem. 1500 men from Haganah's Givati brigade and Palmach's Harel brigade conducted sorties to free up the route to the city between 5 and 20 April. The operation was successful, and enough foodstuffs to last 2 months were trucked into to Jerusalem for distribution to the Jewish population.[40] The success of the operation was assisted by the death of Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni in combat. During this time, and independently of Haganah or the framework of Plan Dalet, militants from Irgun and Lehi formations were allowed to range freely[41][42][43] and massacred a substantial number of Arabs at Deir Yassin, an event that, though publicly deplored and criticized by the principal Jewish authorities, had a deep impact on the morale of the Arab population and contributed to the exodus of the Arab population.At the same time, the first large-scale operation of the Arab Liberation Army ended in a "débâcle", having been roundly defeated at Mishmar HaEmek,[44] followed with the loss of their Druze allies through defection.[45]

By late April, the U.S. State department, concerned to avoid a foreseeable conflagration after the British withdrawal, proposed a truce, managing to get the Arab states, that wished to avoid war, to accept informally proposals by Ben-Gurion they had previously rejected, including a Jewish immigration rate of 48,000 per annum. Likewise they promised the Jews assistance were Arab armies to invade subsequent to the truce. Aware that arm shipments from both Czechoslovakia and France were flowing in, and that local Palestinian forces were demoralized, the Jewish authorities turned down the proposal.[46] Several Arab leaders, including King Ibn Sagud and Azzam Pasha, secretly requested the British to remain on for another year in order to avert catastrophe.[47]

Within the framework of the establishment of Jewish territorial continuity foreseen by Plan Dalet, the forces of Haganah, Palmach and Irgun intended to conquer mixed zones. Palestinian Arab society was shaken. Tiberias, Haifa, Safed, Beisan, Jaffa and Acre fell, resulting in the flight of more than 250,000 Palestinian Arabs.[48]

The British had, at that time, essentially withdrawn their troops. The situation pushed the leaders of the neighbouring Arab states to intervene, but their preparation was not finalized, and they did not assemble sufficient forces to turn the tide of the war. The majority of Palestinian Arab hopes lay with the Arab Legion of Transjordan's monarch, King Abdullah I, but he had no intention of creating a Palestinian Arab-run state, since he hoped to annexe as much of the territory of the British Mandate for Palestine as he could. He was playing a double-game, being in contact with the Jewish authorities as with the Arab League.

In preparation for the Arab states invasion, Haganah successfully launched Operations Yiftah[49] and Ben-'Ami[50] to secure the Jewish settlements of Galilee, and Operation Kilshon, which created a united front around Jerusalem. The inconclusive meeting between Golda Meir and Abdullah I, followed by the Kfar Etzion massacre on 13 May by the Arab Legion led to predictions that the battle for Jerusalem would be merciless.[citation needed]

On 14 May 1948, David Ben-Gurion declared the establishment of the State of Israel and the 1948 Palestine war entered its second phase with the intervention of the Arab state armies and the beginning of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War.

Political objectives


Benny Morris states that the Yishuv's aims evolved during the war.[51]

Initially, the aim was "simple and modest": to survive the assaults of the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab states. "The Zionist leaders deeply, genuinely, feared a Middle Eastern reenactment of the Holocaust, which had just ended; the Arabs' public rhetoric reinforced these fears". As the war progressed, the aim of expanding the Jewish state beyond the UN partition borders appeared: first to incorporate clusters of isolated Jewish settlements and later to add more territories to the state and give it defensible borders. A third and further aim that emerged among the political and military leaders after four or five months was to "reduce the size of Israel's prospective large and hostile Arab minority, seen as a potential powerful fifth column, by belligerency and expulsion".[51]

Plan Dalet, or Plan D, (Hebrew: תוכנית ד', Tokhnit dalet) was a plan worked out by the Haganah, a Jewish paramilitary group and the forerunner of the Israel Defense Forces, in autumn 1947 to spring 1948, which was sent to Haganah units in early March 1948. According to the academic Ilan Pappe, its purpose was to conquer as much of Palestine and to expel as many Palestinians as possible,[52] though according to Benny Morris there was no such intent. In his book The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Pappé asserts that Plan Dalet was a "blueprint for ethnic cleansing" with the aim of reducing both rural and urban areas of Palestine.[53] The intent of Plan Dalet is subject to much controversy, with historians on the one extreme asserting that it was entirely defensive, and historians on the other extreme asserting that the plan aimed at maximum conquest and expulsion of the Palestinians.

The Arab League as a whole

The Arab League had unanimously rejected the UN partition plan and were bitterly opposed to the establishment of a Jewish state.

The Arab League before partition affirmed the right to the independence of Palestine, while blocking the creation of a Palestinian government.[Clarification needed] Towards the end of 1947, the League established a military committee commanded by the retired Iraqi general Isma'il Safwat whose mission was to analyse the chance of victory of the Palestinians against the Jews.[54] His conclusions were that they had no chance of victory and that an intervention of the Arab regular armies was mandatory.[54] The political committee nevertheless rejected these conclusions and decided to support an armed opposition to the Partition Plan excluding the participation of their regular armed forces.[55]

In April with the Palestinian defeat, the refugees coming from Palestine and the pressure of their public opinion, the Arab leaders decided to invade Palestine.[56]

The Arab League gave reasons for its intervention in Palestine in the cablegram:[57]

  • the Arab states find themselves compelled to intervene in order restore law and order and to check further bloodshed
  • the Mandate over Palestine has come to an end, leaving no legally constituted authority
  • the only solution of the Palestine problem is the establishment of a unitary Palestinian state.

Some unofficial statements before the war had been more aggressive. Arab League Secretary Azzam Pasha, according to an interview in an 11 October 1947 article of Akhbar al-Yom, said: "I personally wish that the Jews do not drive us to this war, as this will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades".[58]

According to Yoav Gelber, the Arab countries were "drawn into the war by the collapse of the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab Liberation Army [and] the Arab governments' primary goal was preventing the Palestinian Arabs' total ruin and the flooding of their own countries by more refugees. According to their own perception, had the invasion not taken place, there was no Arab force in Palestine capable of checking the Haganah's offensive".[59] Anyway, the Yishuv perceived the peril of an Arab invasion as threatening its very existence. Having no real knowledge of the Arabs' true military capabilities, the Jews took Arab propaganda literally, preparing for the worst and reacting accordingly."[59]

King Abdullah I of Jordan

King Abdullah was the commander of the Arab Legion, the strongest Arab army involved in the war.[60] The Arab Legion had about 10,000 soldiers, trained and commanded by British officers.

King Abdullah outside the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, Jerusalem, 29 May 1948.

In 1946–47, Abdullah said that he had no intention to "resist or impede the partition of Palestine and creation of a Jewish state."[61] Ideally, Abdullah would have liked to annex all of Palestine, but he was prepared to compromise.[62][63] He supported the partition, intending that the West Bank area of the British Mandate allocated for the Arab state be annexed to Jordan.[64] Abdullah had secret meetings with the Jewish Agency (at which the future Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir was among the delegates) that reached an agreement of Jewish non-interference with Jordanian annexation of the West Bank (although Abdullah failed in his goal of acquiring an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea through the Negev desert) and of Jordanian agreement not to attack the area of the Jewish state contained in the United Nations partition resolution (in which Jerusalem was given neither to the Arab nor the Jewish state, but was to be an internationally administered area). In one stunning diplomatic coup, the strongest Arab army agreed not to attack the Jewish state.[65]

However, by 1948, the neighbouring Arab states pressured Abdullah into joining them in an "all-Arab military intervention" against the newly created State of Israel, that he used to restore his prestige in the Arab world, which had grown suspicious of his relatively good relationship with Western and Jewish leaders.[61]

Abdullah's role in this war became substantial. He saw himself as the "supreme commander of the Arab forces" and "persuaded the Arab League to appoint him" to this position.[66] Through his leadership, the Arabs fought the 1948 war to meet Abdullah's political goals.[67]

The other Arab states

King Farouk of Egypt was anxious to prevent Abdullah from being seen as the main champion of the Arab world in Palestine, which he feared might damage his own leadership aspirations of the Arab world.[62] In addition, Farouk wished to annex all of southern Palestine to Egypt.[62] Nuri as-Said, the strongman of Iraq, had ambitions for bringing the entire Fertile Crescent under Iraqi leadership.[62] Both Syria and Lebanon wished to take certain areas of northern Palestine.[62]

One result of the ambitions of the various Arab leaders was a distrust of all the Palestinian leaders who wished to set up a Palestinian state, and a mutual distrust of each other.[62] Co-operation was to be very poor during the war between the various Palestinian factions and the Arab armies.[62]

Arab Higher Committee of Amin al-Husayni

Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni with aides and Palestinian irregulars of the Holy War Army, Jerusalem district, February 1948.

At the beginning of 1948, the former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and Chairman of the Arab Higher Committee, Amin al-Husayni was in exile in Egypt. He was involved in high level negotiations between Arab leaders at a meeting held in Damascus in February 1948 to organize Palestinian Field Commands. Total distrust existed between him and the British as well as with the Arab League. He thought they had territorial ambitions in Palestine, while they took pains not to alienate the Hashemite kingdom. As a result, the Higher Committee had at its disposal some £750,000 as opposed to the $28 million for the purchase of foreign armaments at the disposal of the Jewish Agency.[68] The commanders of his Holy War Army, Hasan Salama and Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, were allocated only the Lydda district and Jerusalem. This decision

paved the way for an undermining of the Mufti's position among the Arab States. On 9 February, only four days after the Damascus meeting, a severe blow was suffered by the Mufti at the Arab League session in Cairo [where his demands for] the appointment of a Palestinian to the General Staff of the League, the formation of a Palestinian Provisional Government, the transfer of authority to local National Committees in areas evacuated by the British, a loan for administration in Palestine and appropriation of large sums to the Arab Higher Executive for Palestinians entitled to war damages [were all rejected].[69]

The Arab League blocked recruitment to al-Husayni's forces,[70] which collapsed following the death of his most charismatic commander, his cousin Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, on 8 April.

Following rumours that King Abdullah was re-opening the bilateral negotiations with Israel that he had previously conducted in secret with the Jewish Agency, the Arab League, led by Egypt, decided to set up the All-Palestine Government in Gaza on 8 September under the nominal leadership of the Mufti. Historian Avi Shlaim wrote:

The decision to form the Government of All-Palestine in Gaza, and the feeble attempt to create armed forces under its control, furnished the members of the Arab League with the means of divesting themselves of direct responsibility for the prosecution of the war and of withdrawing their armies from Palestine with some protection against popular outcry. Whatever the long-term future of the Arab government of Palestine, its immediate purpose, as conceived by its Egyptian sponsors, was to provide a focal point of opposition to Abdullah and serve as an instrument for frustrating his ambition to federate the Arab regions with Jordan.[71]

Abdullah regarded the attempt to revive al-Husayni's Holy War Army as a challenge to his authority and on 3 October his Minister of Defence ordered all armed bodies operating in the areas controlled by the Arab Legion to be disbanded. Glubb Pasha carried out the order ruthlessly and efficiently.[72]

Initial line-up of forces

Military assessments

According to Benny Morris, by the end of 1947, the Palestinians "had a healthy and demoralising respect for the Yishuv's military power" and if it came to battle the Palestinians expected to lose. The British Intelligence and Arab League military reached similar conclusions.[73] However the British Foreign Ministry and C.I.A believed that the Arab States would finally win in case of war.[74][75]

On the eve of the war, the available number of Arab troops likely to be committed to war was about 23,000 (10,000 Egyptians, 4,500 Jordanians, 3,000 Iraqis, 3,000 Syrians, 2,000 ALA volunteers, 2,000 Lebanese), in addition to the irregular Palestinians already present. By March 1948, the effective number of Arab combatants numbered 12,000.[76] The Yishuv had a numerical superiority, with 35,000 troops of the Haganah, 3,000 of Stern and Irgun, and a few thousand armed settlers.[77] Egypt, Iraq, and Syria all possessed air forces, Egypt and Syria had tanks, and all had some modern artillery.[78] The Yishuv bought from Czechoslovakia modern armaments.[79] Syria bought from Czechoslovakia a quantity of small arms for the Arab Liberation Army but the shipment never arrived due to Hagana force intervention.[80] Prior to the war, Arab forces had been trained by British and French instructors. This was particularly true of Jordan's Arab Legion under command of Lt Gen Sir John Glubb.

On 12 May, three days before the invasion, David Ben-Gurion was told by his chief military advisers (who over-estimated the size of the Arab armies and the numbers and efficiency of the troops who would be committed — much as the Arab generals tended to exaggerate Jewish troops strength) that Israel's chances of winning a war against the Arab states were only about even.[78]

Yishuv forces

IDF soldiers of the Samson's Foxes unit advance in a captured Egyptian Bren Gun carrier.

In November 1947, the Haganah was an underground paramilitary force that had existed as a highly organized, national force,since the Arab riots of 192021, and throughout the riots of 1929, Great Uprising of 1936–39.,[81] and World War 2. It had a mobile force, the HISH, which had 2,000 full-time fighters (men and women) and 10,000 reservists (all aged between 18 and 25) and an elite unit, the Palmach composed of 2,100 fighters and 1,000 reservists. The reservists trained three or four days a month and went back to civilian life the rest of the time. These mobile forces could rely on a garrison force, the HIM (Heil Mishmar, lit. Guard Corps), composed of people aged over 25. The Yishuv's total strength was around 35,000 with 15,000 to 18,000 fighters and a garrison force of roughly 20,000.[81][82]

Two clandestine groups, Irgun and Lehi, had between 2,000–4,000 and 500–800 members, respectively. Irgun, whose activities were considered by MI5 to be terrorism, was monitored by the British.[83] There were also several thousand men and women who had served in the British Army in World War II who did not serve in any of the underground militias but would provide valuable military experience during the war.[84] Walid Khalidi says the Yishuv had the additional forces of the Jewish Settlement Police, numbering some 12,000, the Gadna Youth Battalions, and the armed settlers.[85] Few of the units had been trained by December 1947.[81]

In 1946, Ben-Gurion decided that the Yishuv would probably have to defend itself against both the Palestinian Arabs and neighbouring Arab states and accordingly began a "massive, covert arms acquisition campaign in the West". By September 1947 the Haganah had "10,489 rifles, 702 light machine-guns, 2,666 submachine guns, 186 medium machine-guns, 672 two-inch mortars and 92 three-inch (76 mm) mortars" and acquired many more during the first few months of hostilities. The Yishuv also had "a relatively advanced arms producing capacity", that between October 1947 and July 1948 "produced 3 million 9 mm bullets, 150,000 Mills grenades, 16,000 submachine guns (Sten Guns) and 210 three-inch (76 mm) mortars",[81] along with a few "Davidka" mortars, which had been indigenously designed and produced. They were inaccurate but had a spectacularly loud explosion that demoralized the enemy. A large amount of the munitions used by the Israelis came from the Ayalon Institute, a clandestine bullet factory underneath kibbutz Ayalon, which produced about 2.5 million bullets for Sten guns. The munitions produced by the Ayalon Institute were said to have been the only supply that was not in shortage during the war. Shortly after independence, Israel no longer had to conceal it's arms manufacturing operations, and moved them above ground. All of the Haganah's weapons-manufacturing was centralized and later became Israel Military Industries.[86][87] Locally produced explosives were plentiful.[qt 3] Initially, the Haganah had no heavy machine guns, artillery, armored vehicles, anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons,[84] nor military aircraft or tanks.[81] The Yishuv also managed to purchase arms on the black market, including three B-17 bombers bought in the United States, with one of them bombing Cairo in July 1948.[88] They also managed to obtain stocks of British weapons due to the logistical complexity of the British withdrawal, and the corruption of a number of officials.[79]

On 5 December 1947, conscription was instituted for all men and women aged between 17 and 25 and by the end of March, 21,000 had been conscripted.[89] On 30 March, the call-up was extended to men and single women aged between 26 and 35. Five days later, a General Mobilization order was issued for all men under 40.[90] By July 1948, the Israelis had established an air force, a navy, and a tank battalion.[88]

Sources disagree about the amount of arms at the Yishuv's disposal at the end of the Mandate. According to Karsh before the arrival of arms shipments from Czechoslovakia as part of Operation Balak, there was roughly one weapon for every three fighters, and even the Palmach could arm only two out of every three of its active members.[84] According to Collins and LaPierre, by April 1948, the Haganah had managed to accumulate only about 20,000 rifles and Sten guns for the 35,000 soldiers who existed on paper.[91] According to Walid Khalidi "the arms at the disposal of these forces were plentiful".[85] The Yishuv forces were divided into brigades:[Clarification needed]

Brigade Commander Size[92] Operations
Golani Moshe Mann 4,500 Dekel, Hiram
Carmeli Moshe Carmel 2,000 Hiram
Alexandroni Dan Even 5,200 Latrun, Hametz
Kiryati Michael Ben-Gal 1,400 Dani, Hametz
Givati Shimon Avidan 5,000 Hametz, Barak, Pleshet
Etzioni David Shaltiel Battle of Jerusalem, Shfifon, Yevusi, Battle of Ramat Rachel
7th Armoured Shlomo Shamir Battles of Latrun
8th Armoured Yitzhak Sadeh Danny, Yoav, Horev
Oded Avraham Yoffe Yoav, Hiram
Harel Yitzhak Rabin 1,400 Nachshon, Danny
Yiftach Yigal Allon 4,500 inc. some Golani Yiftah, Danny, Yoav, Battles of Latrun
Negev Nahum Sarig 2,400 Yoav

Arab forces

In addition to the local irregular Palestinians militia groups. The five Arab states that joined the war were Egypt, Jordan (Transjordan), Syria, Lebanon and Iraq sending expeditionary forces of their regular armies. Additional contingents came from Yemen.

Local Palestinians

There was no national military organization in the Arab Palestinian community. There were two paramilitary youth organizations, the pro-Husayni Futuwa and the anti-Husayni Najjada ("auxiliary corps").[62] According to Karsh, these groups had 11,000–12,000 members,[62] but according to Morris, the Najjada, which was based in Jaffa and had 2,000–3,000 members, was destroyed in the run-up to the 1948 war, during Husayni's attempt to seize control of it, and the Futuwa never numbered more than a few hundred.[93] At the outbreak of the war, new local militia groups, the National Guard, mushroomed in towns and cities. Each was answerable to its local Arab National Committee.[94]

The tendency of the Palestinians to dissipate their forces along village and clan lines would be a major weakness of the Palestinian side.[95] In particular there was a split within the Palestinian community between those loyal to the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Haji Amin Husseini and those opposed to his leadership.[62] In December, Abd al-Qadir Husseini, who was a protégé of his uncle the Grand Mufti arrived in Jerusalem with one hundred combatants who had trained in Syria and that would form the cadre of the Holy War Army. His forces were joined by a few hundred young villagers and veterans of the British army.[96] There were 7,000 Palestinians who served in the British Army during World War II, and 10,500 Palestinians in the Mandate's para-military police force most of whom deserted during the winter of 1947–48 fight in the war.[62]

The equipment of the Palestinian forces was very poor. The British confiscated most of their arsenal during the 1936–39 rebellion and World War II.[97] A report of 1942 by the Haganah intelligence service assessed the number of firearms at the disposal of the Palestinians at 50,000 [but] this was probably an overestimate[98] or even "highly exaggerated".[99] In early February 1948 the Arab League's military Committee delivered 1,700 rifles to the Palestinian Arabs; at the same time the Egyptians gave the Mufti 1,200 rifles, Iraq sent 1,000 rifles and Syria gave 645 rifles, 78 machine guns and 8 mortars.[100] The Arab Liberation Army (Jaysh al-Inqadh al-Arabi) had been set up by the Arab League. It was made up of around 6,000 volunteers, mostly from Syria, and was led by Fawzi al-Qawuqji. Its officially allotted area was northern Palestine, including Samaria.[101]

Arab states

Jordan's Arab Legion was considered the most effective Arab force. Armed, trained and commanded by British officers, this 8,000–12,000 strong force was organised in four infantry/mechanised regiments supported by some 40 artillery pieces and 75 armoured cars.[95] Until January 1948, it was reinforced by the 3,000-strong Transjordan Frontier Force.[98] As many as 48 British officers served in the Arab Legion.[102] Glubb Pasha, the commander of the Legion, organized his forces into four brigades as follows:

Military Division Commander[103][104] Rank Military Zone of operations
First Brigade, includes: 1st and 3rd regiments Desmond Goldie Colonel Nablus Military Zone
Second Brigade, includes: Fifth and Sixth Regiments Sam Sidney Arthur Cooke Brigadier Support force
Third Brigade, includes: Second and Fourth Regiments Teel Ashton Colonel Ramallah Military Zone
Fourth Brigade Ahmad Sudqi al-Jundi Colonel Support: Ramallah, Hebron, and Ramla

The Arab Legion joined the war in May 1948, but fought only in the areas that King Abdullah wanted to secure for Jordan: the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

The Jordanian forces were probably the best trained of all combatants. Other combatant forces lacked the ability to make strategic decisions and tactical maneuvers,[105] as evidenced by positioning the fourth regiment at Latrun, which was abandoned by other combatants before the arrival of the Jordanian forces. In the later stages of the war, Latrun proved to be of extreme importance, and a decisive factor for Jerusalem's fate.

Iraq's army in 1948, had an of 21,000 men in 12 brigades and the Iraqi Air Force had 100 planes, mostly British. Initially the Iraqis committed around 3,000 men[106] to the war effort, including four infantry brigades, one armoured battalion and support personnel. These forces were to operate under Jordanian guidance[107] During the first truce, the Iraqis increased their force to about 10,000.[108] Ultimately, the Iraqi expeditionary force numbered around 15,000 to 18,000 men.[109] The first Iraqi forces to be deployed reached Jordan in April 1948 under the command of Gen. Nur ad-Din Mahmud.[110]

Egypt's army in 1948, was able to put a maximum of around 40,000 men into the field, 80% of its military-age male population being unfit for military service and its embryonic logistics system being limited in its ability to support ground forces deployed beyond its borders. Initially, an expeditionary force of 10,000 men was sent to Palestine under the command of Maj. Gen. Ahmed Ali al-Mwawi. This force consisted of five infantry battalions, one armoured battalion equipped with British Light Tank Mk VI and Matilda tanks, one battalion of sixteen 25-pounder guns, a battalion of eight 6-pounder guns and one medium-machine-gun battalion with supporting troops.

The Egyptian Air Force had over 30 Spitfires, 4 Hawker Hurricanes and 20 C47s modified into crude bombers.

By the time of the second truce, the Egyptians had 20,000 men in the field in thirteen battalions equipped with 135 tanks and 90 artillery pieces.[111]

Syria had 12,000 soldiers at the beginning of the 1948 War, grouped into three infantry brigades and an armoured force of approximately battalion size. The Syrian Air Force had fifty planes, the 10 newest of which were World War II–generation models.

On 14 May Syria invaded Palestine with the 1st Infantry Brigade supported by a battalion of armoured cars, a company of French R 35 and R 37 tanks, an artillery battalion and other units. On 15–16 May they attacked the Israeli village Tzemah, which they captured, following a renewed offensive, on 18 May. The village was abandoned following the Syrian forces' defeat at the Deganias a few days later. Subsequently, the Syrians scored a victory at Mishmar HaYarden on 10 June, after which they reverted to a defensive posture, conducting only a few minor attacks on small, exposed Israeli settlements.[112]

Lebanon's army was the smallest of the Arab armies, consisting of only 3,500 soldiers.[98] According to Gelber, in June 1947, Ben-Gurion "arrived at an agreement with the Maronite religious leadership in Lebanon that cost a few thousand pounds and kept Lebanon's army out of the War of Independence and the military Arab coalition."[113] According to Rogan and Shlaim, a token force of 1,000 was committed to the invasion. It crossed into the northern Galilee and was repulsed by Israeli forces. Israel then invaded and occupied southern Lebanon until the end of the war.[114]

During the first truce, Sudan sent six companies of regular troops to fight alongside the Egyptians.[115] Yemen also committed a small expeditionary force to the war effort.[116]

British forces in Palestine

There were 100,000 British troops deployed in Palestine "in two ground forces divisions, two independent infantry brigades, two mechanized regiments, some artillery units and a number of RAF squadrons".[101] The peak deployment was in July 1947, when 70,200 British troops were stationed in Palestine, supported by 1,277 civilian drivers and 28,155 civilian employees.[117] The Royal Navy had ships in Palestine tasked with enforcing a blockade of the Palestinian coastline to intercept illegal Jewish immigration.

British forces were gradually withdrawn in 1948. On 13 May 1948, the British blockade of Palestine was lifted.[118] British High Commissioner Alan Cunningham left Palestine on 14 May 1948. After Israeli independence, British forces withdrew into a small enclave in Haifa, at its port, from where they gradually withdrew. In addition, the Royal Air Force station of RAF Ramat David, near Haifa, was maintained to cover the retreat of British forces from Palestine. On 22 May, the Royal Egyptian Air Force attacked RAF Ramat David, mistaking the airfield for one occupied by the Israeli Air Force. Egyptian warplanes mounted a total of three attacks on the airbase, destroying three aircraft and a hangar, damaging some other aircraft, and killing four airmen. By the second attack, the RAF had mounted a standing patrol over the airfield, and five Egyptian Spitfires were shot down – four in aerial combat and one by ground fire. The final RAF forces were withdrawn from Palestine the following day, and RAF Ramat David was handed over to the Israelis.[119][120] The last British forces left Palestine on 30 June 1948.[121]

Course of the war

Last minute efforts to avoid the war

Several Arab leaders, including King Ibn Saud and Azzam Pasha, secretly requested the British to remain on for another year in order to avert catastrophe.[qt 4]

First phase: 15 May – 11 June 1948

On 14 May 1948, the day before the termination of the British Mandate, David Ben-Gurion declared the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz-Israel to be known as the State of Israel, and the British Mandate officially expired at midnight between 14 and 15 May. Following the proclamation, Iraq and the neighboring Arab states Egypt, Jordan (Transjordan) and Syria, invaded the territory of the former British Mandate on the night of 14–15 May 1948.[122][qt 5]

The initial Arab plans called for Syrian and Lebanese forces to invade from north while Jordanian and Iraqi forces were to invade from east in order to meet at Nazareth and then to push forward together to Haifa. In the south, the Egyptians were to advance and take Tel Aviv.[123] Anyway, at Damascus Arab's League meeting on 11–13 May, Abdullah rejected the plan, which served Syrian interest, using the fact his allies were afraid to go to war without his army. Instead, Iraqis should attack Jezreel valley and Arab Legion enter Ramallah and Nablus and link the Egyptian army at Hebron,[123] which was more in compliance with Abdallah's political objective to occupy the territory allocated to the Arab State by the partition plan and promises not to invade the Jewish State. More Lebanon decided not to take part to the war at the last minute due to the still influential Christians' opposition and to Jewish bribes.[56]

A Butterfly Haganah improvised Armored-car at Kibbutz Dorot in the Negev,Israel 1948. The Armored-car is based on CMP-15 truck. The car has brought supply to the Kibbutz. The Negev Kibbutz's children were later evacuated by those cars from their Kibbutz, before an expected Egyptian Army attack

The first mission of the Jewish forces was to hold on against the Arab armies and stop them until reinforcements and weapons arrived. Initially, the fighting was handled by Haganah, Irgun, and Lehi. On 26 May 1948, Israel established the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), incorporating these forces into one military under a central command.

The Egyptian army – the south- central regions

Volunteers evacuating a wounded man during Egyptian bombardment of Tel Aviv.

For the first few weeks of the war, Egyptian warplanes were able to bomb Tel Aviv with almost complete impunity, meeting only ground fire. The Egyptians also attacked rural settlements and airfields, though few casualties were caused.[124] Two Royal Egyptian Air Force (REAF) Spitfires bombed Tel Aviv. One of them was shot down by anti-aircraft fire and its pilot taken prisoner. However, the Egyptians continued their bombing raids over the city, killing about 40 people. Most civilian casualties in Tel Aviv occurred on a 18 May raid against the Tel Aviv Central Bus Station.

The Egyptian force, the largest among the Arab armies, invaded from the south. Its two main columns made its way along the shoreline, through what is today the Gaza Strip and east toward Beersheba.[125][126] To secure their flanks, the Egyptians laid siege to a number of kibbutzim in the Negev, among those Kfar Darom, Nirim and Yad Mordechai.[126] The Egyptians met fierce resistance from the lightly armed defenders of the besieged kibbutzim. They were stalled in their advance and took heavy losses, while losses sustained by the defenders were comparatively light.[126]

Both sides increased their manpower over the following months, but the Israeli advantage grew steadily as a result of the progressive mobilization of Israeli society and the influx of an average of 10,300 immigrants each month.[127]

An Egyptian Spitfire shot down over Tel Aviv.

On 29 May, Israeli forces stopped the Egyptian drive towards Tel Aviv in Operation Pleshet. In the first combat mission performed by Israel's fledgeling air force, four Avia S-199s attacked an Egyptian armored column of 500 vehicles on its way to Ashdod. The Israeli planes dropped 70 kilogram bombs and strafed the column, although their machine guns jammed quickly. Two of the planes crashed, killing a pilot. The attack caused the Egyptians to scatter, and they had lost the initiative by the time they had regrouped. The attack was followed by small-scale Israeli harassment of the Egyptian lines. Givati Brigade forces then launched a counterattack. Although the counterattack was repulsed, the Egyptian offensive was halted as Egypt changed its strategy from offensive to defensive.[128]

On 6 June, in the Battle of Nitzanim, Egyptian forces attacked the kibbutz of Nitzanim and the Israeli defenders surrendered after resisting for five days.

The Jordanian army – Jerusalem and central areas

Jordanian artillery shelling Jerusalem in 1948.

Arab Legion soldier standing in ruins of the most sacred Synagogue, the "Hurva" as the Legion blew it up without reason, Old City.[129]

Jewish residents of Jerusalem fleeing during the Jordanian offensive.

The heaviest fighting occurred in Jerusalem and on the Jerusalem – Tel Aviv road, between Jordan's Arab Legion and Israeli forces.[130] As part of the redeployment to deal with the Egyptian advance, the Israelis abandoned the Latrun fortress overlooking the main highway to Jerusalem, which the Arab Legion immediately seized.[131] The Arab Legion also occupied the Latrun Monastery. From these positions, the Jordanians were able to cut off supplies to Israeli troops and civilians in Jerusalem.[132]

Mathematics professor Michael Fekete, the Provost of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, with his water quota, during the siege of Jerusalem

Though some supplies, mostly munitions, were airdropped into the city, the shortage of food, water, fuel and medicine was acute. King Abdullah ordered Glubb Pasha, the commander of the Arab Legion, to enter Jerusalem on 17 May, and heavy house-to-house fighting occurred between 19 and 28 May, with the Arab Legion eventually succeeding in pushing Israeli forces from the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem as well as the Jewish Quarter of the Old City.[132] The Israeli forces were seriously short of food, water and ammunition.[132] The Arab Legion fired 10,000 artillery and mortar shells a day.[132]

The 1,500 Jewish inhabitants of the Old City's Jewish Quarter were expelled, and several hundred were detained. The Jews had to be escorted out by the Jordanian army to protect them against Palestinian Arab mobs that intended to massacre them.[133] The Arab Legion also attacked West Jerusalem with sniper fire. The Israelis attempted to take the Latrun fortress in a series of battles lasting from 24 May to 18 July. The Arab Legion held Latrun and managed to repulse the attacks.[132] During the attempts to take Latrun, Israeli forces suffered some 586 casualties, among them Mickey Marcus, Israel's first general, who was killed by friendly fire. The Arab Legion also took significant losses, losing 90 dead and some 200 wounded up to 29 May.[134] The Israeli position in Jerusalem was only saved via the opening of the so-called "Burma Road", a makeshift bypass road built by Israeli forces that allowed Israeli supply convoys to pass into Jerusalem.[132]

Parts of the area where the road was built were cleared of Jordanian snipers in May and the road was completed on 14 June. Supplies had already begun passing through before the road was completed, with the first convoy passing through on the night of 1–2 June. The Jordanians spotted the activity and attempted to shell the road, but were ineffective, as it could not be seen. However, Jordanian sharpshooters killed several road workers, and an attack on 9 June left eight Israelis dead. On 18 July, elements of the Harel Brigade took about 10 villages to the south of Latrun to enlarge and secure the area of the Burma Road.

On 22 May, Arab forces attacked kibbutz Ramat Rachel south of Jerusalem. After a fierce battle in which 31 Arabs and 13 Israelis were killed, the defenders of Ramat Rachel withdrew, only to partially retake the kibbutz the following day. Fighting continued until 26 May, until the entire kibbutz was recaptured. Radar Hill was also taken from the Arab Legion, and held until 26 May, when the Jordanians retook it in a battle that left 19 Israelis and 2 Jordanians dead. A total of 23 attempts by the Palmach's Harel Brigade to capture Radar Hill in the war failed.

The same day, Thomas C. Wasson, the US Consul-General in Jerusalem and a member of the UN Truce Commission was shot dead in West Jerusalem. It was disputed whether Wasson was killed by the Arabs or Israelis.

The Arab Legion was able to repel an Israeli attack on Latrun. . The Jordanians launched two counterattacks, temporarily taking Beit Susin before being forced back, and capturing Gezer after a fierce battle.[135]

The Iraqi army – the northern and central region

Israeli soldiers in Afula.

An Iraqi force consisting of two infantry and one armoured brigade crossed the Jordan River from northern Jordan, attacking the Israeli settlement of Gesher with little success. Following this defeat, Iraqi forces moved into the strategic triangle bounded by the Arab towns Nablus, Jenin and Tulkarm. On 25 May, they were making their way towards Netanya, when they were stopped.[136] On 29 May, an Israeli attack against the Iraqis led to three days of heavy fighting over Jenin, but Iraqi forces managed to hold their positions.[136] After these battles, the Iraqi forces became stationary and their involvement in the war effectively ended.[110][136]

Iraqi forces failed in their attacks on Israeli settlements with the most notable battle taking place at Gesher, and instead took defensive positions around Jenin, Nablus, and Tulkarm, from where they could put pressure on the Israeli center.[135][137] On 25 May, Iraqi forces advanced from Tulkarm, taking Geulim and reaching Kfar Yona and Ein Vered on the Tulkarm-Netanya road. The Alexandroni Brigade then stopped the Iraqi advance and retook Geulim. On 1 June, the Carmeli and Golani Brigades captured Jenin from Iraqi forces. They were pushed out by an Iraqi counterattack, and lost 34 dead and 100 wounded.

The Syrian and Lebanese armies – the northern region

Syrian R-35 light tank destroyed at Degania Alef.

Syrian forces advanced into Galilee on 15 May, but were bogged down by resistance from numerous kibbutzim. The Syrians were forced to besiege the kibbutzim rather than advance.[136] Throughout the Galilee, numerous isolated Israeli settlement outposts were exposed to Arab attack on all sides, and had to rely on their own armories for defense.[138]

On 6 June, a Syrian-Lebanese-Arab Liberation Army force retook Malkiya.[136] That was the only intervention of the Lebanese army in that war.

On 21 May, the Syrian army was stopped at kibbutz Degania Alef in the north, where local militia reinforced by elements of the Carmeli Brigade halted Syrian armored forces with Molotov cocktails, hand grenades and a single PIAT. One tank that was disabled by Molotov cocktails and hand grenades still remains at the kibbutz. The remaining Syrian forces were driven off the next day with four Napoleonchik mountain guns—Israel's first use of artillery during the war.[139]

On 6 June, nearly two brigades of the Arab Liberation Army and the Lebanese Army took Malkiya and Kadesh.

On 6 June, Syrian forces attacked Mishmar HaYarden, but were repulsed. On 10 June, the Syrians overran Mishmar HaYarden and advanced to the main road, where they were stopped by units of the Oded Brigade.[135]

Palestinian forces

In the continuity of the civil war, fighting took place between Israeli forces and Palestinian Arab militias particularly in the Lydda, al-Ramla and Jerusalem areas. On 23 May, the Alexandroni Brigade captured Tantura, south of Haifa, from Arab forces. On 2 June, Holy War Army commander Hasan Salama was killed in a battle with Haganah at Ras al-Ein.

Air battles

All Jewish aviation assets were placed under the control of the Sherut Avir (Air Service, known as the SA) in November 1947 and flying operations began in the following month from a small civil airport on the outskirts of Tel Aviv called Sde Dov, with the first ground support operation (in an RWD-13)[140] taking place on 17 December. The Galilee Squadron was formed at Yavne'el in March 1948, and the Negev Squadron was formed at Nir-Am in April. By 10 May, when the SA suffered its first combat loss, there were three flying units, an air staff, maintenance facilities and logistics support. At the outbreak of the war on 15 May, the SA became the Israeli Air Force. With its fleet[141] of light planes it was no match for Arab forces during the first few weeks of the war with their T-6s, Spitfires, C-47s, and Avro Ansons. In the first few weeks of the war, the Israelis' light airplanes bombed Arab encampments and columns. The raids were usually carried out at night to avoid interception. These raids usually had little effect, except on morale.

Avia S-199 Israeli 1st fighter aircraft

During this time, the balance of air power began to swing in favor of the Israeli Air Force following the purchase of 25 Avia S-199s from Czechoslovakia, the first of which arrived in Israel on 20 May. Ironically, Israel was using inferior derivatives of the Bf-109 designed in Nazi Germany to counter British-designed Spitfires flown by Egypt.

On 3 June, Israel scored its first victory in aerial combat when pilot Modi Alon shot down a pair of Egyptian bombers over Tel Aviv. From then on, the Israeli Air Force began engaging the Arabs in air-to-air combat. By the fall of 1948, the IAF had achieved air superiority and had superior firepower and more knowledgeable personnel, many of whom had seen action in World War II.[142] Israeli planes then began intercepting and engaging Arab aircraft on bombing missions, and Arab air raids gradually fell.

Following Israeli air attacks on Egyptian and Iraqi columns, the Egyptians repeatedly bombed Ekron Airfield, where IAF fighters were based. During a 30 May raid, bombs aimed for Ekron hit central Rehovot, killing 7 civilians and wounding 30. In response to this, and probably to the Jordanian victories at Latrun, Israel began bombing targets in Arab cities. On the night of 31 May/1 June, the first Israeli raid on an Arab capital took place when three IAF planes bombed Amman, hitting the King's Palace and an adjacent British airbase, killing around a dozen people and damaging a number of British planes. Israel did not bomb Amman again, as the British had threatened to attack Israeli airfields and planes. Israel also bombed Arish, Gaza, Damascus, and Cairo. Israeli B-17 bombers coming to Israel from Czechoslovakia bombed Egypt on their way to Israel.[143][144] According to Alan Dershowitz, Israeli planes focused on bombing military targets in these attacks, though Benny Morris wrote that an 11 June air raid on Damascus was indiscriminate.

Sea battles

At the outset of the war, the Israeli Navy consisted of four former Aliyah Bet ships that had been seized by the British and impounded in Haifa harbor. These ships were refurbished by a newly formed naval repair facility with the assistance of two private shipbuilding and repair companies. In October 1948, a submarine chaser was purchased from the United States. The five warships were manned by former merchant seamen, former crewmembers of Aliyah Bet ships, Israelis who had served in the Royal Navy during World War II, and foreign volunteers. The newly refurbished and crewed warships served on coastal patrol duties and bombarded Egyptian coastal installations in and around the Gaza area all the way to Port Said.[145]

End of the first phase

Throughout the following days, the Arabs were only able to make limited gains due to fierce Israeli resistance, and were quickly driven off their new holdings by Israeli counterattacks.

As the war progressed, the IDF managed to field more troops than the Arab forces. In July 1948, the IDF had 63,000 troops; by early spring 1949, they had 115,000. The Arab armies had an estimated 40,000 troops in July 1948, rising to 55,000 in October 1948, and slightly more by the spring of 1949.

First truce: 11 June – 8 July 1948

The UN declared a truce on 29 May, which came into effect on 11 June and lasted 28 days. The truce was designed to last 28 days and an arms embargo was declared with the intention that neither side would make any gains from the truce. Neither side respected the truce; both found ways around the restrictions placed on them.[146] Both the Israelis and the Arabs used this time to improve their positions, a direct violation of the terms of the ceasefire.[147]

At the time of the truce, the British view was that "the Jews are too weak in armament to achieve spectacular success".[146] As the truce commenced, a British officer stationed in Haifa stated that the four-week-long truce "would certainly be exploited by the Jews to continue military training and reorganization while the Arabs would waste [them] feuding over the future divisions of the spoils".[147] During the truce, the Israelis sought to bolster their forces by massive import of arms.[146] The IDF was able to acquire weapons from Czechoslovakia as well as improve training of forces and reorganization of the army during this time.

Israeli Forces 1948[148]
Initial strength 29,677
4 June 40,825
17 July 63,586
7 October 88,033
28 October 92,275
2 December 106,900
23 December 107,652
30 December 108,300

Yitzhak Rabin, an IDF commander at the time of the war and later Israel's fifth Prime Minister, stated "[w]ithout the arms from Czechoslovakia... it is very doubtful whether we would have been able to conduct the war".[149]

The Israeli army increased its manpower from approximately 30,000–35,000 men to almost 65,000 during the truce. It was also able to increase its arms supply to more than 25,000 rifles, 5,000 machine guns, and fifty million bullets.[147] As well as violating the arms and personnel embargo, they also sent fresh units to the front lines like the Arabs.[147]

Altalena burning near Tel Aviv beach

During the truce, Irgun attempted to bring in a private arms shipment aboard a ship called "Altalena". When they refused to hand the arms to the Israeli government, Ben-Gurion ordered that the ship be sunk. Several Irgun members were killed in the fighting.

On 8 July, the day before the expiration of the truce, Egyptian forces under General Muhammad Naguib renewed the war by attacking Negba.[150] The following day, Israeli forces launched a simultaneous offensive on all three fronts. The fighting continued for ten days until the UN Security Council issued the Second Truce on 18 July.[147] During the fighting, the Israelis were able to open a lifeline to a number of besieged kibbutzim.[146]

UN mediator Bernadotte

UN Palestine mediator, Folke Bernadotte, assassinated in September 1948 by the militant group Lehi.

The ceasefire was overseen by UN mediator Folke Bernadotte and a team of UN Observers made up of army officers from Belgium, United States, Sweden and France.[151] Bernadotte was voted in by the General Assembly to "assure the safety of the holy places, to safeguard the well being of the population, and to promote 'a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine'".[147]

After the truce was in place, Bernadotte began to address the issue of achieving a political settlement. The main obstacles in his opinion were "the Arab world's continued rejection of the existence of a Jewish state, whatever its borders; Israel's new 'philosophy', based on its increasing military strength, of ignoring the partition boundaries and conquering what additional territory it could; and the emerging Palestinian Arab refugee problem".[147]

Taking all the issues into account, Bernadotte presented a new partition plan. He proposed there be a Palestinian Arab state alongside Israel and that a "Union" "be established between the two sovereign states of Israel and Jordan (which now included the West Bank); that the Negev, or part of it, be included in the Arab state and that Western Galilee, or part of it, be included in Israel; that the whole of Jerusalem be part of the Arab state, with the Jewish areas enjoying municipal autonomy and that Lydda Airport and Haifa be 'free ports'—presumably free of Israeli or Arab sovereignty".[147] Israel rejected the proposal, in particular the aspect of losing control of Jerusalem, but they did agree to extend the truce for another month. The Arabs rejected both the extension of the truce and the proposal.[147]

Second phase: 8–18 July 1948

An Egyptian artillery piece captured by battalion 53 of the Givati Brigade.

Israeli soldiers in Lod (Lydda) or Ramle.

On 10 July, Glubb Pasha ordered the defending Arab Legion troops to "make arrangements...for a phony war".[152] The fighting that followed was dominated by large-scale Israeli offensives and a defensive posture from the Arab side. Operation Danny was the most important Israeli offensive, aimed at securing and enlarging the corridor between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv by capturing the roadside cities Lod (Lydda) and Ramle.

In a second planned stage of the operation the fortified positions of Latrun—overlooking the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway—and the city of Ramallah were also to be captured. Hadita, near Latrun, was captured by the Israelis at a cost of 9 dead.

The second plan was Operation Dekel, which was aimed at capturing the lower Galilee including Nazareth. The third plan, to which fewer resources were allocated, Operation Kedem, was to secure the Old City of Jerusalem, but failed.[153] To the north, Operation Brosh was launched in a failed attempt to dislodge Syrian forces from the Eastern Galilee and the Benot Yaakov Bridge. During the operation, 200 Syrians and 100 Israelis were killed. The Israeli Air Force also bombed Damascus for the first time.

In the south, the IDF carried out several offensives, including Operation An-Far and Operation Death to the Invader. The task of the 11th Brigades's Ist Battalian on the southern flank was to capture villages, and its operation ran smoothly, with but little resistance from local irregulars. According to Amnon Neumann, a Palmach veteran of the Southern front, hardly any Arab villages in the south fought back, due to the miserable poverty of their means and lack of weapons, and suffered expulsion.[154] What slight resistance was offered was quelled by an artillery barrage, followed by a the storming of the village, whose residents were expelled and houses destroyed.[155] On 12 July, the Egyptians launched an offensive action, and again attacked Negba, which they had previously failed to capture, using three infantry battalions, an armored battalion, and an artillery regiment. In the battle that followed, the Egyptians were repulsed, suffering 200–300 casualties, while the Israelis lost 5 dead and 16 wounded.[156]

After failing to take Negba, the Egyptians turned their attention to more isolated settlements and positions. On 14 July, an Egyptian attack on Gal On was driven off by a minefield and by resistance from Gal On's residents.[157] The Egyptians then assaulted the lightly defended village of Be'erot Yitzhak. The Egyptians managed to penetrate the village perimeter, but the defenders concentrated in an inner position in the village and fought off the Egyptian advance until IDF reinforcements arrived and drove out the attackers. The Egyptians suffered an estimated 200 casualties, while the Israelis had 17 dead and 15 wounded. The battle was one of Egypt's last offensive actions during the war, and the Egyptians did not attack any Israeli villages following this battle.

Operation Danny

Israeli armored vehicles in Lydda airport after the town's capture by Israeli forces.

Arab forces surrender to the victorious Israelis in Ramla.

The objectives of Operation Danny were to capture territory east of Tel Aviv and then to push inland and relieve the Jewish population and forces in Jerusalem. Lydda had become an important military center in the region, lending support to Arab military activities elsewhere, and Ramle was one of the main obstacles blocking Jewish transportation. Lydda was defended by a local militia of around 1,000 residents, with an Arab Legion contingent of 125–300.[158]

The IDF forces gathered to attack the city numbered around 8,000. It was the first operation where several brigades were involved. The city was attacked from the north via Majdal al-Sadiq and al-Muzayri'a, and from the east via Khulda, al-Qubab, Jimzu and Daniyal. Bombers were also used for the first time in the conflict to bombard the city. The IDF captured the city on 11 July.[146]

Up to 450 Arabs and 9–10 Israeli soldiers were killed. The next day, Ramle fell.[146] The civilian populations of Lydda and Ramle fled or were expelled to the Arab front lines, and following resistance in Lydda, the population there was expelled without provision of transport vehicles; some of the evictees died on the long walk under the hot July sun.[159]

On 15–16 July, an attack on Latrun took place but did not manage to occupy the fort.[146] A desperate second attempt occurred on 18 July by units from the Yiftach Brigade equipped with armored vehicles, including two Cromwell tanks, but that attack also failed. Despite the second truce, which began on 18 July, the Israeli efforts to conquer Latrun continued until 20 July.

Operation Dekel

While Operation Danny proceeded in the centre, Operation Dekel was carried out in the north. Nazareth was captured on 16 July, and by the time the second truce took effect at 19:00 18 July, the whole lower Galilee from Haifa Bay to the Sea of Galilee was captured by Israel.

Operation Kedem

Originally Operation Kedem was to begin on 8 July, immediately after the first truce, by Irgun and Lehi forces. However, it was delayed by David Shaltiel, possibly because he did not trust their ability after their failure to capture Deir Yassin without Haganah assistance.

Irgun forces commanded by Yehuda Lapidot were to break through at the New Gate, Lehi was to break through the wall stretching from the New Gate to the Jaffa Gate, and the Beit Horon Battalion was to strike from Mount Zion.

The battle was planned to begin on the Sabbath, at 20:00 on 16 July, two days before the second ceasefire of the war. The plan went wrong from the beginning and was postponed first to 23:00 and then to midnight. It was not until 02:30 that the battle actually began. The Irgun managed to break through at the New Gate, but the other forces failed in their missions. At 05:45 on 17 July, Shaltiel ordered a retreat and to cease hostilities.

On 14 July 1948, Irgun occupied the Arab village of Malha after a fierce battle. Several hours later, the Arabs launched a counterattack, but Israeli reinforcements arrived, and the village was retaken at a cost of 17 dead.

Second truce: 18 July – 15 October 1948

At 19:00 on 18 July, the second truce of the conflict went into effect after intense diplomatic efforts by the UN.

On 16 September, Count Folke Bernadotte proposed a new partition for Palestine in which the Negev would be divided between Jordan and Egypt, and Jordan would annex Lydda and Ramla. There would be a Jewish state in the whole of Galilee, with the frontier running from Faluja northeast towards Ramla and Lydda. Jerusalem would be internationalized, with municipal autonomy for the city's Jewish and Arab inhabitants, the Port of Haifa would be a free port, and Lydda Airport would be a free airport. All Palestinian refugees would be granted the right of return, and those who chose not to return would be compensated for lost property. The UN would control and regulate Jewish immigration.[160]

The plan was once again rejected by both sides. On the next day, 17 September, Bernadotte was assassinated in Jerusalem by the militant Zionist group Lehi. A four-man team ambushed Bernadotte's motorcade in Jerusalem, killing him and a French UN observer sitting next to him. Lehi saw Bernadotte as a British and Arab puppet, and thus a serious threat to the emerging State of Israel, and feared that the provisional Israeli government would accept the plan, which it considered disastrous. Unbeknownst to Lehi, the government had already decided to reject it and resume combat in a month. Bernadotte's deputy, American Ralph Bunche, replaced him.[161][162][163][164]

On 22 September 1948, the Knesset passed the Area of Jurisdiction and Powers Ordnance, 5708-1948. The law officially added to Israel's size by annexing all land it had captured since the war began. It also declared that from then on, any part of Palestine captured by the Israeli army would automatically become part of Israel.[165]

Operation Shoter

The Arabs had blocked Israeli traffic along the Tel Aviv-Haifa highway. Assaults on 18 June and 8 July failed due to poor planning and stiff resistance by Arab militia in superior positions.

Operation Shoter was launched a week after the truce came into effect against an area known as the "Little Triangle" south of Haifa, with the aim of taking the final Arab pocket on the Tel Aviv-Haifa road. The Arabs had blocked the road to Israeli traffic along the highway, and poorly planned assaults on 18 June and 8 July had failed to dislodge Arab militia from their superior positions. The operation was launched on 24 July, in response to the killings of two Israeli civilians.

Israeli assaults on 24 and 25 July were beaten back by stiff resistance. The Israelis then broke the Arab defenses with an infantry and armour assault backed by heavy artillery shelling and aerial bombing. Three Arab villages surrendered, and Israeli soldiers and aircraft struck at one of the Arab retreat routes, killing 60 Arab soldiers.

The Arabs claimed that the Israelis had massacred Arab civilians, but the Israelis rejected the claims. A United Nations investigation found no evidence of a massacre. Following the operation, the Tel Aviv-Haifa road was open to Israeli military and civilian traffic, and Arab roadblocks along the route were removed. Traffic along the Haifa-Hadera coastal railway was also restored.

Third phase: 15 October 1948 – 10 March 1949

Israeli operations

Israel launched a series of military operations to drive out the Arab armies and secure the borders of Israel. However, invading the West Bank might have brought into the borders of the expanding State of Israel a massive Arab population it could not absorb. The Negev desert was an empty space for expansion, so the main war effort shifted to Negev from early October.[166]

The northern region

An Israeli mortar team outside Safsaf in October 1948.

Israeli soldiers attack Sasa as part of Operation Hiram, October 1948.

On 22 October, the third truce went into effect.[167] Irregular Arab forces refused to recognize the truce, and continued to harass Israeli forces and settlements in the north. On the same day that the truce came into effect, the Arab Liberation Army violated the truce by attacking Manara, capturing the strongpoint of Sheikh Abed, repulsing counterattacks by local Israeli units, and ambushed Israeli forces attempting to relieve Manara. The IDF's Carmeli Brigade lost 33 dead and 40 wounded.[168] Manara and Misgav Am were totally cut off, and Israel's protests at the UN failed to change the situation.

On 24 October, the IDF launched Operation Hiram and captured the entire upper Galilee, driving the ALA and Lebanese Army back to Lebanon, and successfully ambushing and destroying an entire Syrian battalion.[169] The Israeli force of four infantry brigades was commanded by Moshe Carmel.[169] The entire operation lasted just 60 hours, during which numerous villages were captured, often after locals or Arab forces put up resistance.[169] Arab losses were estimated at 400 dead and 550 taken prisoner, with low Israeli casualties.[169]

Some prisoners were reportedly executed by the Israeli forces. An estimated 50,000 Palestinian refugees fled into Lebanon, some of them fleeing ahead of the advancing forces, and some expelled from villages which had resisted, while the Arab inhabitants of those villages which had remained at peace were allowed to remain and became Israeli citizens. The villagers of Iqrit and Birim were persuaded to leave their homes by Israeli authorities, who promised them that they would be allowed to return. Israel eventually decided not to allow them to return, and offered them financial compensation, which they refused to accept.[170]

At the end of the month, the IDF had captured the whole Galilee, driven all Lebanese forces out of Israel, and had advanced 5 miles (8.0 km) into Lebanon to the Litani River,[171] occupying thirteen Lebanese villages. In the village of Hula, two Israeli officers killed between 35 and 58 prisoners as retaliation for the Haifa Oil Refinery massacre. Both officers were later put on trial for their actions.

The southern regions – The Egyptian army

Israeli troops occupying abandoned Egyptian trenches at Huleiqat, October 1948.

IDF forces in Beersheba during Operation Yoav.

IDF forces near Beit Natif (near Hebron) after it was occupied. Oct 1948.

On 15 October, the IDF launched Operation Yoav in the northern Negev.[146] Its goal was to drive a wedge between the Egyptian forces along the coast and the Beersheba-Hebron-Jerusalem road and ultimately to conquer the whole Negev.[146] This was a special concern on the Israeli part because of a British diplomatic campaign to have the entire Negev handed over to Egypt and Jordan, and which thus made Ben-Gurion anxious to have Israeli forces in control of the Negev as soon as possible.[146]

Operation Yoav was headed by the Southern Front commander Yigal Allon. Committed to Yoav were three infantry and one armoured brigades, who were given the task of breaking through the Egyptian lines.[169] The Egyptian positions were badly weakened by the lack of a defense in depth, which meant that once the IDF had broken through the Egyptian lines, there was little to stop them.[169] The operation was a huge success, shattering the Egyptian ranks and forcing the Egyptian Army from the northern Negev, Beersheba and Ashdod.[169]

In the so-called "Faluja Pocket", an encircled Egyptian force was able to hold out for four months until the 1949 Armistice Agreements, when the village was peacefully transferred to Israel and the Egyptian troops left.[169] Four warships of the Israeli Navy provided support by bombarding Egyptian shore installations in the Ashkelon area, and preventing the Egyptian Navy from evacuation retreating Egyptian troops by sea.[145]

On 19 October, a naval battle took place near Majdal (now Ashkelon), with three Israeli corvettes facing an Egyptian corvette with air support. An Israeli sailor was killed and four wounded, and two of the ships were damaged. One Egyptian plane was shot down, but the corvette escaped. Israeli naval vessels also shelled Majdal on 17 October, and Gaza on 21 October, with air support from the Israeli Air Force. The same day, the IDF captured Beersheba, and took 120 Egyptian soldiers prisoner. On 22 October, Israeli naval commandos using explosive boats sank the Egyptian flagship Emir Farouk, and damaged an Egyptian minesweeper.[169]

On 9 November 1948, the IDF launched Operation Shmone to capture the Tegart fort in the village of Iraq Suwaydan. The fort's Egyptian defenders had previously repulsed eight attempts to take it, including two during Operation Yoav. Israeli forces bombarded the fort before an assault. After breaching the outlying fences without resistance, the Israelis blew a hole in the fort's outer wall, prompting the 180 Egyptian soldiers manning the fort to surrender without a fight. The defeat prompted the Egyptians to evacuate several nearby positions, including hills the IDF had failed to take by force. Meanwhile, IDF forces were met with stiff resistance in Iraq Suwaydan itself, losing 6 dead and 14 wounded.

From 5 to 7 December, the IDF conducted Operation Assaf to take control of the Western Negev. The main assaults were spearheaded by mechanized forces, while Golani Brigade infantry covered the rear. An Egyptian counterattack was repulsed. The Egyptians planned another counterattack, but it failed after Israeli aerial reconnaissance revealed Egyptian preparations, and the Israelis launched a preemptive strike. About 100 Egyptians were killed, and 5 tanks were destroyed, with the Israelis losing 5 killed and 30 wounded.[135]

On 22 December, the IDF drove the remaining Egyptian forces out of Israel with Operation Horev (also called Operation Ayin).[169] The goal of the operation was to secure the entire Negev from Egyptian presence, destroying the Egyptian threat on Israel's southern communities and forcing the Egyptians into a ceasefire. During five days of fighting, the Israelis expelled the Egyptians from the Negev.[169]

Israeli forces subsequently launched raids into the Nitzana area, and entered the Sinai Peninsula on 28 December. The IDF captured Umm Katef and Abu Ageila, and advanced north towards Al Arish, with the goal of encircling the entire Egyptian expeditionary force. Israeli forces pulled out of the Sinai on 2 January 1949 following joint British-American pressure and a British threat of military action. IDF forces regrouped at the border with the Gaza Strip. Israeli forces attacked Rafah the following day, and after several days of fighting, Egyptian forces in the Gaza Strip were surrounded. The Egyptians agreed to negotiate a ceasefire on 7 January, and the IDF subsequently pulled out of Gaza.[169]

On 28 December, the Alexandroni Brigade failed to take the Falluja Pocket, but managed to seize Iraq el-Manshiyeh and temporarily hold it. The Egyptians counterattacked, but were mistaken for a friendly force and allowed to advance, trapping a large number of men. The Israelis lost 87 soldiers.[135]

On 5 March, Operation Uvda was launched following nearly a month of reconnaissance, with the goal of securing the southern Negev from Jordan. The IDF entered and secured the territory, but did not meet significant resistance along the way, as the area was already designated to be part of the Jewish state in the UN Partition Plan, and the operation meant to establish Israeli sovereignty over the territory rather than actually conquer it. The Golani, Negev, and Alexandroni brigades participated in the operation, together with some smaller units and with naval support.[135]

On 10 March, Israeli forces reached the southern tip of Palestine: Umm Rashrash on the Red Sea (where Eilat was built later) and took it without a battle. Israeli soldiers raised a hand-made Israeli flag ("The Ink Flag") at 16:00 hours on 10 March, claiming Umm Rashrash for Israel. The raising of the Ink Flag is considered to be the end of the war.[135]

Anglo-Israeli air clashes

The funeral of a Royal Air Force pilot killed during a clash with the Israeli Air Force.

As the fighting progressed and Israel mounted an incursion into the Sinai, the Royal Air Force began conducting almost daily reconnaissance missions over Israel and the Sinai. RAF reconnaissance aircraft took off from Egyptian airbases and sometimes flew alongside Royal Egyptian Air Force planes. High-flying British aircraft frequently flew over Haifa and Ramat David Airbase, and became known to the Israelis as the "shuftykeit."[172]

On 20 November 1948, an unarmed RAF photo-reconnaissance De Havilland Mosquito of No. 13 Squadron RAF was shot down by an Israeli Air Force P-51 Mustang flown by American volunteer Wayne Peake as it flew over the Galilee towards Hatzor Airbase. Peake opened fire with his cannons, causing a fire to break out in the port engine. The aircraft turned to sea and lowered its altitude, then exploded and crashed off Ashdod. Both of the crew were killed.[172][173]

Just before noon on 7 January 1949, four Spitfire FR18s from No. 208 Squadron RAF on a reconnaissance mission in the Deir al-Balah area flew over an Israeli convoy that had been attacked by five Egyptian Spitfires fifteen minutes earlier. The pilots had spotted smoking vehicles, and were drawn to the scene out of curiosity. Two planes dived to below 500 feet altitude to take pictures of the convoy, while the remaining two covered them from 1,500 feet.[172][174]

Israeli soldiers on the ground, alerted by the sound of the approaching Spitfires and fearing another Egyptian air attack, opened fire with machine guns. One Spitfire was shot down by a tank-mounted machine gun, while the other was lightly damaged and rapidly pulled up. The remaining three Spitfires were then attacked by patrolling IAF Spitfires flown by Slick Goodlin and John McElroy, volunteers from the United States and Canada respectively. All three Spitfires were shot down, and one pilot was killed.[172][174]

Two pilots were captured by Israeli soldiers and taken to Tel Aviv for interrogation, and were later released. Another was rescued by Bedouins and handed over to the Egyptian Army, which turned him over to the RAF. Later that day, four RAF Spitfires from the same squadron escorted by seven No. 213 Squadron RAF and eight No. 6 Squadron RAF Hawker Tempests went searching for the lost planes, and were attacked by four IAF Spitfires. The Israeli formation was led by Ezer Weizman. The remaining three were manned by Weizman's wingman Alex Jacobs and American volunteers Bill Schroeder and Caesar Dangott.[172][174]

The Tempests found they could not jettison their external fuel tanks, and some had non-operational guns. Schroeder shot down a British Tempest, killing pilot David Tattersfield, and Weizmann severely damaged a British plane flown by Douglas Liquorish. Weizmann's plane and two other British aircraft also suffered light damage during the engagement. The battle ended after the British wiggled their wings to be more clearly identified, and the Israelis eventually realized the danger of their situation and disengaged, returning to Hatzor Airbase.[172][174]

Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion personally ordered the wrecks of the RAF fighters that had been shot down to be dragged into Israeli territory. Israeli troops subsequently visited the crash sites, removed various parts, and buried the other aircraft. However, the Israelis did not manage to conceal the wrecks in time to prevent British reconnaissance planes from photographing them. An RAF salvage team was deployed to recover the wrecks, entering Israeli territory during their search. Two were discovered inside Egypt, while Tattersfield's Tempest was found north of Nirim, four miles inside Israel. Interviews with local Arabs confirmed that the Israelis had visited the crash sites to remove and bury the wrecks. Tattersfield was initially buried near the wreckage, but his body was later removed and reburied at the British War Cemetery in Ramla.[172][175]

In response, the RAF readied all Tempests and Spitfires to attack any IAF aircraft they encountered and bomb IAF airfields. British troops in the Middle East were placed on high alert with all leave cancelled, and British citizens were advised to leave Israel. The Royal Navy was also placed on high alert. At Hatzor Airbase, the general consensus among pilots, most of whom had flown with or alongside the RAF during World War II, was that the RAF would not allow the loss of five aircraft and two pilots to go without retaliation, and would probably attack the base at dawn the next day.[172][176]

That night, in anticipation of an impending British attack, some pilots decided not to offer any resistance and left the base, while others prepared their Spitfires and were strapped into the cockpits at dawn, preparing to repel a retaliatory airstrike. However, British commanders refused to authorize any retaliation. The day following the incident, British pilots were issued a directive to regard any Israeli aircraft infiltrating Egyptian or Jordanian airspace as hostile and to shoot them down, but were also ordered to avoid activity close to Israel's borders.[172][176]

UN Resolution 194

In December 1948, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 194. It called to establish a UN Conciliation Commission to facilitate peace between Israel and Arab states. However, many of the resolution's articles were not fulfilled, since these were opposed by Israel, rejected by the Arab states, or were overshadowed by war as the 1948 conflict continued.


Largely leftover World War II era weapons were used by both sides. Egypt had some British equipment; the Syrian army had some French. German, Czechoslovak and British equipment was used by Israel.[177]

Type Arab armies IDF
Tanks Matilda tanks, R-39s, FT-17s, R35s, Panzer IVs (dug in and used as stationary gun emplacements by Egypt), Fiat M13/40, Sherman M4, M-22, Vickers MK-6. Cromwell tanks, H39s, Sherman M4
APCs/IFVs British World War II era trucks, Humber Mk III & IV, Automitrailleuses Dodge/Bich type, improvised armored cars/trucks, Marmon-Herrington Armoured Cars, Universal Carriers, Lloyd Towing Carriers British World War II era trucks, improvised armored cars/trucks, White M3A1 Scout Cars, Daimler Armoured Cars, M3 Half-tracks, IHC M14 Half-tracks, M5 Half-tracks
Artillery Mortars, 15 cm sIG33 auf Pz IIs, 25 mm anti-tank guns on Bren carriers, improvised self-propelled guns used by Syrians in 1948–49, 65 mm mountain guns on Lorraine 38L chenillettes, 2-pounder anti-tank guns, 6-pounder anti-tank guns Mortars, 2-inch (51 mm) British mortars, 65 mm French howitzers (Napoleonchiks), 120 mm French mortars, Davidka mortars
Aircraft Spitfires, T-6 Texans, C-47 Dakotas, Hawker Hurricanes, Avro Ansons Spitfires, Avia S-199s, B-17 Flying Fortresses, P-51 Mustangs, C-47 Dakotas
Small Arms Lee Enfield rifles, Bren Guns, Sten guns, MAS 36s Sten guns, Mills grenades, Karabiner 98k (Czech copies), Bren Guns, MG-34 Machine guns, Thompson submachine guns, Lee Enfield rifles, Molotov cocktails, PIAT anti-tank infantry weapon


1949 Armistice Agreements

Map comparing the borders of the 1947 partition plan and the Armistice Demarcation Lines of 1949.

Boundaries defined in the 1947 UN Partition Plan for Palestine:

  Area assigned for a Jewish state;
    Area assigned for an Arab state;
    Planned Corpus separatum with the intention that Jerusalem would be neither Jewish nor Arab

Armistice Demarcation Lines of 1949:

      Israeli controlled territory from 1949;
    Arab controlled territory until 1967

In 1949, Israel signed separate armistices with Egypt on 24 February, Lebanon on 23 March, Jordan on 3 April, and Syria on 20 July. The Armistice Demarcation Lines, as set by the agreements, saw the territory under Israeli control encompassing approximately three-quarters of the prior British administered Mandate as it stood after Transjordan's independence in 1946. Israel occupied territories of about one-third more than was allocated to the Jewish State under the UN partition proposal.[qt 6] After the armistices, Israel had control over 78% of the territory comprising former Mandatory Palestine[178][179] or some 8,000 square miles (21,000 km2), including the entire Galilee and Jezreel Valley in the north, whole Negev in south, West Jerusalem and the coastal plain in the center.

The armistice lines were known afterwards as the "Green Line". The Gaza Strip and the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) were occupied by Egypt and Jordan respectively. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and Mixed Armistice Commissions were set up to monitor ceasefires, supervise the armistice agreements, to prevent isolated incidents from escalating, and assist other UN peacekeeping operations in the region.


Israel lost 6,373 of its people, about 1% of its population at the time, in the war. About 4,000 were soldiers and the rest were civilians.[180] Around 2,000 were Holocaust survivors.[181]

The exact number of Arab casualties is unknown. One estimate places the Arab death toll at 7,000, including 3,000 Palestinians, 2,000 Egyptians, 1,000 Jordanians, and 1,000 Syrians.[88] In 1958 the Palestinian historian Arif al-Arif calculated that the Arab armies' combined losses amounted to 3,700, with Egypt losing 961 regular and 200 irregular soldiers, and Jordan losing 362 regulars and 200 irregulars. The Palestinians suffered double the Jewish losses, with 13,000 dead, 1,953 of whom are known to have died in combat situations. Of the remainder, 4,004 remain nameless but the place, tally and date of their death is known, and a further 7,043, for whom only the place of death is known, not their identities nor the date of their death. According to Henry Laurens, the largest part of Palestinian casualties consisted of non-combatants and corresponds to the successful operations of the Israelis.[182]

Demographic outcome

Palestinian Arabs

During the 1947-1948 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine and the 1948 Arab–Israeli War that followed, around 750,000 Palestinian Arabs fled or were expelled from their homes, out of approximately 1,200,000 Arabs living in former Mandatory Palestine. In 1951, the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine estimated that the number of Palestinian refugees displaced from Israel was 711,000.[183]

This number did not include displaced Palestinians inside Israeli-held territory. More than 400 Arab villages, and about ten Jewish villages and neighbourhoods, were depopulated during the Arab-Israeli conflict, most of them during 1948. According to estimate based on earlier census, the total moslim population in Palestine was 1,143,336 in 1947.[184] The causes of the 1948 Palestinian exodus are a controversial topic among historians.[185] After the war, around 156,000 Arabs remained in Israel and became Israeli citizens.[186]

Displaced Palestinian Arabs, known as Palestinian refugees, were settled in Palestinian refugee camps throughout the Arab world. The United Nations established UNRWA as a relief and human development agency tasked with providing humanitarian assistance to Palestinian refugees. Arab nations refused to absorb Palestinian refugees, instead keeping them in refugee camps while insisting that they be allowed to return.[187][188]

Refugee status was also passed on to their descendants, who were also largely denied citizenship in Arab states. The descendants of refugees are also denied citizenship in their host countries. The Arab League instructed its members to deny Palestinians citizenship "to avoid dissolution of their identity and protect their right of return to their homeland." More than 1.4 million Palestinians still live in 58 recognized refugee camps,[187][188] while more than 5 million Palestinians live outside Israel and the Palestinian Territories.

The Palestinian refugee problem and debate about the right of return are also major issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Palestinian Arabs and their supporters have staged annual demonstrations and commemorations on 15 May of each year, which is known to them as "Nakba Day". The popularity and number of participants in these annual al Nakba demonstrations has varied over time. During the Second Intifada after the failure of the Camp David 2000 Summit, the attendance at the demonstrations against Israel increased.


During the 1948 War, around 10,000 Jews were forced to evacuate their homes from Arab dominated parts of former Mandatory Palestine.[189] But in the three years following the war, 700,000 Jews settled in Israel, mainly along the borders and in former Arab lands,[11] duplicating the Jewish population of Israel.[190][191] Some 300,000 arrived from Asian and North African nations as part of the Jewish exodus from Arab and Muslim countries.[192] Among them, the largest group (over 100,000) was from Iraq. The remaining came mostly from Europe, including 136,000 from the 250,000 displaced Jews of World War II living in refugee camps and urban centers in Germany, Austria, and Italy,[193] and more than 270,000 coming from Eastern Europe,[194] mainly Romania and Poland (over 100,000 each).

Many of the Jewish immigrants from Arab and Muslim countries were forcibly expelled by their governments, while others left, fleeing either antisemitic violence, pogroms and government persecution brought on by the war or by political instability, or left to settle in Israel motivated for Zionist convictions or to find a better economic and secure home in the West. They constituted the first wave of a total of 800,000–1,000,000 Jews who over the course of the next thirty years would flee or be expelled from the Arab world.[192] Approximately 680,000 of them immigrated to Israel; the rest mostly settled in Europe (mainly France) or the Americas.[195]

Israel initially relied on Jewish Agency-run tent camps known as immigrant camps to accommodate displaced Jews from Europe and Muslim nations. In the 1950s, these were transformed into transition camps, where living conditions were improved and tents were replaced with tin dwellings. Unlike the situation in the immigrant camps, when the Jewish Agency provided for immigrants, residents of the transition camps were required to provide for themselves. These camps began to decline in 1952, with the last one closing in 1963. The camps were largely transformed permanent settlements known as development towns, while others were absorbed as neighborhoods of the towns they were attached to, and the residents were given permanent housing in these towns and neighborhoods.[196]

Most development towns eventually grew into cities. Some Jewish immigrants were also given the vacant homes of Palestinian refugees. There were also attempts to settle Jewish refugees from Arab and Muslim countries in moshavim (cooperative farming villages), though these efforts were only partially successful, as they had historically been craftsmen and merchants in their home countries, and did not traditionally engage in farm work.


After the war, Israeli and Palestinian historiographies differed on the interpretation of the events of 1948:[197] in the West the majority view was of a tiny group of vastly outnumbered and ill-equipped Jews fighting off the massed strength of the invading Arab armies; it was also widely believed that the Palestinian Arabs left their homes on the instruction of their leaders.[198]

From 1980, with the opening of the Israeli and British archives, some Israeli historians have developed a different account of the period. In particular, the role played by Abdullah I of Jordan, the British government, the Arab aims during the war, the balance of force and the events related to the Palestinian exodus have been nuanced or given new interpretations.[198] Some of them are still hotly debated among historians and commentators of the conflict today.[199]


See also


  1. 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Oren 2003, p. 5.
  2. Morris (2008), p.260.
  3. Morris, 2008, p. 332.
  4. Morris, 2008, pp. 400, 419
  5. 5.0 5.1 Gelber (2006), p.12.
  6. Pollack, 2004; Sadeh, 1997
  7. David Tal,War in Palestine, 1948: Israeli and Arab Strategy and Diplomacy,Routledge 2004, p.174.
  8. Benny Morris (2008), p. 180 and further
  9. Rogan and Shlaim 2007 p. 99.
  10. Cragg 1997 pp. 57, 116.
  11. 11.0 11.1 Morris, 2001, chap. VI.
  12. Morris, 2008, pp. 66–69
  13. UNITED NATIONS: General Assembly: A/RES/181(II): 29 November 1947: Resolution 181 (II). Future government of Palestine.
  14. Krämer 2011. p.307.
  15. Fischbach 2005 p.293
  16. Flint 2012 p.139
  17. Makdisi 2010 pp.245–6
  18. Lockman 1996, p.340
  19. Khalaf 1991, p.153
  20. Data from the Report of UNSCOP – 1947
  21. Pappe, 2006, p. 35 Pappe sources this to a speech given by the Pakistani representative to the United Nations, Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, on 28 November 1947 which can be read here [1]
  22. El-Nawawy, 2002, p. 1-2
  23. Morris, 2001, p. 190.
  24. Heller 2001, pp.275–276
  25. Gold, 2007, p. 134
  26. Morris, 2008, p. 50, p. 66-67, p. 70-72.
  27. Morris (2008), p. 76
  28. Efraïm Karsh (2002), p. 30
  29. Benny Morris (2003), p. 101
  30. Yoav Gelber 2006 pp.16–21.
  31. Benny Morris (2008), p. 101
  32. Henry Laurens La Question de Palestine, Vol.2, Fayard, 2007 p.67.
  33. Yoav Gelber (2006), pp. 51–56
  34. Dominique Lapierre et Larry Collins (1971), chap. 7, pp. 131–153
  35. Benny Morris (2003), p. 163
  36. Dominique Lapierre et Larry Collins (1971), p. 163
  37. Benny Morris (2003), p. 67
  38. Yoav Gelber (2006), p. 85
  39. Henry Laurens (2005), p. 83
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  41. Baylis Thomas, How Israel was Won: A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Lexington Books 1999 p.65:'the military actions were, at first, left to unofficial forces, the Irgun and LEHI. These groups, officially condemned by the Jewish Agency for their terrorism, were permitted to operate largely without check’.
  42. John B. Quigley,Palestine and Israel: A Challenge to Justice, Duke University Press, 1990 p.59:'The Haganah, Irgun and LEHI secretly coorddinated strategy in the early months of 1948. But two days after the Deir Yassin attack, the Irgun and Haganah concluded a formal pact of cooperation. The Haganah agreed to try to keep the press from denouncing Irgun terrorism and to ask Britain to stop demanding the disbanding of Zionist terrorist organizations. The Irgun and Haganah thereafter held regular strategy conferences.'
  43. John Bowyer Bell,Terror Out of Zion,Transaction Publishers, (1977) 2009 pp.142–3.On the Tenuat Hameri pact, and pp.292-3on Haganah's David Shaltiel's foreknowledge and coordination of the assault on Deir Yassin.
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  45. Benny Morris (2003), p. 242
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  1. Yoav Gelber (1 January 2006). Palestine 1948: War, Escape And The Emergence Of The Palestinian Refugee Problem. Sussex Academic Press. pp. 306. ISBN 978-1-84519-075-0. Retrieved 13 July 2013. ""Instructions called for demolition of villages that could not be held permanently. Another paragraph detailed the method for taking over an Arab village: Surround the village and search it (for weapons). In case of resistance — annihilate the armed force and expel the population beyond the border... If there is no resistance, a garrison should be stationed in the village. . . The garrison commander should expropriate all weapons, radio receivers and vehicles. All political suspects should be arrested. After consulting the appropriate political authorities, appoint local institutions for administering the village internal affairs. The text clarified unequivocally that expulsion concerned only those villages that would fight against the Hagana and resist occupation, and not all Arab hamlets. Similar guidelines related to the occupation of Arab neighborhoods in mixed towns. In his article written in 1961, Khalidi and those who followed in his footsteps presented the guideline instructing the Hagana units to expel the Arab villagers as the principal issue of Plan D. Furthermore, they have distorted its meaning by portraying it as a general order embracing all Arabs in all villages. The text, however, is clear enough: reading Plan D as it is, without deconstructing it to change its meaning, show that there is no correlation between the actual text, and the significance, background and outcomes that the Palestinian scholars and their Israeli colleagues assign it. These paragraphs of Plan D were of marginal significance, and their contribution to shaping a policy towards the Arab population was immaterial. Arab policies were decided either locally, by commanders in the field and their local advisors on Arab affairs, or by the Arabists within Ben- Gurion’s inner circle of advisors who advised their superiors. Ber, Pasternak and even Yadin did not pretend to be authorities on Arab affairs or any other issues of high policy. Their concerns were just military, and the scheme’s purpose was preparing for the Arab invasion, not expelling the Palestinians."" 
  2. — Benny Morris, 2004. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, pp. 602–604. Cambridge University Press; ISBN 978-0-521-00967-6. "It is impossible to arrive at a definite persuasive estimate. My predilection would be to opt for the loose contemporary British formula, that of 'between 600,000 and 760,000' refugees; but, if pressed, 700,000 is probably a fair estimate"; — The Israeli government mentioned much lower numbers.
    Memo US Department of State, 4 May 1949, FRUS, 1949, p. 973.: "One of the most important problems which must be clared up before a lasting peace can be established in Palestine is the question of the more than 700,000 Arab refugees who during the Palestine conflict fled from their homes in what is now Israeli occupied territory and are at present living as refugees in Arab Palestine and the neighbouring Arab states.";
    Memorandum on the Palestine Refugee Problem, 4 May 1949, FRUS, 1949, p. 984.: "Approximately 700,000 refugees from the Palestine hostilities, now located principally in Arab Palestine, Transjordan, Lebanon and Syria, will require repatriation to Israel or resettlement in the Arab states."
  3. Bernard Joseph (1960). The Faithful City: The Siege of Jerusalem, 1948. Simon and Schuster. p. 8. Retrieved 14 July 2013. ""For example, all the land mines used against Rommel came from Jewish factories in Palestine."" 
  4. Benny Morris (1 October 2008). 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. Yale University Press. pp. 185. ISBN 978-0-300-14524-3. Retrieved 14 July 2013. ""King Abdullah had always acknowledged Arab (as distinct from Jordanian) weakness, and his son, Prince Talal, openly predicted defeat.34 at the last moment, several leaders, including King Ibn Sagud and Azzam Pasha—to avert catastrophe—secretly appealed to the British to soldier on in Palestine for at least another year.35 Egypt's foreign minister, Khashaba, had already done so. He "wished they would remain, and suggested that it was their duty to do so."" 
  5. Yoav Gelber (1 January 2006). Palestine 1948: War, Escape and the Emergence of the Palestinian Refugee Problem. Sussex Academic Press. p. 138. ISBN 978-1-84519-075-0. Retrieved 14 July 2013. ""A war between Israel and the Arab States broke out immediately, and the Arab armies invaded Palestine."" 
  6. L. Carl Brown (17 January 2004). Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outsid. I.B.Tauris. pp. 126–. ISBN 978-1-86064-899-1. Retrieved 14 July 2013. ""...when the war ended in 1949, Israel was in control of about one-third more territory (some 2,500 square miles) than it had been allocated by the United Nations partition plan"" 


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